Sigmund Freud

An Outline of Psychoanalysis



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An Outline of Psychoanalysis

Sigmund Freud was born in 1856 in Moravia; between the ages of four and eighty-two his home was in Vienna: in 1938 Hitler's invasion of Austria forced him to seek asylum in London, where he died in the following year. His career began with several years of brilliant work on the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system. He was almost thirty when, after a period of study under Charcot in Paris, his interests first turned to psychology; and after ten years of clinical work in Vienna (at first in collaboration with Breuer, an older colleague) he invented what was to become psychoanalysis. This began simply as a method of treating neurotic patients through talking, but it quickly grew into an accumulation of knowledge about the workings of the mind in general. Freud was thus able to demonstrate the development of the sexual instinct in childhood and, largely on the basis of an examination of dreams, arrived at his fundamental discovery of the unconscious forces that influence our everyday thoughts and actions. Freud's life was uneventful, but his ideas have shaped not only many specialist disciplines, but also the whole intellectual climate of the twentieth century.

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SIGMUND FREUD

An Outline of Psychoanalysis

Translated by Helena Ragg-Kirkby
with an Introduction by Malcolm Bowie

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1

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Contents

Introduction by Malcolm Bowie

Translator's Preface

Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series

1 *Revision of the Dream-theory*

2 *Dreams and Occultism*

3 *The Analysis of the Psychical Personality*

4 *Fear and the Drives*

5 *Femaleness*

6 *Explanations, Applications, Orientations*

7 *On the Question of a* Weltanschauung

Notes

An Outline of Psychoanalysis

Part One: The Nature of Things Psychical

Chapter 1: the Psychical Apparatus

Chapter 2: the Theory of the Drives

Chapter 3: the Development of the Sexual Function

Chapter 4: Psychical Qualities

Chapter 5: Explanatory Notes Concerning the Interpretation of Dreams

Part Two: The Practical Task

Chapter 6: the Psychoanalytical Technique

Chapter 7: a Sample of Psychoanalytical Work

Part Three: What We Gain For Our Theory

Chapter 8: the Psychical Apparatus and the External World

Chapter 9: the Internal World

Notes

Introduction

On 16 January 1938, in the old hall of the Musikverein, Bruno Walter conducted the Vienna Philharmonic in a valedictory performance of Mahler's ninth symphony. The occasion was special in many ways. Walter was the work's dedicatee, and had given its premiere a quarter of a century before; the orchestra was Walter's own, as it had once been Mahler's; notables, including the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, were present in the hall, and F. W. Gaisberg, the pioneering record producer, was on hand with his technical assistants to commit the event to disc.[1] Listening to this extraordinary performance today, one becomes an eavesdropper on a vanished style of orchestral playing: the players, with their studied lilt, their poised rubato and their unanimous portamenti, are speaking in a shared local dialect. This is how Mahler himself made them sound, one imagines, and theirs is an artistic tradition, soon to be despoiled, that for a memorable hour or so on that winter evening was still perfectly coherent and intact.

Almost as moving as the coordinated sound of strings, woodwind and brass, however, are the murmur of the expectant audience at the start of the record, and the coughs and shufflings that enter the acoustic picture from time to time. Real people were there to hear Walter and his band play. People who had colds, or were uncomfortable in their seats. Jews and non-Jews were there

together, both in the ranks of the orchestra and in the auditorium. Despite the ingrained presence of antisemitism in the former capital of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and despite occasional outbursts from rabble-rousing politicians, the professional bourgeoisie of the city seemed to have its own codes of tolerance and took pride in the cultural cross-currents that ran through its social and artistic life. Yet within two months of this concert, the Anschluss was to divide this composite Viennese population irreversibly. The Vienna Philharmonic was to be 'Aryanized', and the Jews who had been in Walter's audience were, like those who had been players, to have an intolerable choice visited upon them: they could leave the country, stripped of their property and livelihood, or remain to face persecution at the hands of a murderous new political order.

Freud's second series of *Introductory Lectures* and his *Outline of Psychoanalysis* belong to this threshold moment in European history, and indeed offer their own muted commentary on the rise of Nazism and the impending destruction of the European Jews. Affinities between Freud and Mahler abound. They were born within four years of each other, inhabited the same social world and had acquaintances in common. Each recognized the other's genius, and, on one memorable afternoon in August 1910, Freud took Mahler on as a very short-term patient: at Mahler's request they strolled together through Leiden to discuss the composer's marital difficulties.[2] At a much deeper level the two temperaments were akin. Both men were ironists, artists in retrospection, enthusiasts for nature, and both had a keen sense of human limitation. Seen inside

the larger flux of natural growth and decay, the perturbations of the human individual were a Lilliputian sideshow, but neither of these commanding Viennese figures found this lack of proportion unduly discouraging. Freud's short paper 'On Transience', written during the First World War, could almost be a footnote to the *'Ewig…, ewig…'* ('Eternally…, eternally…') on which the final movement of Mahler's *Das Lied von der Erde* ends: 'As regards the beauty of Nature,' Freud had written, 'each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as eternal' (*'Was die Schönheit der Natur betrifft, so kommt sie nach jeder Zerstörung durch den Winter im nächsten Jahre wieder, und these Wiederkehr darfin Verhältnis zu unserer Lebensdauer als eine ewige bezeichnet werden'*).[3] For a moment at least, mankind could be rescued by natural beauty from his own littleness; beyond transience lay a thoroughly earthly vision of eternity.

The affinity between Freud and Mahler was, of course, much more than a mere convergence between two creative personalities. If we place the two of them in the company of Karl Kraus, Robert Musil, Joseph Roth, Italo Svevo, Arthur Schnitzler and other members of that extraordinary late-Habsburg generation, we can see them all as the bewildered but defiantly inventive denizens of a crumbling empire. They were all self-conscious latecomers in the history of a regime, and witnesses to the ending of a world. When Freud wrote the words 'Finis Austriae' in his diary on 12 March 1938 he was reacting to the German invasion that had begun that

morning, but he was also writing the epitaph for a culture that had been a long time dying and had talked to itself often of its own demise.[4]

An emphasis on endings and leave-takings certainly helps us to understand the tenor of these extraordinary times. The Musikverein concert, as a social occasion, redramatized the palpable sense of loss and regret that is already there in the notes of Mahler's score. Long before Walter raised his baton, the composer had set the stage for an event of this kind. Valediction came naturally to him, and there was now every reason for hearing his personal swansong as the slightly premature requiem for a threatened nation state. Freud, too, had anticipated the catastrophe that was about to envelope Austria. His anatomy of human destructiveness, born of the First World War and its aftermath, had been elaborated in successive essays of the 1920s, and his central concept of the *Todestrieb*, the death drive, had been launched, in part, to make sense of the recent mass slaughter that Europe had seen.[5] The psychoanalytic theory of the human drives, that is to say, had already been adjusted to take account of the continent's next massive spate of mechanized killing. But there is a real danger of misunderstanding Freud's writings of the 1930s if we place too much emphasis on their intimations of disaster.

The problem of historical understanding that these writings pose for modern readers springs at once into relief if we simply consider the cultural resonances of the place-name 'Marienbad'. This

Bohemian spa-town, now known again by its original Czech name Mariánské Lázně, has become an emblem of loss in its extreme form. For many writers, the mere naming of this resort conjures up the ghostly residue of an otherwise irrecoverable central European past. In the film and 'cine-novel' *L'Année dernière à Marienbad,* jointly created by Alain Resnais and Alain Robbe-Grillet during the early 1960s, the retrospection to which modern lovers may fall victim is decked out in cultural reminiscences.[6] The effort to regain access to a personal past somehow involves palatial architecture, grandly displayed on screen, just as the current sexual desires of the protagonists are bodied forth in the mouldings, carvings and stucco embellishments of this or that late Baroque interior. The film makes use of the Nymphenburg and Schleissheim palaces outside Munich rather than Marienbad itself, but the title of the work has already prepared the viewer for such displacements: whether as a personal memory, or as a historical reference point, or as a promise of therapeutic benefit, Marienbad, like the other great spas, is already lost. W. G. Sebald, in his haunting last book, *Austerlitz,* lays out a similar scenario. Marienbad, for the eponymous secondary narrator of the novel, is still all there, a real place, on the map and visitable, but at the same time it is mute and inscrutable: 'I tried to explain that something or other unknown wrenched at my heart here in Marienbad, something very obvious like an ordinary name or a term which one cannot remember for the sake of anyone or anything in the world'.[7]

If we move back in time only as far as 1936, however, the same town is alive with visitors and animated human exchange. Marienbad was the venue for the 14th International Psychoanalytical Congress. Although it had been chosen in part to allow Anna Freud to return at short notice to Vienna if her ailing father's health deteriorated further, the place had numerous other advantages: comfortable accommodation, good transport links, a central location within the European land-mass and a long history of high-level international parleying. The Emperor Franz Josef had visited Edward VII during one of the king's regular sojourns there. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and a kaleidoscopic array of czars, viziers, presidents and princesses had passed through in recent decades. And the town had also been hospitable to ordinary people from across Europe: taking the waters was a fad that flowed easily across boundaries of class and culture. Jews from the professional bourgeoisie in Berlin and Vienna came there, together with rabbis from Warsaw or from far-flung *shtetls*.[8] The leading Yiddish writer of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sholem Aleichem, gave the title *Marienbad* to a fond satirical portrait of these visitors to the spa: in a series of letters to and from home, the passions and anxieties of a widely distributed Yiddish-speaking population are distilled.[9]

Remembering the cosmopolitan busyness of this single town in its heyday, and holding off for a moment from the images of desolation that the place has attracted in the decades since the Holocaust, we can begin to rediscover an important quality of robustness in

psychoanalysis itself during these years. Freud himself was continuing to undergo painful treatment for cancer of the jaw in the mid thirties and was subject to bouts of severe discouragement, but the view of the human mind that he had formulated in the early years of the century was flourishing internationally. That view, even as it was monitored by Ernest Jones and others intent on maintaining its doctrinal purity, was being adapted and pluralized by the analytical community at large. It was at the Marienbad Congress in 1936 that Jacques Lacan made his professional debut as an analyst, and that his concept of the 'mirror phase' was launched on its own eventful career.[10] It was at this conference, too, that the competition between the followers of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud as theorists of child development entered a decisive new phase. Psychoanalysis was by now sure enough of itself if not to welcome serious internal dissent then at least to sustain it reasonably open-mindedly when it began to well up.

Marienbad is not empty but full, therefore, if we transport ourselves back to this Congress. Ernest Jones, addressing the delegates as president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, paid tribute to Czechoslovakia 'as an island of freedom surrounded by totalitarian states', and the Congress itself was a standard-bearer for free intellectual exchange and bracing disagreement.[11] If we look forward from this fertile moment into the war years and beyond, we can see that the later politics of the psychoanalytic movement are already there in an early draft form. The debate between Kleinians and Anna Freudians was to dominate

the life of the British Psychoanalytical Society in the years 1941–5, and Lacan, building on the ideas launched in his 'mirror phase' paper, was to establish a psychoanalytic tradition of his own from the 1950s onwards. The sheer staying power of these disagreements is astonishing. The 'controversial discussions', as the wartime disputes came to be called, have continued indefinitely.[12] The schism between Lacan and the International Psychoanalytical Association became a central feature of Freudian thinking as it spread globally, and remains so to this day. The psychoanalytic institutions of the early twenty-first century are much more than a distant after-effect of the Marienbad encounters: they are a materialization of the tensions – the thought-sustaining differences of theoretical temper – that had declared themselves, decades earlier, in a convenient and hospitable Bohemian resort.

What makes the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: Second Series,* seen in the context of Freud's personal life, so fascinating is that, for all their intellectual complexity, they could easily not have been written at all. They are not a book born of internal necessity, as *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* had been. When Freud began to write these lectures, he had already completed the long series of moral and cultural essays begun with *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in 1920; he had already produced a number of popularizing works on the basic tenets of psychoanalysis; and he had recently reported himself exhausted as a writer and empty of notable new ideas. One of his main motives in taking up his pen again, after two very lean years of literary

production, was a straightforward commercial one. The *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag,* which had been established at the end of the First World War as a private publishing house for the dissemination of Freud's insights, was by now in a precarious financial state. Psychoanalysis had spread at great speed around the world and had attracted many distinguished adherents and admirers, but this did not mean that its new publications, especially those of a technical kind, could be expected to sell. Indeed they sold poorly, and the *Verlag* was in crisis. Freud's hope was that a further introductory work from himself, and one that also contained a detailed review of recent extensions and applications of his theory, would help to rescue the firm. If other people could write for profit on the Freudian view of mankind, perhaps Freud himself, exploiting an advantage that no one else had, could join their number.[13]

The new *Introductory Lectures* are an occasional work, therefore, and an informal and digressive one at that. Although Freud, as he wrote, imagined an audience of the kind he had had nearly twenty years before for the original series, and used a conversational idiom appropriate to the lecture-theatre, these pages were never intended for public performance. Yet writing of this kind, half-pretending to be spontaneous speech, proves in its published form to be a flexible vehicle for a characteristic late-Freudian dialogue between certainty and doubt. He holds his own theory of the unconscious to be true in its broad outlines, but subject to continual correction and refinement in its particulars. That theory gains strength from the empirical observation of patients and from close attention to the

stories they tell about themselves, and it must be prepared to reposition itself as new material becomes available. Freud by this stage in his career had become accustomed to the mutability of theoretical notions, his own included, and is able to think of psychoanalysis, the whole of it, as a set of transient conventions destined in due course to be supplanted, or to be integrated into a new science of mankind. Until either of these destinies is fulfilled, however, psychoanalysis must be protected from its detractors and celebrated for its discoveries. Defenders of a provisional truth must be prepared to be obdurate until a truer truth is found.

The sheer delight that Freud takes in the plasticity of his own thinking is nowhere more evident than in his lecture on 'Fear and the Drives'. The drives–or 'instincts' as they were known throughout James Strachey's Standard Edition of Freud's works – had been a tantalizing object of enquiry from an early stage in his career. 'The more deeply we probe in our study of psychical processes, the more we become aware of their richness and complexity,' he now writes, reminding himself and his reader that a coherent and stable theory of the drives is a precious navigational aid for those who venture into the mental interior (p. 84, below). Having a clear view of the fundamental drives was crucial for anyone who wanted to avoid being swallowed into an uncontrollable luxuriance of mental causes and effects. And if those drives turned out to be few in number and patterned by a single great contrast or contrariety, so much the more useful they would be to psychoanalysis when it was called on to present its scientific credentials.

The problem, however, is that the very component of Freud's theory that should have offered a bulwark against mutability was itself subject to mutation: 'The theory of the drives is, so to speak, our mythology. The drives are mythic in essence, magnificent in their elusiveness' (p. 86). With great relish, Freud then tells the story of his own efforts to trap this elusive prey, and in so doing to transform teasing myth into true science. First of all, he had found his key contrast and his key endorsement of the principle of parsimony in the difference between the sexual and self-preservative drives. But thinking about the matter further, and seeking to take account of the human destructiveness that was visible all around him in war-ravaged Europe, he came to the view that sex and self-preservation were intimately linked life-forces, and that their complement and counterpart was to be found in a death-drive. The story of this change is a simple one in that both pairs of terms have the same task to perform: they are both called on to stabilize and elucidate the turbulent mental field. It is just that the second is now thought to perform the task better.

Yet the story is not complete at this point. Having reminded his reader of the benefits that a bipolar presentation of the drives may be expected to bring, Freud takes flight again into speculation and uncertainty. However firmly the psychoanalytic theorist may wish to draw his demarcating line between the drives of 'life' and 'death', actual mental material never quite seems to behave in accordance with his prescription. The mind dotes upon hybrids and amphibians, and so does Freud:

we now propose that this relationship [of confluence between Eros and aggression] is paradigmatic, and that all drive-impulses that we are able to look at involve such 'mergences' or 'fusions' of the two kinds of drive – in all sorts of different proportions of course. In the process, the erotic drives would introduce the diversity of their sexual aims into the mix, whereas the others [that is the destructive ones] would only allow of a variety of mitigations and debasements in their one unchanging tendency. This postulate paves the way for studies that in due course may acquire great significance for our understanding of pathological processes. For mergences may also disintegrate, and we may reasonably suppose that these 'drive de-mergences' affect function in the most severe way But these views are still too new; nobody has tried so far to put them to any practical use (pp. 95–6).

Suddenly, in passages of this kind, an open future of scientific hypothesis and guesswork comes into view. Mental events, human dispositions and pathological symptoms are all alike in one respect at least: all of them are composite in character and bring distinct sorts of desire together in varying ratios. Separate forces need to be thought about in their propensity for 'mergence', and merged forces in their tendency to come apart. Freud's theory of the drives seems to be looking beyond its own hard-won pattern of symmetries into a world of mutating categories and conceptual fluctuation. Psychoanalysis is at once complete and hedged about with unfinished business.

Much of Freud's writing later in this series of lectures has the same quality of syncopated internal debate. When, for example, he begins to ask himself what light his doctrine might now be in a position to shed on such matters as religion, politics and education, he veers between attitudes of rebellion and acquiescence towards the established social order. Psychoanalysis has a message of

emancipation for politicians and educators but must not be seen consorting with unruly elements in either sphere; it encourages the free expression of desire, but is prevented by its scientific vocation from descending more than a step or two towards bacchanalian revelry. Religion, too, is at an uncomfortable crossroads for the analytic observer: it is objectionable in so far as it actively inhibits intellectual enquiry, but yet it so plainly springs from the troubled infancy of humankind that it deserves to be treated with forbearance. The religious believer presents symptoms of exactly the sort that an analytic practitioner meets from day to day in the consulting room. Not the least of the virtues that Freud claims for his system in the final lecture is that it allows the speculative intellect to oscillate in this way: it has room within it for an ebb and flow of sympathy on the clinician's part; it thrives upon the fusion and de-fusion of ideas. In the end, however, there is something that is too deliciously irresponsible about any form of theorizing that rides the waves of uncertainty in order to explore merely possible worlds: 'Our best hope for the future is that the intellect – call it the scientific spirit, call it reason – will over the course of time establish a dictatorship over the human psyche (p. 160).' Freud's sudden switch of direction is characteristic. Indeed he had been correcting himself in similar terms over several decades of speculative adventure. Psychoanalysis was not poetry, prophecy or divination, but science pure and simple; it must examine fantasy but not become fantasy; it must be tolerant of human wishes but not yield to wishfulness in its own procedures. The rule of science was alone

among dictatorships in having so much self-denial in it, and so much benevolence towards the wayward desires of human beings at large.

An Outline of Psychoanalysis was Freud's last book, and the personal circumstances in which it was written are extraordinary. After the resignation of Schuschnigg on 11 March 1938 and the German annexation of Austria that began on the following day, Freud was gradually persuaded that he had to leave Vienna, but leaving was a complicated and risk-filled matter, and nearly three months elapsed before arrangements were finally in place for him to travel byway of Paris to London.[14] Towards the end of this period he began work on a brief essay designed, in his own opening words, 'to offer as it were a dogmatic conspectus of psychoanalysis by bringing together all its doctrines in the most concentrated and clear-cut form' (p. 175). One of the distinctive pleasures this essay affords is, as Lionel Trilling put it, that of 'listening to a strong, decisive, self-limiting voice uttering statements to which I can give assent'.[15] Freud's defence of scientific rationality is as firm as it has ever been, and contains a compelling account of the interplay between empirical observation and conjecture. Science, he again insists, has no place in it for occult qualities or superstitious nostrums. To be scientific is to bring a finely tuned power of inference to bear upon the world of facts, including the special order of invisible material facts to which thoughts, feelings, wishes and intentions belong:

> The processes with which [psychology] is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those of other sciences – of, say, chemistry or physics – but it is possible to establish which laws they obey, to trace their mutual relationships and interdependencies seamlessly over long stretches; in other words, to reach what one calls an 'understanding' of the relevant area of natural phenomena. This can't happen without our making assumptions and creating new terms – but these should not be despised as testifying to any embarrassment on our part. On the contrary, they should be treasured as an enriching of science, (p. 187)

The clarity and nuance of Freud's presentation in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* are as remarkable as its tone. It is the finest of his expository works, and when one remembers the conditions of its birth its achievement can be seen to be much more than a stylistic one: these pages are a courageous act of defiance directed against disease, infirmity and what Freud had recently termed the 'almost prehistoric barbarism' of Nazi ideology.[16]

It would be misguided to think of the *Outline* as a diplomatic retelling of an already familiar tale, or as an old man's attempt to set down a safe consensual view of the psychoanalytic project, for the work has its own intellectual drama and its own atmosphere of risk. From the beginning of his career as the inventor and proponent of a new mental science, Freud had been aware that his views possessed huge powers of provocation. Right-minded people had no wish to be told about infantile sexuality, the upthrust of unconscious desire into daily life, or the scandalous passions that raged inside the nuclear family, but Freud was calmly intent on telling them about such things. In the *Outline,* however, he devotes less attention to the headline news that he had previously put into circulation than

to an underlying scandal that was if anything even more sensational.

Running counter to a time-honoured Western prejudice in favour of consciousness both as the seat of personal identity and as the defining characteristic of the psychical, Freud's new science had evidence from the consulting room to suggest that 'the psychical in itself is unconscious'. Consciousness was a fragile and momentary affair, and its event-sequence had too many gaps in it to be intelligible in its own terms alone. These gaps could be satisfactorily filled only by reference to an alternative mental sequence. The unconscious was a postulate rather than a directly observable state of affairs, but without its concealed logic and its continuity of action the contents of consciousness made incomplete sense. Freud's vision of the conscious mind perched precariously and parasitically on the outer surface of an implacable unconscious had its grandeur: in conditions like these, heroic powers of inference were required by anyone seeking to bring different mental zones, systems, or logics together into a coherent overall model of the 'psychical apparatus'. But the disproportion between the conscious and unconscious components of the mind gives a strange air of self-apology to Freud's defence of science and reason, for science, even with its inferential procedures working at full stretch, is still no more than a specialised and well-ordered version of consciousness. Psychoanalysis, even as it declares its allegiance to the scientific attitude, is building its understanding of the world on a flimsy

foundation; it is endlessly reminded, by the mental stuff on which it chooses to dwell, of the limitations of its warrant.

Freud's doctrine re-emerges, then, in this final, concentrated exposition of it, as a psychomachia, a conflict within the soul of man. The drama of psychoanalysis was always to be found in a series of characteristic tensions, but now, at this very late hour, Freud is able to rehearse these with a disinterestedness and tranquillity that are quite new. Here is a theoretical edifice that is also a therapy; a movement away from the mental underworld that cannot be accomplished without re-entering its troubled force-field at every turn; an attempt to free human desire from its traumas and fixations, but one that keeps on turning up new evidence of unfreedom in the material it inspects.

The works collected in this volume are the products of their time, but it would be shortsighted to think of them only in that way – as, say, an *Abschied,* a farewell to the fertile Austrian culture in which Freud's new mental science had been born forty years earlier. Transience, fugitiveness and a certain valedictory intensity are all present in what follows, but not because external events have imposed these qualities. Such themes are part of a natural historian's vision of the human mind as it lives and dies inside the larger process of nature. In order to understand the continuing importance of these late works, we need to pass from the dark moments in which they were written to the texture of their arguments, just as we may find ourselves passing, while we listen to

Bruno Walter's first recording of Mahler's ninth, from the Austrian tragedy that was unfolding inside and outside the hall to the complex harmonic dramas of the work itself.

What remains to be said of the affinity between Freud and Mahler? Schoenberg, who was a great critic as well as a great composer, wrote of Mahler's last completed symphony in terms that readers of Freud's *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* will find familiar:

> His Ninth is most strange. In it, the author hardly speaks as an individual any longer. It almost seems as though this work must have a concealed author who used Mahler merely as his spokesman, as his mouthpiece. This symphony is no longer couched in the personal tone. It consists, so to speak, of objective, almost passionless statements of a beauty which becomes perceptible only to one who can dispense with animal warmth and feels at home in spiritual coolness.[17]

It is Freud's objectivity, his willingness to be a spokesman or mouthpiece for the divided human mind, that gives this last book its enduring power. In this 'dogmatic conspectus' of psychoanalysis an impersonal beauty is to be found.

Notes

1. For Gaisberg's own memories of this occasion, see his *Music on Record* (London: Robert Hale, 1946), 150–51.

2. Contrasting accounts of this incident, seen from the Freudian and Mahlerian viewpoints respectively, are to be found in Ernest Jones's *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work,* vol. II (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), 89, and Donald Mitchell's *Gustav Mahler: The Wunderhorn Years* (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 74.

3. Mahler's *The Song of the Earth* was composed in 1907–8 and first performed, under Bruno Walter, in 1911. Freud's paper, which was first published in 1916, is to be found in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, translated from the German under the General Editorship of James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–74), XIV, 305–7. The sentence quoted is to be found on 305. Other references to this edition are given in the form, volume number + page number.

4. A detailed chronicle of Freud's activities during the last years of his life is to be found in *The Diary of Sigmund Freud, 1929–1939. A Record of the Final Decade,* translated and annotated, with an introduction, by Michael Molnar (London: Hogarth Press, 1992). Freud's entry for 12 March 1938 is to be found on 229–30.

5. The story of the emergence and development of the concept 'death drive' in Freud's writings is a complicated one. A convenient

starting point for any detailed exploration of the issues involved is to be found in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (XVIII, 7–64) (see in particular 38–41).

6. The text of Robbe-Grillet's screenplay, together with 48 stills from the film itself, is to be found in *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* (Paris: Minuit, 1961).

7. W. G. Sebald, *Austerlitz,* translated from the German by Anthea Bell (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2001), 300.

8. A lively portrait of the town during its heyday is to be found in Sigmund Müinz's memoir, *King Edward VII at Marienbad: Political and Social Life at the Bohemian Spas* (London: Hutchinson, 1934).

9. Sholem Aleichem's epistolary novel, first published in 1911, has been translated from the Yiddish by Aliza Shevrin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982).

10. Lacan's contribution to the Marienbad congress is described by Elisabeth Roudinesco in her *Jacques Lacan,* translated by Barbara Bray (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 107–117.

11. Ernest Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work,* vol. III (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), 223.

12. A detailed record of these discussions is to be found in *The Freud-Klein Controversies,* edited by Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner (London: Routledge, 1991)

13. On the *Verlag* in crisis, and Freud's decision to write a new series of *Introductory Lectures,* see Ernest Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work,* vol. III (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), 177–87.

14. Freud's departure from Vienna is memorably recounted both in the third volume of Ernest Jones's biography and in Michael Molnar's edition of Freud's diary (see above, n. 4).

15. Lionel Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination* (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1951), 291.

16. *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), in XXIII, 54.

17. Arnold Schoenberg, *Style and Idea,* edited by Leonard Stein (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 470.

Translator's Preface

My first encounter with Freud (on a train to Hamburg ten years ago – my copy of *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* still contains a German chocolate-wrapper bookmark to prove it) filled me with admiration and frustration in pretty much equal measure. Translating his essays has not changed my mind. On the one hand, Freud delights us with the most wonderfully lucid and compelling theories (narcissism, childhood sexuality, repression, the death-drive, penis envy et al.); on the other, he irritates us with outlandish speculations that are at times so difficult to grasp that they are barely comprehensible at all (the phylogenetic Ice Age and eating the primal father come to mind).

When I first became confused by Freud, I feared that the problem might lie with my inadequate German, so I resorted to reading the old English *Standard Edition* as well. However, the fascinating thing about this was that it tended in fact to be even less clear than the original. Translations such as 'anaclitic', 'conative', 'thaumaturgical', 'protasis' or 'apodosis' didn't help me to grasp what Freud might mean; modal verbs were frequently mistranslated; and the wonderfully expressive German subjunctive often not rendered at all. At this point, I rather arrogantly (or innocently) thought that, were I ever to translate Freud, I would come up with the most wonderfully lucid version possible; a version that would clear up

the *Standard Edition's* many obscurities. Needless to say, all I have realized is that it is more or less impossible to do so; in fact, I have come to admire the original translators' achievement far more than I ever did before (not least because they didn't have the benefit of the wonderful Trevor Jones Oxford Harrap dictionary – if I have struggled with words beginning with letters later than 'R', his death is entirely to blame!).

If one were to list all the individual problems involved in translating Freud, the list would be as long as the actual translation. However, various words and concepts do warrant special mention here, as they present potential problems to the reader too.

The most fundamental problem is perhaps this: how to translate Freud's central terms *'Ich', 'Über-Ich',* and *'Es'*. These have traditionally been translated as 'ego', 'super-ego', and 'id' – and have as such become part of the English language. However, I have long disliked them for a variety of reasons. First, they have always seemed far too 'Latinate' for Freud, whose German is for the most part delightfully free of pomposity and fancy jargon; in any case, I have always felt that, had he wanted to use these or similar terms, he would have done so. Second, the English word 'ego' – for me, at any rate – has connotations which it doesn't have in Freud (such as 'egotistical', 'egocentric', 'ego-boost', 'ego-trip' and the like). Third, 'id' seems simply wrong for *'das Es',* which works in German in a way in which it can't do in English. What *'das Es'* implies is the *impersonal* form of the pronoun. As John Reddick's splendid footnote

in his New Penguin Freud translation of *The Ego and the Id* explains, this impersonal usage is not only very common in German, but can also 'convey an unnerving sense of a particular and yet unidentifiable, unbiddable presence or force that can assert itself both within us, and in the world around us'. So, where in English one might say 'I shudder when I think of it', German can more ominously say 'Es schaudert mich, *wenn ich daran denke'*.[*] Moreover, it is striking that Freud often personifies the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich* – but never personifies the *Es:* it seems, rather, to be a kind of swirling abyss, a realm of 'otherness' over which we have no control. Finally, the word *'Über* (or even the umlaut-less 'Uber') is now becoming part of the English language too: 'Übermensch' has long since been English-ified, but we'll now regularly find 'Über-babes', 'Über-clubs', and 'Über-photographers' (to mention but a few) in the broadsheets. Why not *Über-Ich* as well? Thus the three terms have been left in German.

Several other Freudian terms that have made their way into our general consciousness thanks to the *Standard Edition* were almost as challenging. 'Cathexis' is one such. The German noun is *'Besetzung'* (verb: *'besetzen'*, traditionally rendered as 'to cathect'), and part of the problem is that it is impossible to know exactly what Freud had in mind when he chose the term. But it seems to me that 'cathexis' serves only to muddy the waters. I have used 'investment'/'to invest', on the grounds that most English speakers would know what was meant if somebody said they had 'invested' a great deal of energy in a particular task, or love in a particular person. (For the

record, despite the above mention of 'Über-babes', *'Überbesetzung'* is translated as 'hyper-investment'!)

The next obvious problem was with the German word *'Trieb',* traditionally translated as 'instinct'. This was, mercifully, an easy decision: like most modern translators, I opted for 'drive', in order to capture the sense of thrust and vigour that the German implies. That, though, is by no means perfect; indeed, Freud was quite right when he described *'Trieb'* in 'The Question of Lay Analysis' as 'a word that many modern languages envy us' (*'ein Wort, um das uns viele moderne Sprachen beneiden', Die Frage der Laienanalyse,* III).

'Topisch' caused a few more agonies: I have always found the traditional 'topographical' far too long-winded, but as 'topical' had, I felt, too many connotations of skin-cream, I reluctantly plumped for the former. *'Angst'* was also difficult: I ultimately rejected 'anxiety', and decided in favour of straightforward 'fear' (though, as the essay 'Fear and the Drives' shows, fear is anything other than straightforward in Freud's view). I dismissed the dreadful 'symptomatic parapraxis' as a rendering of *'Fehlleistung'*, preferring the word 'slip', given that we are all now familiar with the concept of Freudian slips. *'Psychisch'*: 'psychic' – or 'psychical'? I had decided upon the former until I came to read through my final version, and found it somewhat reminiscent of Glenn Hoddle and Eileen Drewery, so resorted to 'psychical' instead, mouthful though it is. *'Die Weiblichkeit'* (Lecture 5) posed its own problems. In the past, it has been translated as both 'the psychology of women' and

‘femininity’, but neither seemed appropriate. For one thing, the essay doesn’t solely deal with women’s psychology, but with traits that we have traditionally taken to be ‘female’ – in other words, characteristics that a man could equally well possess. ‘Femininity’, for its part, suggests to me something along the lines of fluttering your eyelashes and sitting with your knees together. Thus I opted for the slightly ungainly ‘femaleness’ instead.

Perhaps the most tricky words of all, though, are those that don’t have any one reasonably satisfactory English equivalent. The most striking of these is *‘Instanz’*. This is a word that could give any translator a sleepless night or two, for not only does it have no real linguistic equivalent in English, but it has no real cultural equivalent either. As a result, this translation renders it as ‘entity’, ‘voice’, ‘force’, and ‘authority’ depending on the context. However, none of them really captures the central thrust of *‘Instanz’,* namely some kind of implacable judicial or quasi-judicial authority making judgements about what we are and are not allowed to do, and tormenting us for real or perceived misdemeanours with punishments and dreadful feelings of guilt (something that Freud’s vision has in common with that of fellow Austro-Hungarian Franz Kafka – who had, of course, read his Freud!).

‘Geist’ is another such word. I chose ‘spirit’, though I realize that it – along with *any* translation – doesn’t even begin to cover all the subtleties of the German word (which encompasses ‘spirit’, ‘mind’, ‘intellect’, ‘intelligence’, ‘mental attitude’, ‘imagination’,

'atmosphere' to name but a few). *'Einstellung'* posed similar problems as, again, there is no direct English equivalent. Like *'Instanz',* it is translated here depending on its context, as 'stance', 'attitude', or 'perspective'. *'Inhalt'* becomes both 'content' and 'material'; and the bothersome *'Erziehung'* is rendered interchangeably as 'education' and 'upbringing' in the 'Explanations, Applications, Orientations' essay, as the German word encompasses both English ideas.

The next problem specific to translating Freud lies in his tendency to create peculiar compound nouns such as *'Kompromißbildung', 'Symptombildung', 'Verdrängungswiderstand', 'Triebregung',* and *'Wunschregung'* (and many more besides) – compounds that, cunningly enough, lend his theories an air of scientific fact. So, although the English compounds may sound rather unpleasant ('compromise-formation', 'symptom-formation', 'repression-resistance', 'drive-impulse', and 'wish-impulse' are hardly Shakespeare or Keats), they do at least have the merit of preserving the bizarreness of Freud's German.

Of course, this translation posed a number of problems that aren't necessarily specific to Freud – although his subject-matter means that they are more or less bound to come to light. The first of these is the simple *'das Kind'*. Obviously, there is no problem with translating this as 'the child'. But how do you carry on? In German, it's straightforward: *'das Kind'* is neuter, and leaves you with no alternative. We, however, are understandably resistant to calling a

child ‘it’ as a matter of course. To make matters even worse, though, English political correctness has interfered with the traditional and easy solution of using ‘he’: as anyone who has recently encountered a childcare manual will tesify, we are supposed to either a) alternate between the two; b) use ‘he or she’; c) use ‘she’ alone (which, for some reason, isn’t regarded as sexist); or d) repeat ‘the child’ (as in clumsy concoctions such as ‘the child will tell you when the child is ready to be fed’). One possible solution is offered by ‘their’ (e.g. ‘the child is in love with their mother’) – but it is deeply ugly. So I have generally resorted to ‘he’ and ‘his’, occasionally using ‘its’ if it seems to fit better in the context. My own dislike of political correctness aside, there is some justification for this: Freud *is* normally talking about male children; where he is clearly referring to girls (as in the ‘Femaleness’ essay), I have, of course, used ‘she’. In addition, there is one instance where he actually says ‘he (or she)’ (*‘er (oder sie)’)* and, again, I have taken my cue from him. *‘Menschheif’* and *‘der Mensch’* pose a similar problem and here, too, I make no apologies for adopting the old-fashioned but clear ‘mankind’ and ‘man’ where they fit better than ‘humankind’ and ‘humans’.

Finally, I should like to mention some people without whom this translation would be much the poorer. Trevor Jones I have already named; I would also like to thank Ellah Allfrey for taking on the unenviable task of typing up my manuscript; Anna South for commissioning it in the first place; and, *wie immer,* my fellow ‘de-Frauder’ John Reddick.

Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series

1

Revision of the Dream-theory[1]

Ladies and Gentlemen! If I have called you together again after a break of more than fifteen years to review with you the new developments or, perhaps, improvements in psychoanalysis during this intervening period it is only right and proper from more than one point of view that we should begin by looking at how things stand with the theory of dreams. This theory occupies a particular place in the history of psychoanalysis; it indicates a turning point. With it, analysis completed its transition from being a psychotherapeutic procedure to become depth psychology. Moreover, ever since then, the theory of dreams has remained the most characteristic and peculiar aspect of the young science; something with no counterpart in the rest of our knowledge; a piece of virgin territory, wrested from folklore and mysticism. The strangeness of its postulates has conferred on it the role of a shibboleth: its application distinguishes those who could become adherents of psychoanalysis from those for whom it would remain ultimately unfathomable. For me personally, it was something that I

could safely hang on to in those difficult times when the facts of neurosis, then unrecognized, tended to confuse my unpractised judgement. No matter how often I began to doubt the rightness of my tentative findings, if I succeeded in translating a senseless and muddled dream into a logical and intelligible psychical process on the part of the dreamer, I felt a renewed confidence that I was on the right track.

It is, therefore, of particular interest to us precisely in the case of the theory of dreams to trace two things. On the one hand it is interesting to trace the changes that psychoanalysis has undergone in this interval; and, on the other hand, to see what progress it has made in the meantime with regard to the extent to which our contemporaries understand and appreciate it. I shall warn you at the outset that you will be disappointed on both counts.

Let us flick through the back issues of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse* that bring together the authoritative works in our field. In the early volumes you will find a regular section entitled ‘On the Interpretation of Dreams’, which contains extensive contributions on various points of the theory of dreams. But the further you go, the more scarce such contributions become, and this regular section ultimately disappears altogether. Analysts act as if they had nothing more to say about dreams; as if the theory of dreams were a closed chapter. However, if you ask which parts of the dream-theory have been adopted by outsiders, by the psychiatrists and psychotherapists – who heat their soup on our fire

without, incidentally, being particularly grateful for the hospitality – by the so-called educated people who are wont to appropriate science's more striking conclusions; by the literati and by the general public as a whole – then the answer gives us little cause for satisfaction. A few formulas have become generally known, including ones that we have never represented such as the proposition that all dreams are sexual in nature: but precisely such important things as the fundamental difference between the manifest dream content and latent dream thoughts; the recognition that fear-dreams don't contradict the notion that the function of dreams is wish-fulfilment; the impossibility of interpreting a dream without possessing all the dreamer's relevant associations; and, above all, the realization that the essential thing about dreams is the process of dream-work, all seem to be more or less as alien to the general consciousness as they were thirty years ago. I may say this, as I have received countless letters during the course of this period, in which writers submit their dreams to me for interpretation or demand information about the nature of dreams: these are all people who claim to have read *The Interpretation of Dreams*, yet they betray their lack of understanding of our dream-theory in every sentence. This is not going to stop us from giving a coherent account of what we know about dreams. You will remember that last time I devoted a number of lectures to demonstrating how we came to understand this previously unexplained psychological phenomenon.

So: if somebody – a patient in analysis, for example – recounts one of his dreams to us, we assume that he has thereby communicated something to us, as he committed himself to do when he embarked upon analytical treatment. Admittedly, this is a communication made by unsuitable means, since the dream is in itself not a social utterance, not a means of communication. Nor, indeed, do we understand what the dreamer wished to tell us, and he himself knows no better than we do. Now, we are faced with having to make a speedy decision: either the dream is – as non-analytical doctors would assert – a sign that the dreamer slept badly; that not all the parts of his brain had uniformly come to rest; that individual parts wanted to carry on working under the influence of unknown stimuli but could only do so in a very incomplete fashion. If that is the case, then we would be right to concern ourselves no further with this product of nocturnal disturbance that has no psychical value. For what do we suppose that we could expect to gain from investigating it that would be useful for our purposes? Or, on the other hand – but it is clear that we have decided otherwise right from the outset. We have – admittedly, quite arbitrarily – assumed or postulated that even this incomprehensible dream must be a completely valid, meaningful and valuable psychical act that we can use in analysis in the same way as we can use any other type of communication. Only the result of our attempts can tell us whether we are right or not. If we do succeed in converting the dream into a valuable expression of this kind, we clearly have the prospect of

learning something new, of obtaining the types of communication that would otherwise have remained inaccessible to us.

Now, however, the difficulties of our task and the puzzles of our topics present themselves to us. How are we to set about converting the dream into a normal communication, and how do we explain the fact that part of what the patient is expressing has taken this form that is just as incomprehensible to him as it is to us?

You see, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this time I am going to portray this dogmatically rather than genetically. Our first step is to set out our new approach towards dreams by introducing two new concepts or names. We call what is normally referred to as the dream the 'dream-text' or the 'manifest' dream; and we call what we are looking for – that which we suppose to be so to speak behind the dream – the 'latent' dream thoughts. Then we can go on to phrase our two tasks in the following way: we have to convert the 'manifest' dream into the 'latent' one; and we have to show how the latter becomes the former in the dreamer's psyche. The first part of this is a practical task: it falls to the interpretation of dreams and requires a particular technique. The second is a theoretical task: it is meant to explain what we take to be the process of *dream-work,* and it can be no more than a theory. Both the technique of dream interpretation and the theory of dream-work have to be created from scratch.

Which of the two should we begin with? I believe the technique of dream interpretation should come first: it will prove to be much

more tangible and will make a more vivid impression on you.

Let us imagine, then, that the patient has recounted a dream that we are supposed to interpret. We have listened impassively, and did not start to reflect on what he was saying while he was still saying it. So what do we do next? We decide to concern ourselves as little as possible with what we have heard, with the manifest dream. Of course, this manifest dream displays all sorts of characteristics that are not entirely immaterial to us. It may be coherent and seamlessly constructed like a work of literature; or it may be incomprehensibly confused, almost like a delirium; it may contain absurd elements or jokes and apparently sophisticated conclusions; it may appear to be clear and sharp to the dreamer or murky and hazy; its images may demonstrate all the sensuous force of perceptions, or may be shadowy, like a breath of air; all sorts of different characteristics may find themselves sharing a single dream, scattered over several parts of it; and, finally, the dream may display an indifferent emotional tone or may be accompanied by the most powerful delightful or distressing sensations. Don't imagine that we dismiss this infinite diversity in manifest dreams: we shall return to this later and shall find that much of it can be used for the purposes of interpretation. For the time being, though, we shall leave it aside and shall take the main road that leads to the interpretation of dreams. That is to say, we call upon the dreamer likewise to free himself from the impression of the manifest dream, to turn his attention from the whole of the dream to its individual components,

and to tell us, one after the other, what every one of these components calls to his mind, what associations present themselves to him if he tackles them individually.

This is a curious technique, is it not? It is not the usual way to treat a communication or utterance. No doubt you also detect that there are certain assumptions lurking behind this procedure that are as yet unspoken. But let us proceed. In what order do we get the patient to deal with the component parts of his dream? Here, there are a number of routes open to us. We can simply follow the chronological order in which they emerged while the patient was recounting the dream. That is, so to speak, the strictest method, the classical one. Alternatively, we can ask the dreamer first of all to pick out the previous day's residua in the dream, as experience has taught us that practically every dream includes a memory-trace of or allusion to one or, frequently, several of the previous day's events; and if we follow these links, we have often found the bridge from the apparently remote dream world to the patient's real world at one fell swoop. Or alternatively we tell him to begin with those particular elements in the dream's content that strike him by being particularly clear or sensually powerful, for we know that it will be particularly easy for him to make associations in the case of these elements. It doesn't matter which of these ways we use to reach the associations we are looking for.

So there we are: we have these associations. They produce the most diverse things: memories of the previous day (the 'dream-day')

and of times long gone, deliberations, arguments for and against things, confessions and questions. Some of these come bubbling out of the patient; others cause him to hesitate for a while. Most of them are clearly related to an element of the dream – hardly surprising, as dreams are after all derived from these elements. However, it can also be the case that the patient prefaces them with the words: 'that doesn't seem to have anything at all to do with the dream; I'm just saying it because it springs to mind'.

If we listen to this wealth of associations, we soon notice that they have more than just their derivation in common with the dream's content. They throw a surprising light on all the parts of the dream, fill in the gaps between them, make sense of their peculiar combinations. It really is time for us to fully appreciate the relationship between the associations and the dream content. The dream appears as an abridged extract from these associations, assembled according to rules that, admittedly, are not yet fully grasped, and its elements seem to be like a representative elected by a mass of people. There is no doubt that our technique has enabled us to discover something that the dream is a substitute for, something wherein its psychical value lies – but something that no longer displays the off-putting peculiarity of the dream, its strangeness and its confusing nature.

But let there be no misunderstanding! The associations to the dream are not yet the latent dream thoughts. These are contained in the associations as if in a mother ley – and yet are not *completely*

contained in them. On the one hand, the associations provide far more than we need to formulate the latent dream thoughts, namely all the details, transitions, links, which the patient's intellect had to produce as it approached them. On the other hand, the associations frequently stopped just short of the actual dream thoughts: they only came close to them, only touched upon them in allusions. At that point we plunge in ourselves: we complete the allusions, draw irrefutable conclusions, openly express things that the patient's associations only touched upon. This sounds as if we were allowing our wit and will to play around with the material that the dreamer puts at our disposal, and as though we were misusing it in order to read things *into* his remarks that can't actually be read *out* of them; nor is it easy to prove the legitimacy of this procedure in an abstract portrayal of it. But you only have to try a dream analysis for yourself, or bury yourself in a well-described example of one from our literature, and you will be convinced of just how compellingly this kind of interpretative work proceeds.

While we are in our interpretation of dreams generally and chiefly dependent on the dreamer's associations, we nevertheless operate in a quite *in*dependent manner with regard to certain elements of the dream content. This is largely because we have to, for as a rule the associations break down at this point. We noted at an earlier stage that this always applies to the same elements; there are not many of these, and accumulated experience has taught us that they are to be regarded and interpreted as *symbols* for something else. Compared to other elements of the dream, one can

attribute a fixed – although not necessarily unambiguous – meaning to them, the scope of which is determined by particular rules that we are used to. Since we know how to translate these symbols (whereas the dreamer doesn't, although he himself used them) it can so happen that the meaning of a dream becomes immediately clear to us just as soon as we have heard the dream-text, even before we start making an effort to interpret it – while it remains a riddle to the dreamer himself. However, I have said so much about symbolism in the earlier lectures, about our knowledge of it and the problems it poses, that there is no need for me to repeat myself today.

That, then, is our method of dream interpretation. The next, and very well justified, question is this: can we interpret all dreams with its help? And the answer is: no, not all – and yet enough for us to be confident that it is a useful and legitimate method. But why not all? The answer that we have only recently arrived at has something important to teach us, something that immediately takes us into the psychical conditions in which dreams are formed. And that is: it can't apply to all dreams, because the work of dream interpretation is carried out in the face of a resistance which varies from being barely perceptible to being completely insurmountable – at any rate with the powers we currently have at our disposal. We can't overlook these manifestations of resistance during our work. At some point the associations are given without hesitation, and the first or second of them already gives us our explanation. At other points the patient falters and hesitates before finally coming out

with an association, and we often have to listen to a long string of them before obtaining anything that can help us to understand the dream. We are certainly right to believe that the longer and more circuitous the string of associations, the more powerful is the patient's resistance. We can also detect the same influence at work in the forgetting of dreams. It happens often enough that, despite his best efforts, the patient can no longer recall one of his dreams. However, once analytical work has cast aside a difficulty which has been disturbing the patient's relationship to analysis, the forgotten dream suddenly reinstates itself. Two other observations also belong here. It very often happens that part of a dream is initially left out and is then added as an afterthought. This can be regarded as an attempt to forget that particular part. Experience shows that this is precisely the part that is most significant: we suppose that a more powerful resistance was standing in the way of its being communicated than was the case with the other parts. Furthermore, we often see that the dreamer tries to counteract the tendency to forget the dreams by putting them into writing the instant he wakes up. We can tell him that this is a waste of time, because the resistance that he has circumvented in recording the dream-text is simply displaced onto his associations and renders the manifest dream inaccessible to interpretation. This being the case, we need not be surprised if a further increase in the resistance suppresses the associations altogether and thereby completely thwarts our attempts to interpret the dream.

The conclusion we draw from all this is that the resistance that we notice in our work on interpreting dreams must also contribute to the dream's formation. One can actually draw a distinction between such dreams that are formed under low pressure from resistance and such in which there has been a high degree of resistance. This pressure, however, also changes within the same dream from one place to another: it is to blame for the gaps, the obscurities, the confusions that can disturb the coherence of even the most pleasant dream.

But what is causing this resistance – and what is it resisting? Well, resistance is, for us, the surest sign of a conflict. There must be one force that wants to express something and another that is striving to prevent this from happening. What thus arises as a manifest dream may be a combination of all the decisions into which the battle between the two urges has been compressed. At one point, one force might have succeeded in getting its own way and saying what it wanted to say; at another point, the opposing force may either have succeeded in totally erasing the intended communication or have replaced it with something that betrays no sign of it. The commonest and, for the formation of dreams, most characteristic cases are those in which the conflict results in a compromise, so that the communicating force was indeed able to say what it wanted to say, but not in the way that it wanted to say it: it is dampened, distorted, made unrecognizable. If, then, the dream doesn't give a faithful account of the dream thoughts, if the gap between the two can only be bridged by interpretation, then

this is a triumph for the opposing, inhibiting, restricting force which we have deduced from perceiving the process of resistance in the interpretation of dreams. So long as we were looking at the dream as an isolated phenomenon, independent of the psychical formations related to it, we called this force the ‘dream censor’.

You have long been aware that this censorship is not unique to dreams. You know, too, that the conflict between two psychical forces, which we – somewhat imprecisely – call the ‘unconscious-repressed’ and ‘conscious’, totally dominates our psychical life and that resistance to dream interpretation, the sign of dream censorship, is nothing other than the resistance of repression that keeps both those forces apart. You are also aware that, under certain conditions, other psychical constructs emerge from this same conflict, constructs that are the result of compromises just as much as dreams are; and you won’t expect me to repeat to you here everything contained in the introduction to my theory of the neuroses in order to put before you what we know about the conditions under which such compromise-formations arise. You will have gathered that dreams are pathological products, the first part of the series that includes hysterical symptoms, obsessions, delusions, but that they distinguish themselves from these other things by their transitoriness and by the fact that they arise under conditions that are part of normal life. For we must remember that dream-life is, as Aristotle has already said, the way in which our mind works during sleep. Being asleep means turning away from the real external world, and it thus provides the conditions for a

psychosis to develop. Even the most painstaking study of serious psychosis would not allow us to uncover a single trait that would be more characteristic of this illness. In psychosis, however, the turning away from reality is brought about in two different ways: either the unconscious-repressed becomes so excessively powerful that it overwhelms the conscious that is trying to cling to reality; or reality becomes so unbearably distressing that the threatened *Ich* throws itself into the arms of the unconscious drives in a desperate act of rebellion. The harmless dream-psychosis is the result of a consciously willed, and only temporary, withdrawal from the external world; it also disappears when relations with the external world are resumed. During the sleeper's isolation, there is also a change in the distribution of his psychical energies: part of the repressive expenditure that is normally used to restrain the unconscious can be saved, for even if the unconscious takes advantage of its relative freedom and becomes active, it finds that the path to motility is barred and that the only path open to it is the harmless one to hallucinatory gratification. Now, then, a dream can be formed; however, the fact of dream censorship shows that enough repression-resistance still remains in operation during sleep.

Here we have the chance to answer the question whether a dream also has a function; whether a useful task is entrusted to it. The condition of repose without stimuli, which the state of sleep would like to create, is threatened from three sides: by chance external stimuli during sleep; by interests from the previous day that won't subside; and in an unavoidable way from the stirrings from unsated

repressed drives that are just lying in wait for an opportunity to express themselves. Owing to the nocturnal reduction in repression, there would be a risk that the rest afforded by sleep would be disturbed every time the outer or inner stimulus managed to combine with one of the unconscious drive-sources. The dream process allows the result of such a combination to find an outlet in a harmless hallucinatory experience, thus ensuring that the person can carry on sleeping. It is not a contradiction of this function if the dream occasionally causes the sleeper to wake up in a state of fear; but it is probably a signal that the guardian considers the situation to be too dangerous and believes that he can no longer deal with it. In such a case, we are frequently aware while we are asleep of this consoling thought that wants to prevent us from waking up: 'don't worry, it's just a dream!'

This, Ladies and Gentlemen, was all I wanted to say to you about the interpretation of dreams, whose task it is to lead us from the manifest dream back to the latent dream thoughts. This having been achieved, interest in the dream – for practical analysis – has mostly faded away. We fit what the patient communicated in the form of the dream together with his other communications, and proceed with analysis. We, however, have a particular interest in remaining with dreams for a while longer; we are tempted to study the process by which the latent dream thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream. We call this the 'dream-work'. You will recall that I described it in the earlier lectures in such detail that I can confine myself to the briefest summary in today's survey.

The process of dream-work is, then, something quite new and strange, the like of which had never been known before. It has given us our first insight into the processes that take place in our unconscious system, and has shown us that these are quite different from the ones we know about in our conscious thought; that they must necessarily appear to the latter to be preposterous and mistaken. The significance of our findings has then been increased by the discovery that the same mechanisms – we dare not say 'thought processes' – that are at work in the formation of neurotic symptoms are also those that have transformed the latent dream thoughts into the manifest dream.

In what is to follow, I shall be unable to avoid a schematic method of exposition. Let us assume that we have interpreted a manifest dream in any given case, and that we now have before us all the latent thoughts, more or less emotionally charged, that have replaced it. A difference between them will then strike us, a difference that will take us a long way. Almost all these dream thoughts will be recognized or acknowledged by the dreamer: he admits that he did think thus at some time or another, or that he might very well have thought it. There is only one thing that he refuses to accept; something that is alien to him, perhaps even repellent; a something that he may possibly reject in a state of passionate agitation. Now it becomes clear to us that the other thoughts are pieces of his conscious – or, to put it more correctly: *pre*conscious – thinking; they could also have been thought in

waking life, indeed were probably formed over the course of the day. However, this one denied thought – or, to put it better, this one impulse – is the child of the night: it belongs to the dreamer's unconscious and is therefore denied and rejected by him. It had to wait for the nocturnal reduction of repression in order to express itself in some way. This expression is, it has to be said, a diluted, distorted, disguised one; without our work of dream interpretation, we would not have discovered it. This unconscious impulse has to thank its connection with the other, harmless, dream thoughts for the opportunity to steal in through the barriers of censorship in an inconspicuous disguise. On the other hand, the preconscious dream thoughts have the same connection to thank for the power to occupy the psyche even during sleep. For we are in no doubt that this unconscious impulse is the real creator of the dream; it provides the psychical energy for its formation. Like every other impulse, it can strive for nothing other than its own gratification, and, moreover, our experience in dream interpretation shows us too that this is the meaning of all dreaming. In every dream, a drive-wish is supposed to be represented as fulfilled. The nocturnal closing-off of the psyche from reality and the regression to primitive mechanisms that is thereby achieved make it possible for this desired drive-gratification to be experienced in hallucinatory form as something happening now. As a result of the same regression, ideas are converted into visual images in dreams; the latent dream thoughts are, in other words, dramatized and illustrated.

This piece of dream-work tells us about some of the most striking and peculiar characteristics of the dream. Let me repeat the sequence of events in dream-formation. Introduction: the desire to sleep, and the deliberate turning away from the outside world. Two consequences of this for the psychical apparatus: first the possibility that older and more primitive modes of activity can emerge (in other words: regression); second the reduction in the resistance due to repression that burdens the unconscious. As a result of this latter feature the opportunity arises for dreams to be formed, which is exploited by the factors that trigger a dream – that is, by the internal and external stimuli that have become activated. The dream that thus emerges is already a compromise-formation and it has a dual function. On the one hand it is accordant with the *Ich*, since it serves the desire to sleep by dealing with stimuli that might disturb the sleeper; on the other hand it allows a repressed drive-impulse the satisfaction that is possible in these circumstances in the form of an hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. The whole process of dream-formation, which the sleeping ego permits, is, however, controlled by the censor, a control which is exercised by the remnants of repressive forces. I can't portray this process any more simply: the process is itself no simpler that this. However, I can now proceed with my description of the dream-work.

Let us return once more to the latent dream thoughts. Their most powerful element is the repressed drive-impulse, which has created some kind of expression for itself (toned down and disguised though it may be) by basing itself on whatever stimuli happen to be

available and by transferring itself onto the previous day's residua. Like every other drive-impulse, this one presses to be gratified through action but, finding its root to motility blocked by the physiological mechanisms of the state of being asleep, it is forced to go in the opposite direction, that of perception, and to make do with an hallucinatory gratification. The latent dream thoughts are thus translated into a number of sense-images and visual scenes. In this way that thing happens to them which we find so new and disturbing. All the linguistic devices by which we express our more subtle thought-relations (conjunctions and prepositions, alterations in declination and conjugation) are dropped, because there is no means of portraying them: as in a primitive language without grammar, only the raw material of thought is expressed and the abstract is led back to the concrete which it is based on. What is thus left over can easily appear to be incoherent. When it becomes common practice for certain objects to be represented by symbols that have become strangers to conscious thought, then this accords both with the tendency in the psychical apparatus towards archaic repression and also with the dictates of censorship. But other changes made to the elements of the dream thoughts go far beyond this. Such of these elements as allow us to find any point of contact between them are *compressed* into new unities. As thoughts are transformed into pictures, those that allow this kind of compression or merging quite unequivocally take precedence; it is as if a force were at work that was causing the material to be pressed together or condensed. As the result of compression an element in the

manifest dream can then correspond to any number of elements in the latent dream thoughts; but conversely an element of the dream thought can also be represented by any number of images in a dream.

Even more remarkable is the other process of *displacement* or shift of emphasis, which we only know in conscious thought as a flaw in reasoning or as the means for a joke. The individual notions in the dream thoughts are after all not of equal value; they are invested with varying amounts of affect and are correspondingly judged to be more or less important and more or less worthy of interest. In dream-work these notions are separated from the affects attached to them. The affects are dealt with separately: they can be displaced onto something else; they can remain as they are; they can undergo a transformation; or they may not appear in the dream at all. The importance of these notions, now stripped of all affect, returns in the dream in the sensory force of the dream-images; but we notice that this emphasis has been transferred from important elements to unimportant ones, so that something that only played a subsidiary role in the dream thoughts seems to have been pushed into the foreground in the dream – and, vice versa, the essential aspects of the dream thoughts are represented only fleetingly and hazily in the dream. No other aspect of the dream-work contributes so much to making the dream strange and unfathomable to the dreamer. Displacement is the principal means employed in the *dream-distortion* that the dream thoughts have to endure under the influence of the censorship.

Once these processes have taken effect on the dream thoughts, the dream is almost ready. However, another, somewhat inconstant, factor has yet to come into play. This is the so-called secondary processing, and it appears after the dream has become an object of conscious perception. At this point, we treat it in just the same way as we are accustomed to treat anything within our perception: we try to fill in the gaps and to make links – and, in the process, frequently expose ourselves to gross misunderstandings. But this as it were rationalizing activity – which, at best, lends the dream the kind of smooth façade that can't possibly correspond to its real content – may also be entirely omitted, or it may express itself only to a very modest degree. In such cases the dream openly parades all its cracks and crevices. On the other hand we must not forget that the dream-work, too, doesn't operate with the same amount of energy; often enough it restricts its activity only to particular parts of the dream thought, and allows other parts to appear in the dream unaltered. In this event, the dreamer has the impression that he has carried out the most subtle and complicated intellectual operations, that he has speculated, cracked jokes, made decisions or solved problems, when all this is in fact the product of our normal mental activity, might just as well have taken place the day before the dream as during the night, has nothing to do with the dream-work, and brings nothing to light that is characteristic of dreams. Nor is it superfluous to emphasize once again the opposition within dream thoughts themselves between the unconscious drive-impulse and the previous day's residua. While the latter exhibit the full diversity of

our psychical acts, the former, which becomes the actual motive force of dream-formation, tends to find an outlet as wish-fulfilment.

I could have told you all this fifteen years ago; indeed I believe I did in fact tell it to you then. Now we want to bring together such modifications and new insights as might have affected our theory in the intervening period.

I have already said that I fear that you find that there really is very little to report – and that you won't understand why I have obliged you to listen to the same thing twice over and have obliged myself to say it. But fifteen years have passed since then, and I hope that this will prove to be the easiest way to re-establish contact with you. Moreover, these are such fundamental things, things of such decisive importance for an understanding of psychoanalysis, that you may be glad to hear them for a second time; and the very fact that, fifteen years on, things have remained so much the same is in itself worth knowing.

You will, of course, find in the psychoanalytical literature of this period much that confirms our theory and goes into great detail about it. I intend to give you only examples of this. At the same time I can also recapitulate on a few things that we already knew earlier. This mostly concerns symbolism and the other methods of representation in dreams. Believe it or not, only very recently the medical faculty at an American university refused to allow psychoanalysis the status of a science, on the grounds that it admits

of no experimental proof. They could have raised the same objection to astronomy, too; it is, after all, particularly difficult to perform experiments on the celestial bodies. There, one is entirely dependent on observation.

On the other hand, researchers in Vienna, no less, have made a start on confirming our dream-symbolism through experiments. As long ago as 1912, a Doctor Schrötter found that if people under deep hypnosis are instructed to dream about sexual activities, the sexual material is replaced in the resulting dream by the symbols that are familiar to us. For example, a woman is instructed to dream about sexual congress with a female friend. In the dream, the friend appears with a travelling bag, which has a label pasted onto it saying 'ladies only'. Even more impressive are the 1924 experiments of Betlheim and Hartmann, who worked with patients suffering from so-called Korsakow syndrome. They told them stories with a crude sexual content, and noted the ways in which the patients distorted the story when they were asked to reproduce it. In the process, the familiar symbols for the sexual organs and the sexual act appeared yet again; these included, among others, the symbol of the staircase which, the authors rightly say, would have been inaccessible to any conscious wish to distort.

In another interesting series of experiments, H. Silberer showed that we can catch the dream-work as it were *in flagrante delicto,* in the act of turning abstract thoughts into visual images. If he tried to force himself to do intellectual work while he was in a state of

fatigue, drunken with sleep, his thoughts frequently vanished and in their place a vision would appear that was clearly a substitute for them.

Here's a simple example of this. Let's suppose, says Silberer, that I am intending to smooth out a rough patch in an essay. Vision: I see myself planing a piece of rough-sawn timber. In these experiments it often happened that the content of the vision was not the actual thought that was waiting to be dealt with but his own subjective state while he was making the effort: it was the subjective instead of the objective. This is what Silberer called a 'functional phenomenon'. The next example will show you what is meant by this. The author is endeavouring to compare the opinions of two philosophers about a certain problem. But in his sleepy state, one of their opinions keeps slipping away from him and eventually he has a vision of himself demanding information from a surly secretary who is bent over a desk and who at first ignores him, then just looks at him reluctantly and dismissively. The conditions under which the experiment was made probably themselves explain why the visions forced to occur in this way so often depict a scene that stems from self-observation.

Let us stay with symbols for a little longer. There were some which we believed we had understood, but which still disturbed us as we couldn't explain how *that* particular symbol came to have *that* particular meaning. In such cases, any confirmation we could get from elsewhere – from philology, folklore, mythology or ritual –

was bound to be particularly welcome. An example of this type was the symbol of the cloak. Now, I hope you will be impressed when you hear Theodore Reik's 1920 account:

in the most ancient marriage ceremony of the Bedouins, the bridegroom covers the bride with a special cloak called an 'Aba' and, as he does so, speaks these ritual words: 'Henceforth shalt no one but me ever cover thee' (source: Robert Eisler, *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt)*.

We have also discovered several new symbols, of which I shall give you at least two examples. According to Abraham (1922), a spider in a dream is a symbol of the mother – but a phallic mother, a mother we fear; so the fear of spiders expresses the dread of committing incest with the mother, and the horror of the female genitals. You perhaps know that the mythological creation of the Medusa's head can be traced back to the same motif of this terror of castration. The other symbol I want to mention is that of the bridge, which Ferenczi explained in 1921–2. It originally signifies the male member, which joins the parents together during sexual intercourse, but it takes on further meanings that are derived from this first one. In so far as we have the male organ to thank for the fact that we ever made the journey from womb to world, the bridge signifies the crossing from the beyond (the as-yet-unborn state, the womb) to the here-and-now (life); and, as humans also picture death as a return to the mother's body (to the water), the bridge also takes on the meaning of a summons to death; and, finally, at yet another remove from its original meaning, it represents any kind of transition or

change of state. It is all of a piece with this that a woman who has not overcome her desire to become a man so often dreams of bridges that are too short to reach the opposite river-bank.

In the manifest content of dreams, we very often find images and situations that are reminiscent of the well-known motifs from fairy tales, legends and myths. The interpretation of such dreams thus throws some light on the original interests that created these motifs – although of course we mustn't allow ourselves to forget that this material has undergone a shift in meaning over the course of time. Our interpretative work uncovers the raw material, so to speak, that we can often enough call sexual in the very broadest sense, but which has ended up being used in the most incredibly diverse ways when it is worked on later. This sort of derivation tends to reap the anger of all those researchers who are not psychoanalytically inclined, as if we were seeking to deny or disparage everything that developed later on this original basis. None the less, such insights are both interesting and instructive. The same applies to the derivation of certain motifs in the fine arts, such as, for example, when J. Eisler (1919), guided by his patients' dreams, analytically interprets the young man playing with the little boy, represented in the Hermes of Praxitiles. I have almost finished with this topic, but I can't resist mentioning how often mythological themes in particular can be explained by the dream-theory. Thus the legend of the labyrinth, for example, can be seen to represent an anal birth:

the winding passageways are the bowels, and the thread of Ariadne is the umbilical cord.

Detailed study has allowed us to become increasingly familiar with the methods of representation used by dream-work – a fascinating and almost inexhaustible subject. I shall give you some examples of this. Thus, for instance, the dream expresses the notion of frequency by duplicating similar things. Listen to this young girl's strange dream. She enters a large hall, where she finds a person sitting on a chair; this is repeated six or eight times – perhaps even more – but every time, the person is her father. This can easily be understood when we learn from the additional details that came to light during interpretation that this space represents the womb. Then the dream is equivalent to the well-known fantasy of the young girl who claims to have already met her father in utero, when he paid a visit to the womb during the mother's pregnancy. You mustn't be put off by the fact that something is reversed in the dream: that the act of entering has been transferred from the father to the dreamer's own person (that, incidentally, has its own particular meaning too). The duplication of the father-figure can only mean that the process concerned happened repeatedly. We have to admit too that dreams are not really taking many liberties when they convey *frequency* by means of *aggregation*. They have simply fallen back on the original meaning of the word, which nowadays denotes to us a repetition in time but which is in fact derived from things being gathered together in space. But, wherever possible, dream-work turns temporal relationships into

spatial ones and represents them as such. In a dream we might see a scene, say, between people who seem to be very small and distant, as if we were looking at them through the wrong end of a pair of opera glasses. Their smallness and their spatial remoteness mean here the same thing: it is remoteness in *time* that is meant, and we are to understand this as a scene from the far distant past. Furthermore, you will perhaps remember that I already told you in the earlier lectures (and illustrated my point with examples) that we had learnt to use even the purely formal features of the manifest dream for interpretative purposes, that is, to convert them into content deriving from the latent dream thoughts. Now you know, of course, that all the dreams in one particular night belong in the same context. But it is by no means a matter of indifference whether these dreams appear to the dreamer as a continuum or whether they are arranged into various pieces and, if so, into how many. The number of these pieces often corresponds to an equal number of separate focal points in the formation of the latent dream thoughts; or it may correspond to different tendencies battling with one another in the dreamer's psyche, each of which finds its main (if never its exclusive) expression in a particular part of the dream. A sort of 'pre-dream' and a longer main dream often stand to each other in a relation of condition and execution: you can find a very clear example of this in my previous lectures. A dream that the dreamer describes as somehow 'slotted in' really corresponds to a dependent clause in the dream thoughts. In his study of pairs of dreams Franz Alexander (1925) shows that two dreams occurring in

one night not infrequently share out the task of fulfilling the dream's function: taken together, they provide a wish-fulfilment in two stages, something that neither dream could do on its own. So if, say, the dream-wish consists of a forbidden act being performed upon a particular person, then this person appears undisguised in the first dream, but the act is only vaguely alluded to. The second dream then does it differently: the act is openly referred to, but the person is made unrecognizable or is replaced by someone indifferent. This really does give the impression of actual cunning. A second and similar relation between the two parts of a pair of dreams is this: one depicts the punishment and the other the sinful wish-fulfilment. It's a bit like saying: 'if you take the punishment then you can allow yourself the forbidden fruit'.

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I can't detain you any longer with such petty discoveries, nor with discussions about the uses of dream interpretation in analytical work. I am sure you are impatient to hear which changes have taken place in our fundamental attitudes towards the nature and meaning of dreams. As I have already warned you, there is in fact little to report on this topic. The most strongly disputed point of the whole theory was undoubtedly the assertion that all dreams are wish-fulfilments. We have already, I believe, dealt with the unavoidable, perpetually recurring objection of the layman ('but there are so many fear-dreams!') in the earlier lectures. By dividing

dreams into categories of wish, fear, and punishment, we have kept our theory intact.

Even punishment-dreams are wish-fulfilments. Not fulfilments of drive-impulses but, rather, fulfilments of the criticizing, censoring and punishing force in our psyche. When we are confronted by a pure punishment-dream, only a very straightforward operation of the mind is necessary for us to be able to construct the wish-dream to which the punishment-dream was the appropriate riposte; and which, for the purposes of the manifest dream, was replaced by this rejection, namely the punishment-dream. You know, ladies and gentlemen, that the study of dreams was the first thing that helped us to understand neurosis. You will also find it quite understandable that our knowledge of neurosis was able to influence our view of dreams later on. As you will hear, we felt it necessary to postulate the existence in the psyche of a particularly critical and forbidding authority that we call the *Über-Ich.* Since we have now also identified the dream censor as a function of this authority, we have been led to look more carefully at the part played by the *Über-Ich* in dream-formation.

Only two serious difficulties have presented themselves as potential arguments against the theory of wish-fulfilment in dreams. The discussion of these things has moved into remote areas, and yet, it is true, has still not been fully resolved. The first difficulty is presented by the fact that people who have suffered a shock or severe psychical trauma – which was so often the case in the war,

and which is also a basis for traumatic hysteria – are regularly taken back by their dreams into the traumatic situation. This, according to our hypotheses about the function of dreams, should not be the case. What wish-impulse could possibly be satisfied by returning to a highly unpleasant traumatic experience? It is hard to imagine. The second difficulty is one that we encounter practically every day in analytical work; it also involves no such weighty objections as the first one. You are aware that one of the tasks of psychoanalysis is to lift the veil of amnesia which shrouds the first years of childhood and to bring to conscious memory the expressions of early infantile sexual life that are contained within them. Now, the child's first sexual experiences are associated with painful impressions of fear, prohibition, disappointment and punishment. We can understand their having been repressed but, that being so, we don't understand how they can have such free access to our dream-life; how they can become the pattern followed by so many dream-fantasies; how our dreams come to be filled with reproductions of and allusions to these infantile scenes. Their unpleasurable character and the dream-work's tendency to fulfil wishes seem not to be compatible after all. But perhaps in this case we are making too much of the difficulties. After all, all the abiding, unfulfilled drive-wishes, which provide the energy for dream-formation throughout our whole lives, remain bound up with the same childhood experiences; and we can well believe that the driving force of these wishes is so violent that it could force to the surface even the material of events that we experienced as unpleasant. And on the other hand, the efforts of the

dream-work are unmistakable in the way in which this material is reproduced: it wants to deny unpleasure by means of distortion and to transform disappointment into fulfilment. It is different in the case of traumatic neurosis. Here, the dreams tend to end with the development of fear. I believe we must not shy from admitting that in this case the function of the dream fails. I shan't resort to the old saying that the exception proves the rule; the wisdom of this saying seems to me to be most dubious. However, the exception probably doesn't cancel out the rule either. If, for the purposes of studying it, we isolate an individual psychical process such as dreaming from all the hurly-burly of the psyche, we make it possible for ourselves to uncover its own set of laws that govern it; if we then put it back into its original context, we must be prepared to discover that our findings are obscured or impaired by coming into contact with other forces. We say that a dream is a wish-fulfilment; if you want to take these latter objections into account, you may say that a dream is at any rate an *attempt* at a wish-fulfilment. Those who can imagine themselves into the dynamics of the psyche will not imagine that you have said anything other than that. In certain circumstances the dream can only fulfil its intention in a very incomplete manner, or it has to abandon it altogether. Of all the things that prevent a dream from carrying out its function, an unconscious fixation on a trauma seems to be the primary one. Whilst the sleeping person has to dream, since the nocturnal waning of repression allows the driving force of the traumatic fixation to become active, his dream-work fails to achieve its desired transformation of the memory-

traces of the traumatic event into a wish-fulfilment. In this case, the person ends up becoming sleepless; he decides to do without sleep, for fear that the dream-function will fail. Traumatic neurosis is an extreme example of this, but one must also admit that childhood experiences can be traumatic; and we need not be too surprised if lesser disruptions to the dream's function appear under other conditions as well.

2
Dreams and Occultism

Ladies and Gentlemen! Today we shall take a narrow path – but one that may lead us to a panoramic view.

You will hardly be surprised to hear that I am going to talk about the relationship between dreams and occultism. Dreams have, after all, often been viewed as the gateway to the world of mysticism; and many people would consider dreams themselves to be an occult phenomenon even today. Even we, who have made them the object of scientific scrutiny, would not dispute that one or more strands link them with those obscure things. Mysticism, occultism: what is meant by these names? Don't expect me to come up with definitions that would encompass such poorly circumscribed zones. We all have a general and vague notion of what we are dealing with. It is a notion of something lying 'beyond' the clearly defined world, with all its inexorable laws, that science has constructed for us.

For occultism, it is objectively the case that there are 'more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy'.[2] Now, we certainly don't want to stick to narrow-minded philosophy: we are prepared to believe anything that anybody can make plausible to us.

We intend to deal with these things in precisely the same way that we deal with other scientific material. Firstly, we need to

establish whether such processes really can be proved; and then – but only when we are in no doubt as to their actuality – we have to try to explain them. But it can't be denied that even this decision is made difficult for us by intellectual, psychological, and historical factors. It is not the same as starting our other investigations.

Firstly, let us take the intellectual difficulty. Allow me to clarify what I mean in a crude and obvious way. Let us suppose we are dealing with the question of the composition of the earth's interior. It is well known that we know nothing certain about this. We conjecture that it consists of heavy metals in a molten state. Now let us imagine that someone claims that the inside of the earth consists of carbonated water – in other words, a kind of soda water. We would certainly say that that is very improbable; that it contradicts all our expectations, and does not take into account the guiding principles of our knowledge, which have led us to propose the metal hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is not unthinkable; if someone shows us a way to test the soda-water hypothesis we will cheerfully try it out. But now someone else comes along who seriously claims that the earth's core is made of jam. We will react quite differently towards this. We will say that jam doesn't occur in nature, that it is a product of human culinary skills; that, moreover, the existence of this product presupposes the availability of fruit trees and their fruit; and that we can't see how we could possibly place vegetation and the art of human cuisine at the centre of the earth. As a result of these intellectual objections, our interest will be diverted: instead of pursuing an investigation as to whether the earth's core really is

made of jam, we will start asking ourselves what sort of person would come up with such an idea; and, at a push, we might ask him where on earth he got it from. The hapless originator of the jam theory will be highly offended and will accuse us of denying him an objective evaluation of his theory due to what he regards as scientific prejudice. But this will all be to no avail. We feel that prejudices are not always reprehensible; that they are sometimes justified and useful, in that they save us unnecessary palaver. Prejudices, after all, are nothing other than conclusions drawn by analogy from other, well-founded, judgements.

As a whole number of occultist claims make a similar impression upon us as the jam hypothesis, we believe ourselves to be justified in rejecting them from the outset without putting them to the test. However, it is not quite so easy. An analogy such as the one I have chosen proves nothing, proves as little as such analogies ever do. Indeed, it remains doubtful whether it is a fitting analogy; and it is clear that a contemptuous and dismissive attitude determined my choice of it. Prejudices are sometimes useful and justified but at other times they are misleading and damaging – and we never know when they are the one and when they are the other. The history of the sciences is itself overflowing with episodes which might serve to warn us against damning things too hastily. For a long time it was also taken to be a ridiculous theory that the stones that we today call meteorites should have reached the earth from outer space or that the rocks of mountains, which contain the remains of shells, should once have formed the seabed. And, moreover,

psychoanalysis elicited pretty much the same response when it postulated the unconscious. We analysts have, then, particular reason to be cautious about using intellectual arguments to reject new theories, and we must admit that these arguments don't enable us to overcome our feelings of aversion, doubt and uncertainty.

I called the second factor that made our task so difficult the psychological one. By this, I mean the general inclination of humans to credulity and to believe in miracles. Right from the very start, when life imposes its strict discipline upon us, a resistance arises in us against the relentlessness and monotony of the laws of thought and against the demands of reality-testing. Reason becomes an enemy that withholds from us so many possibilities of pleasure. We discover how much pleasure is created by escaping from it, at least temporarily, and surrendering ourselves to the temptations of irrationality. The schoolboy delights in twisting words around; the specialist makes fun of his work after a scientific conference; even the most earnest man can enjoy a joke. More serious hostility to 'reason and science, man's highest powers'[3] awaits its opportunity: it is quick to choose the miracle-working doctor or natural healer over the 'trained' doctor; it accommodates occultist ideas, so long as their alleged facts can be taken as breaches of law and rule; it lulls our critical faculties to sleep; falsifies our perceptions; forces us to make confirmations and agreements which can't be justified. Anyone who takes this human tendency into account has every reason to discount much of the information found in occultist literature.

I called the third factor the historical one. With this, I wish to point out that nothing new is actually involved in the world of occultism. Rather, we re-encounter all the signs, miracles, prophecies, and apparitions that are passed down to us from ancient times and ancient books; all that we thought we had long since dispensed with as the offspring of unbridled imagination or tendentious fraud, as products of an age in which human ignorance prevailed and the scientific spirit was still in its early infancy. If we accept as true those things which, according to the occultists, are still happening to this day, then we must also take those other accounts from ancient times to be credible. And now we recall that the traditions and holy books of all peoples are brimming with marvellous stories of this type, and that religions base their claim to credibility on precisely such extraordinary and miraculous events, finding in them proof that superhuman powers are at work. This being the case, we can't help suspecting that the occultist's interests are actually religious ones; that one of the secret motives of the occultist movement is to come to the aid of religion, threatened as the latter is by the progress of scientific thought. And once we have recognized such a motive we have to become increasingly mistrustful, as well as increasingly disinclined to start investigating these apparently occult phenomena.

All the same, however, this disinclination must ultimately be overcome. What we are dealing with is a question of fact: whether what the occultists say is true or not. It must surely be possible to decide this through observation. In fact, we should be grateful to

the occultists. The tales of miracles from ancient times are beyond our powers of examination. If we believe that they can't be proved, then at the same time we must admit that they can't be entirely disproved. But when it comes to what is going on in the present, things that we can be witness to, then we must surely be able to form a definite judgement. If we come to the conclusion that such miracles don't happen today, then we need not fear the objection that they could still have happened in ancient times; in that case, other explanations will be more plausible. We have, then, put our reservations to one side and are ready to take part in the observation of occult phenomena.

Unfortunately we at once encounter circumstances that are highly unfavourable to our honourable intentions. The observations on which our judgement is to depend are made under conditions that render our powers of sensory perception uncertain and blunt our attentive faculties; they are made in the dark or in a poor red light, after long periods of fruitless expectation. We are told that our sceptical – that is to say, critical – attitude may itself prevent the awaited phenomena from making an appearance. The situation thus created is a real caricature of the circumstances under which we normally tend to carry out scientific investigations. The objects of our observations are so-called 'mediums' – people to whom particular 'sensitive' capabilities are attributed but who are in no way distinguished by outstanding qualities of the intellect or character and who are not carried along by some great idea or serious purpose as the ancient miracle-workers were. On the

contrary, they are viewed even by those who believe in their secret powers as particularly untrustworthy; most of them have already been unmasked as frauds, and it seems likely to us that the same fate awaits the others. Their activities make the same impression as children's mischievous pranks or conjurers' tricks. Nothing useful has ever yet emerged from seances with these mediums; we have not been given access to any new source of energy. We don't, it is true, expect a conjurer to advance our knowledge of rabbit breeding just because he can magic a rabbit out of an empty top hat. I can easily put myself into the position of a person who wants to fulfil the demands of objectivity and therefore takes part in the occult seances, but who tires of them after a while, and, repelled by what is required of him, abandons them and returns to his earlier prejudices none the wiser. One could object that this person's behaviour is not correct either: if someone wishes to study phenomena, he can't simply decide in advance what they are like and under what conditions they ought to appear. It is, on the contrary, imperative for him to persevere and to form some estimate of the measures of caution and control that are nowadays taken as a protection against the untrustworthiness of mediums. Unfortunately this modern protective technique puts an end to the easy accessibility of occultistic observations. The study of occultism has become a separate, difficult job, an activity that can't be carried out as a sideline to one's other interests. And until the researchers who are working on this have come to some conclusions, we are left alone with our doubts and our own conjectures.

Of all these conjectures, the most probable is no doubt this: occultism involves a solid core at the heart of various facts which are as yet not understood; facts around which fraud and fantasy have woven an impenetrable veil. But how can we even begin to approach this core? Where can we attack this problem? I believe that dreams come to our aid here, by hinting that we should pluck the theme of telepathy out of all this chaos.

You know that 'telepathy' is what we call the alleged fact that an event that happens to someone at a particular time comes more or less simultaneously into the mind of another person elsewhere, without any of our known ways of communication coming into play. The tacit assumption is that this event concerns a person with whom the other person, the one receiving the information, has a strong emotional involvement. Thus, for example, person A suffers an accident or dies, and person B, someone closely connected with A – his mother, daughter or loved one, say – learns about it at approximately the same time through a visual or auditory perception. In the latter case, then, it is as if he had been informed about it on the telephone, although this, however, has not been the case; it is to a certain extent a psychical parallel to wireless telegraphy. I don't need to emphasize how improbable such processes are. Most of these reports can also be rejected with good reason; however, it is not quite so easy with a few of the remaining ones. Allow me to omit the cautious little word 'alleged' for the purposes of what I intend to tell you now and let me continue as if I believed in the objective reality of telepathic phenomena. But don't

lose sight of the fact that this is not the case; that I have not committed myself to any conviction on this matter.

I actually have little to tell you: just a nondescript fact. In a moment, I shall also diminish your expectations still further by telling you that dreams basically have little to do with telepathy. Telepathy doesn't throw new light onto the nature of dreams, any more than dreams bear direct witness to the reality of telepathy. Moreover, the phenomenon of telepathy is by no means confined to dreams; it can also occur while the person is awake. The sole reason for mentioning the connection between dreams and telepathy is that we seem to be particularly receptive to telepathic messages while we are asleep. In such cases, we have a so-called telepathic dream and, by analysing this, we convince ourselves that the telepathic news has played the same role as some other part of the previous day's residua and, as such, has been altered by the dream-work and made to serve its purpose.

Now, whilst analysing a telepathic dream of this kind, something happens which seems interesting enough to make me choose it as the starting point of this lecture despite its slightness. When I made my first remarks about this subject in 1922, I had just one observation at my disposal. I have made several similar observations since then, but I will stick to my initial example because it is the easiest to describe – and you will immediately find yourselves *in medias res*.

An obviously intelligent man, by his account ‘completely untainted by occultism’, writes to me about a dream that seems remarkable to him. He starts by saying that his married daughter, who lives a long way from him, is expecting her first confinement in the middle of December. He is very attached to this daughter and also knows that she is very fond of him. Now, he dreams during the night of 16–17 November that his wife has given birth to twins. There then follow all kinds of details which I can pass over here and which were also never all fully explained. The wife who has become the mother of the twins in the dream is his *second* wife, his daughter’s stepmother. He doesn’t want to have children with this woman; he believes her unsuitable to bring up children sensibly, and, at the time of the dream, had long since abandoned sexual relations with her. What causes him to write to me is not his doubts about the theory of dreams, though he would have been justified in having such doubts, given the manifest content of the dream; for why does the dream totally contradict his wishes and allow this woman to bear children? Nor, by his account, is there any cause to fear that this undesirable event could ever take place. No: what prompted him to tell me about this dream was the fact that he had received a telegram early on 18 November with the news that his daughter had given birth to twins. The telegram had been handed in on the previous day; the birth had taken place during the night of 16–17 November, at around the same time that he was dreaming about his wife giving birth to twins. The dreamer asks me if I consider the coincidence between the dream and the event to be

mere chance. He doesn't venture to call the dream telepathic, since the difference between the dream's content and the actual event concerns precisely what seems to him to be the essential thing, namely the person giving birth. But from one of his remarks, it emerges that he would have not been surprised if he had had a genuinely telepathic dream. His daughter, he believes, would certainly have 'had him very much in her mind' during labour.

Ladies and Gentlemen! I am sure you have already formed your own explanation of this dream and, moreover, that you understand why I have recounted it to you. Here we have a man, dissatisfied with his second wife, who would rather have married someone like his daughter from his first marriage. Of course, the 'someone like' is omitted in the unconscious. Then during the night he receives this telepathic message that his daughter has given birth to twins. The dream-work seizes on this news, allows the unconscious desire that his daughter could take his second wife's place to act on it – and thus the strange manifest dream arises which veils the desire and distorts the message. We have to say that we would not have known this was a telepathic dream were it not for dream interpretation: psychoanalysis has uncovered a telepathic fact that we would otherwise not have recognized.

But don't let yourselves be misled! Despite this, dream interpretation has never told us anything about the objective truth of telepathic phenomena. They may also just be outward appearances which can be explained in another way. It is possible

that the man's latent dream thoughts could have run thus: 'after all, today is the day on which my daughter must be due to give birth if she has, as I actually believe, miscalculated by a month. And when I last saw her, she already looked as if she was expecting twins. And my dead wife was so fond of children; how delighted she would have been by twins!' (I am bringing in the latter point because of associations of the dreamer that I have not yet mentioned). In this case, the dream would have been stimulated by the dreamer's well-founded suspicions rather than by a telepathic message; the end result would remain the same. You see that this dream interpretation, too, has said nothing about the question as to whether objective reality can be assigned to telepathy. That could only be decided after making further enquiries into all the circumstances of the case – which, unfortunately, was just as impossible in this instance as it was with all the others in my experience. Admittedly, the easiest explanation by far is to assume that telepathy is at work – though nothing much is gained by this. The easiest explanation is not always the right one: the truth is often not terribly simple, and before we commit ourselves to an all-encompassing hypothesis, we want to have observed all precautions.

We can now leave the subject of dreams and telepathy: I have nothing more to say to you on the matter. But do bear in mind that it was not the dream that seemed to tell us something about telepathy, but the *interpretation* of the dream, the psychoanalytical handling of it. Thus we can completely disregard dreams in what

follows, and we will want to pursue our suspicion that the application of psychoanalysis can throw some light on other facts that are said to be occult. There is, for example, the phenomenon of induction or thought-transference, which is closely related to telepathy and can in fact be regarded without much trouble as being the same thing. This states that psychical processes, ideas, states of excitation, volitional impulses can be transferred through space from one person to another without either of them using the known methods of communication (words and gestures). You will understand how remarkable, perhaps also how significant in a practical sense, it would be if such things really did occur. Incidentally, it is amazing that precisely this phenomenon should be mentioned least frequently in the old accounts of miracles.

Whilst treating patients psychoanalytically, I have gained the impression that the activities of professional soothsayers conceal a good opportunity for us to make particularly incontestable observations about thought-transference. Soothsayers are mediocre or even inferior people who surrender themselves to some sort of business or another: they deal out cards, study handwriting or the lines on the palm of the hand, make astrological calculations – and can then predict their visitors' futures, having shown themselves to be familiar with parts of these visitors' past or present lives. The clients seem mostly to be highly satisfied with their efforts and are not at all aggrieved if their prophecies are not later fulfilled. I have come across several such cases; I was able to study them analytically, and will shortly share the most remarkable of these

examples with you. Unfortunately the value of these remarks as evidence will be reduced because of the countless things my professional discretion forces me to conceal. I have, however, taken strict care to avoid distortions. Listen, then, to the story of one of my patients who had such an experience with a soothsayer.

She was the eldest of a number of brothers and sisters, had grown up with an extraordinarily strong attachment to her father, had married young, and had found total satisfaction in her marriage. There was only one thing which she lacked to make her happiness complete: she had remained childless, thus her beloved husband had not been able to take her father's place completely. When after long years of disappointment she decided to undergo a gynaecological operation, her husband revealed to her that the blame lay with him: he had become incapable of fathering children due to an illness before their marriage. She bore this disappointment badly: she became neurotic, and clearly suffered from a fear that she might be tempted to betray her husband. In an attempt to cheer her up, her husband took her to Paris with him on a business trip. One day while they were there, they were sitting in the hotel lobby when she noticed a certain bustle among the hotel employees. She asked what was going on, and was told that 'Monsieur le Professeur' had arrived and was giving consultations in that room over there. She expressed a desire to try out one of these consultations too. Her husband refused, but, when his back was turned, she slipped into the consultation room – and came face to face with the soothsayer.

She was twenty-seven years old, but looked much younger, and had taken her wedding ring off. ‘Monsieur le Professeur’ made her lay her hand on a cup filled with ashes; he carefully studied the imprint, and then told her about all sorts of hard struggles which she had yet to face, before ending with the consoling assurance that she would all the same still marry and would have two children by the time she was thirty-two. She was forty-three years old when she told me this story; she was seriously ill and had no prospect of ever having a child. The prophecy, then, was not fulfilled; yet she spoke about it without any sort of bitterness but with the unmistakable expression of satisfaction, as if she were remembering a happy experience. It was easy to gather that she had not the faintest idea what the two numbers in the prophecy [two and thirty-two] could mean, nor indeed whether they meant anything at all.

You will say this is a silly and incomprehensible story, and you will be asking why I recounted it to you. Now, I would entirely share your opinion if – and this is now the really crucial thing – it weren’t for the fact that analysis has made it possible for us to arrive at an interpretation of that prophecy which seems altogether compelling precisely because of the way it explains the details. For the two numbers have a place in the life of my patient’s mother. She had married late, when she was more than thirty, and her family had often remarked on how successful she had been in making up for lost time. The first two children, of whom our patient was the elder, were born within the shortest possible interval in the same

calendar year, and she did actually already have two children by the time she was thirty-two. Thus what 'Monsieur le Professeur' had said to my patient meant this: 'don't worry, you are still very young. You will still have the same destiny as your mother who also had to wait a long time to have children; you will have two children by the time you are thirty-two'. But having the same destiny as her mother, being in her position, taking her place with her father: this was indeed the most powerful wish of her childhood – and the non-fulfilment of this wish was what was starting to make her ill. The prophecy promised her that it would still be fulfilled in spite of everything: how could she have felt anything other than well-disposed towards the prophet? But do you believe that 'Monsieur le Professeur' could really have been familiar with facts from the intimate family history of a chance client? It is impossible – so where, then, could he have obtained the knowledge which enabled him to express our patient's most powerful and secret wish by using the two numbers in his prophecy? I see only two possible explanations. Either the story as she told it is untrue, and everything happened differently; or we have to accept that thought-transference exists as a real phenomenon. One could, it is true, suggest that the numbers concerned came from the patient's unconscious; that they somehow found their way into her recollections after an interval of sixteen years. I have no grounds to suspect that this was the case, but I can't entirely rule it out – and I imagine that you will be rather more inclined to believe this than to believe in the reality of thought-transference. If you decide in

favour of the latter, then don't forget that only analysis was responsible for creating and discovering the occult fact, which had previously been distorted beyond recognition.

If we were dealing with only one case like that of my patient, then we would simply shrug our shoulders and pass over it. It would not occur to anyone to base a belief which signifies such a decisive turning point on an isolated observation. But let me assure you that this is not the only case in my experience. I have gathered a whole series of such prophecies and have gained the impression from all of them that the soothsayer has simply expressed the thoughts and, particularly, the secret desires of the person questioning him; and that we were therefore justified in analysing such prophecies as if they were the subjective products, fantasies or dreams of the people concerned. Of course, not all cases are equally valuable as evidence, nor is it equally possible in all cases to exclude more rational explanations; but, taking everything as a whole, a strong weight of probability remains all the same in favour of actual thought-transference. The subject is so important that I could justify presenting all my cases to you, but I can't do that: it would be extremely long-winded and I would be unable to avoid breaching professional discretion. I shall try to appease my conscience so far as possible by giving you a few more examples.

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One day, a highly intelligent young man seeks me out. He is a student preparing for his final doctoral examinations – but is in no state to take them as, so he complains, he has lost all interest, concentration and even the ability to remember things in any kind of order. The history of this paralysis-like state is soon revealed: he became ill after doing something that required a great deal of self-discipline. He has a sister, to whom he is attached with an intense but perpetually restrained love, as she is to him. 'What a shame we can't get married!' they would often say to each other. Then a respectable man fell in love with the sister; the feelings were mutual, but her parents refused to consent to the union. In this dire predicament the couple turned to the brother, who offered to help them. He facilitated a correspondence between them, and his influence over his parents was such that he succeeded in persuading them to give their consent. During the engagement, however, a chance event took place, whose significance it is easy to guess. He and his future brother-in-law embarked on a difficult mountain climb without a guide; they lost their way and were in danger of not returning in one piece. Shortly after his sister's marriage he fell into his current state of mental exhaustion.

The influence of psychoanalysis enabled him to work again, and he left me in order to sit his examinations. However, after successfully completing them, he returned to me for a short time in the autumn of the same year. He then related a strange experience to me, which he had had just prior to the summer. In his university

town there lived a fortune teller who enjoyed a great degree of success. Even the princes of the ruling house normally tended to consult her before undertaking anything of importance. Her working method was very simple. She asked for the precise details of the person's birth – asking nothing else about him, not even his name – then she consulted her astrological books, made long calculations, and ultimately made a prophecy about the person in question. Now, my patient decided to call upon her secret art where his brother-in-law was concerned. He visited her and gave her the precise details she required. After she had made her calculations, she came out with the prophecy: 'this person will the in July or August of this year of crab or oyster poisoning'. My patient ended his tale by saying: 'And it was quite marvellous!'

Right from the start I had been an unwilling listener. After his outburst, I permitted myself to ask: 'what do you find so marvellous about this prophecy? It's now late autumn, and your brother-in-law isn't dead; you'd have said so ages ago. So the prophecy was wrong'. 'Yes, that's true', he said, 'but here's the strange thing: my brother-in-law is passionately fond of crabs and oysters and in the previous summer – in other words the summer *before* my visit to the soothsayer – had contracted food poisoning from oysters which had almost killed him'. What was I supposed to say to that? I just felt annoyed that this highly educated man who, what's more, had a successful analysis behind him, couldn't see things more clearly. For my part, rather than believing that one can calculate the onset of shellfish poisoning from astrological tables, I would prefer to

suppose that my patient had not yet overcome his hatred of his rival, the repression of which had caused his own illness, and that the astrologer simply expressed what he expected himself: ‘people don’t give up the things they are fond of, and one day they really will finish him off’. I admit that I can’t think of any other explanation for this case, except perhaps that my patient was allowing himself a joke at my expense. But neither then nor later did he give me any reason to suspect this, and he seemed to mean quite seriously what he was saying.

Let’s take another case. A young man in a respected position is involved in a liaison with a loose woman that is characterized by a strange compulsion. Every now and then he feels the need to injure his lover with mocking and scornful remarks until she is reduced to utter despair. Once he has made her sink so low, he feels relieved; he then effects a reconciliation with her and bestows gifts upon her. Now, though, he wants to be free of her as he finds this compulsion is beginning to trouble him. He notices that his own reputation is suffering from this relationship, and he wants to have a wife and family of his own. Since, however, he can’t detach himself from his mistress of his own volition, he turns to analysis for help. After one such abusive scene, which occurred when he was already in analysis, he got her to write him some words on a little card which he then showed to a graphologist. The graphologist’s verdict runs thus: ‘that is the handwriting of a person in the depths of despair; this person will certainly commit suicide in the next few days’. This

doesn't in fact happen, and the woman remains alive; but analysis succeeds in loosening his fetters. He leaves his mistress and turns his attentions instead to a young woman whom he expects will make him a good wife. Soon afterwards he has a dream which can only be interpreted as revealing incipient doubts about this girl's worthiness. He takes a handwriting sample from her as well, shows it to the same authority on the subject, and is given a judgement about her handwriting which concerns his fears. Thus he abandons his intention to make her his wife.

In order to appreciate the full value of the graphologist's reports, particularly the first one, one has to know something about our patient's secret history. As an early adolescent he, in accordance with his passionate nature, had fallen madly in love with a woman who, although young, was nevertheless much older than he was. Rejected by her, he made a suicide attempt (and there can be no doubt that his intentions were serious). Death evaded him only by a margin, and he recovered only after long and careful nursing. But this reckless deed made a deep impression on the object of his affections. She bestowed her favour upon him, and he became her lover. From then on, he remained secretly attached to her and served her with truly chivalrous devotion. After more than two decades, when they had both aged somewhat (the woman, of course, more than he) he began to feel the need to detach himself from her, to be free, to lead his own life, to have a house and family of his own. And, together with this weariness, he began to

feel a long-suppressed need to take revenge upon his beloved. If he had once wanted to kill himself because she had spurned him, he now wanted to have the satisfaction of seeing her seek death because he was leaving her. But his love for her was still too strong for him to become conscious of this desire; and he wasn't capable of treating her badly enough to drive her to commit suicide. In this frame of mind he took on the mistress I first mentioned as a kind of whipping boy, in order to satisfy his thirst for revenge *in corpore vili*; and he allowed himself to inflict all the tortures on her that, he hoped, would have the effect on her that he really wished to have on the woman he loved. That the revenge was actually directed towards this latter woman was only betrayed by the fact that he made her a confidante and advisor in his affair, instead of hiding his transgression from her. The poor woman, who had long since descended from being the giver of favours to being the receiver of them, probably suffered more from his confidences than his new mistress did from his brutality. The obsession he complained about in the case of the substitute woman and which drove him into analysis was, of course, transferred onto her from the original woman; it was this latter from whom he could not free himself, despite his desire to do so. I am no handwriting expert, and I don't think much of the art of divining someone's character from their handwriting; I am even less inclined to believe that it is possible to predict the writer's future by this method. But, whatever you may think about the value of graphology, you will find it undeniable that, when he promised that the writer of the sample would kill

herself in the next few days, the expert had again only brought to light a powerful hidden desire of the person asking his opinion. Something similar then happened with the second report; here, though, it wasn't an unconscious wish that was involved: it was more a case of the enquirer's growing doubts and worries being clearly expressed through the mouth of the graphologist. Incidentally, with the help of analysis, my patient succeeded in finding a love-object outside the magic circle which had held him spellbound.

Ladies and Gentlemen! You have now heard what dream interpretation, and psychoanalysis in general, can do for occultism. You have seen from my examples that occult facts that would otherwise have remained incomprehensible can be explained by the application of psychoanalytical theory. The question that most certainly interests you most – whether we can believe in the objective reality of our findings – can't be directly answered by psychoanalysis, but the material that it has helped to bring to light does at least make an impression that favours an affirmative response. However, your interest in the subject won't stop here. You will want to know what conclusions are justified by that incomparably richer material that has nothing to do with psychoanalysis. But I can't follow you there; it is no longer my field. The only thing that I could still do is this: I could tell you about observations that are at least related to analysis in one way – namely they were made during analytical treatment, and were

perhaps even made possible by its influence. I shall share one such example with you – the one that left the strongest impression on me. I shall go into this at great length; you will have to pay attention to a large number of details, and even so I will still have to suppress much that would have increased the evidential force of these observations. It's an example in which the facts come clearly to light and don't need to be elaborated on by analysis. Nevertheless we won't be able to do without the help of analysis when discussing it. However, I shall warn you in advance that even this example of apparent thought-transference in the analytical situation is not proof against all reservations, and doesn't allow us unconditionally to accept the reality of occult phenomena.

Listen, then. One day in the autumn of 1919, at around 10:45 a.m., Dr David Forsyth,[4] who had just arrived from London, hands in his card while I am working with a patient. (My esteemed London University colleague will, I am sure, not consider it indiscreet of me to betray the fact that he had spent several months allowing me to initiate him into the art of psychoanalytical technique.) I only have time to greet him and to arrange to meet him later. Dr Forsyth has a special claim upon my interest: he is the first foreigner to come to me after the isolation of the war years, and this seems to herald better times. Soon afterwards, at 11:00, one of my patients, Herr P—, arrives. Herr P— is an intelligent and likeable man, aged somewhere between forty and fifty, who had originally sought me out on account of his problems with women. His case seemed not to

respond to therapy and I had long since recommended that he stop treatment – but he had wanted it to continue, clearly because he felt comfortable having this well-tempered father-transference kind of relationship with me. Money played no role at this time as there was too little of it; the hours I spent with him were stimulating for me too and so, setting aside the strict rules governing medical practice, we were continuing with our analytical endeavours for a specified length of time.

On this day, P— returned to his attempts to begin sexual relationships with women and once again mentioned the girl, poor, beautiful, and immensely appealing, with whom he could be successful if only the fact of her virginity did not scare him off making any serious attempt. He had already mentioned her numerous times before, but today he said for the first time that she (who, naturally, had no idea as to the real reason for his difficulties) used to call him Mr Foresight ['Herr von Vorsicht']. I am very struck by this information; I have Dr Forsyth's card to hand, and I show it to him.

These are the facts. I expect they will seem rather meagre to you, but do carry on listening: there is more to them.

When he was much younger, P— had lived in England for several years and, because of this, had retained a lasting interest in English literature. He possesses an extensive English library, from which he used to bring me books, and I have him to thank for my acquaintance with authors such as Bennett and Galsworthy, of

whom I had until then read but little. One day he lent me a Galsworthy novel entitled *The Man of Property,* which is set in the bosom of the Forsyte family, invented by the author. Evidently Galsworthy was captivated by this, his creation, as in later stories he repeatedly returned to members of this family and eventually collected all the stories that related to them under the title *The Forsyte Saga.* Only a few days before the event I am referring to, P— had brought me a new volume from this series. The name 'Forsyte' and all the typical characteristics that the author wanted it to incorporate had also played a role in my conversations with P—; it had become part of the private language that so easily develops between people who see a lot of each other. Now, the name 'Forsyte' in that series of novels is only very slightly different from that of my visitor, 'Forsyth' – the two are hardly distinguishable at all with German pronunciation – and the most expressive English word that would be pronounced in such a way would be 'foresight', in German *'Voraussicht',* or '*Vorsicht*'. Thus P— had in fact selected from his personal experiences the same name that was in my mind at that very moment as the result of an event that he knew nothing about.

We are already getting somewhere are we not? I believe, however, that we will gain a stronger impression of this striking phenomenon and even something like an insight into the conditions under which it originated if we cast an analytical light onto two other associations which P— brought up in the same session.

First: one day during the preceding week, I had expected Herr P— at 11:00 – but, as he didn't turn up, I went out to pay a visit to Dr Anton von Freund[5] in his lodgings. I was surprised to discover that Herr P— lived on another floor of the building in which the lodgings were located. Referring to this event I had later told P— that I had so to speak visited him at his house; however, I know for certain that I did not mention the name of the person whom I visited in the lodgings. And now, shortly after the mention of Mr Foresight, he puts this question to me: 'Is the Freud-Ottorego who gives English classes at the *Volksuniversität* by any chance your daughter?' And for the first time in all our long dealings with one another he distorts my name in the way that I am already accustomed to hear from officials, clerks and compositors: instead of 'Freud', he says 'Freund'.

Second: at the end of the same session, he recounts a dream from which he awoke in a state of fear – a real *'Alptraum',* he says. He adds that he recently forgot the English word for *'Alptraum'* and had told someone who had asked him that it meant 'a mare's nest'. That, he said, was of course nonsense: 'a mare's nest' meant something unbelievable, a tall story; and the correct translation of *'Alptraum'* was 'nightmare'. This association seemed to have nothing more in common with the earlier one than its 'Englishness'; however, I was reminded of a small incident that took place a month or so earlier. P— was sitting with me in my room when Dr Ernest Jones, another welcome visitor from London whom I had not seen for a long time, unexpectedly appeared at my door. I gesticulated to him to wait in

the other room until I had made an arrangement with P—. P—, however, immediately recognized him from the photograph that was hanging in the waiting-room, and even said he would like to be introduced to him. Now, Jones is the author of a monograph on nightmares. I did not know if P— was familiar with it; he avoided reading analytical books.

I should like to begin by investigating what kind of analytical understanding we can obtain of the context of P—'s associations and the motivation behind them. P —'s attitude to the name Forsyte or Forsyth was similar to mine; it meant the same to him as it did to me, and it was entirely due to him that I was acquainted with the name at all. The remarkable thing was that he mentioned this name in analysis directly after it had become significant to me because of a new event, namely the arrival of the London doctor. But perhaps no less interesting than the fact itself is the way in which the name came up in his analysis session. P— didn't say something along the lines of: 'the name Forsyte from those novels you've read has just occurred to me'; but, without any conscious reference to this source, he was able to weave together the name with his own experiences and thereby brought it to light – something that could have happened long ago but had not happened until then. So what he was saying then was: 'I'm a Forsyth too, that's what the girl calls me'. One can clearly recognize the mixture of exacting jealousy and melancholy self-disparagement that was expressed in this remark. We would not be mistaken if we completed it along these lines: 'I find it hurtful that your thoughts are so intensely taken up by this

newcomer. Come back to me, for *I'm* a Forsyth as well – even if only a Mr Foresight, as the girl says'. And now his train of thought associated with 'Englishness' takes him back to two earlier situations which could have aroused the same jealous feelings. 'A few days ago you paid a visit to my house – but, alas, you didn't visit me: you visited a Herr von *Freund'*. This idea made him distort the name 'Freud' into 'Freund'. The Freud-Ottorego of the university lecture list then came into it because she, as an English teacher, provides the manifest association. And then there comes the memory of another visitor from a few weeks back, a visitor of whom he was certainly equally jealous, but whom at the same time he felt inferior to – for the visitor, Dr Jones, was able to write a book about nightmares whilst he, P—, could at best only have them. His mention of his error concerning the meaning of 'a mare's nest' also belongs in the same context: it has to mean: 'I'm not a real Englishman after all, any more than I am a real Forsyth.'

Now, I can call his jealous impulses neither inappropriate nor incomprehensible. He had known that his analysis and, with it, our relationship would come to an end as soon as foreign pupils and patients started coming back to Vienna again, and this is precisely what happened shortly afterwards. But what we have achieved so far has been a piece of analytical work: we have explained three associations that were brought up by P— in the same hour, and which were all motivated by the same thing; and it doesn't have much to do with the other question, namely whether these associations could have been made without thought-transference.

This question applies to each of the three associations and can therefore be divided into three separate questions. One: could P— have known that Dr Forsyth had just paid me his first visit? Two: could he know the name of the person whom I visited in his house? Three: did he know that Dr Jones had written a book about nightmares? Or was it just *my* knowledge of these things that somehow betrayed itself in his associations? Whether my observations allow us to decide in favour of thought-transference depends on the answers to these three separate questions. Let us leave the first question aside for a while; the other two are easier to deal with. At first sight, the case of my visit to the *pension* makes a particularly convincing impression. I am quite sure that I named no names in my brief, jocular mention to P— of my visit to his house; I would think it highly unlikely that P— would have tried to find out the name of the person concerned; and I am inclined to believe that he still knows nothing about this person's existence. But the evidential value of this case is fundamentally undermined by a chance factor. The man I had visited in the lodgings was not merely called 'Freund', but he was indeed a real friend to all of us.[6] It was Dr Anton von Freund, whose generous donation had enabled us to found our publishing house. His early death, together with that of our colleague Karl Abraham a few years earlier, were the most serious misfortunes to have befallen the development of psychoanalysis. So I might perhaps have said to Herr P—: 'I visited *a friend* in your house' – and this possibility makes any occultist interest in his second association evaporate.

The impression made by the third association quickly fades as well. Could P— have known that Jones had published a book on nightmares when he never read analytical literature? He could indeed have done. He owned books from our publishing house, and could, in any case, have seen the titles of the new publications printed on the covers. It can't be proved – but nor can it be disproved. So we will come to no decision by going down this path. I regret to say that this observation of mine is marred by the same weakness as so many similar ones: it was written down too late and came up for discussion at a time when I was no longer seeing Herr P— and so could question him no further.

Let us return, then, to the first incident which, even taken in isolation, would support the apparent fact of thought-transference. Could P— have known that Dr Forsyth had been with me a quarter of an hour before him? Could he have had any idea at all of his existence, or of his presence in Vienna? We mustn't give in to the inclination to answer both with a flat negative, for I can still see a way that leads to a partial affirmative. I could after all have told Herr P— that I was expecting a doctor from England who wanted tuition in analysis, the first dove after the Great Flood. That could have been in the summer of 1919; Dr Forsyth had arranged things with me by letter months before he arrived. I may even have mentioned his name, although I think this is highly improbable. Given that this name had another significance for us both, the mention of it would inevitably have led to our having a conversation about it, and some trace of this would have remained

in my memory. Nevertheless it may have happened and I may have totally forgotten about it, so that the mention of Mr Foresight during the analysis session could seem to me to be a miracle. If you consider yourself to be a sceptic, then it is a good idea every now and again to be sceptical about your scepticism too. Perhaps I also have the secret inclination towards the miraculous that accommodates the creation of occult phenomena in this way.

If we have thus got one part of this miraculous occurrence out of the way, then another part still awaits us – the most difficult one of all. Let us assume that Herr P— knew there was a Dr Forsyth and that he was expected in Vienna in the autumn – but how do we explain the fact that P— was receptive to his presence on the very day of his arrival and immediately after his first visit? We could say that it is a coincidence – that is, we could leave it unexplained – but I discussed those two other associations of P— precisely in order to exclude coincidence; in order to show you that he really was occupied with jealous thoughts about the people whom I visit and who visit me. Or we could cover even the most extreme possibility, and could try supposing that P— noticed that I was particularly excited (although I was certainly not aware of this) and drew his own conclusions from it. Or perhaps Herr P—, who after all arrived only a quarter of an hour after the Englishman left, could have met him in the short bit of the route they would both have been taking, could have recognized him by his characteristically English appearance and, always ready to find his jealous expectations fulfilled, could have thought: ‘Aha! This is that Dr Forsyth whose

arrival is supposed to put an end to my analysis. And I bet you anything he's just been to see the Professor.' I can't take these rationalist speculations any further. We are once again left with a *non liquet* [not proven], but I must admit that here too – according to my sense of things – the scales tip in the favour of thought-transference. And, moreover, I am by no means the only one to have found myself in the position of experiencing such 'occult' phenomena in the analytical situation. Helene Deutsch also reported similar observations in 1926, and studied the way in which they were conditioned by the transference relationship between patient and analyst.

I am sure you won't be entirely satisfied by my attitude towards this problem – with my being not fully convinced, yet still prepared to be convinced. Perhaps you are saying to yourselves: 'that's another one of those cases where someone who has been an upright scientist all his life becomes feeble-minded, pious, and credulous.' I know that some great names belong in this list, but you should not count me among them. I have, at least, not become pious; I hope I have not become credulous either. It is just that, if you have spent your whole life bowing down in order to avoid painful collision with facts, then in old age you tend to retain the bent back which bows down to any new facts that might emerge. You, I am sure, would prefer me to stick to a moderate theism and to be quite implacable in my rejection of all things occult. But I am incapable of courting favour; I must suggest to you that you should think more

kindly about the objective possibility of thought-transference – and thus also about the possibility of telepathy.

Don't forget that I have treated these problems here only in so far as they can be approached from a psychoanalytical perspective. When they first came to my attention, more than ten years ago, I too was afraid that they might pose a threat to our scientific *Weltanschauung,* which would have had to have given way to spiritualism or mysticism if parts of occultism had turned out to be true. Today, I think differently: we are showing no great confidence in science if we can't trust it to absorb and process whatever occultist theories might turn out to be true. And so far as thought-transference in particular is concerned, it actually seems to favour extending scientific – opponents would say 'mechanistic' – ways of thinking into the elusive dimension of the mind. The telepathic process is supposed, after all, to consist in one person's mental act prompting the same mental act to take place in another person. What lies between the two psychical acts could easily be a physical process which the psychical process is converted into at one end and which is converted back into the same psychical one at the other end. The analogy with other conversions, such as speaking and listening on the telephone, would in this case be unmistakable. And just think what it would be like if we could catch hold of this physical equivalent of the psychical act! I would say that psychoanalysis has prepared the ground for us to accept such processes as telepathy by inserting the unconscious between the

physical realm and that which was until then called the ‘psychical realm’. Once we have got used to the very notion of telepathy, we can use it to do all sorts of things – for the time being, admittedly, only in our imagination. It is a well-known fact that we don’t know how the communal will of great insect states comes about. It possibly happens by means of this kind of direct psychical transference. One is led to conjecture that this is the original, archaic way in which individual beings communicated with one another, a way which was forced to take a back seat during the course of phylogenetic development by the better method of communicating by means of signs that are received by the sense organs. But the older method might have remained preserved in the background, and under certain conditions it could still take effect; for example in passionately aroused masses. This is all still very tentative and full of unresolved riddles, but there is no reason to be alarmed by it.

If telepathy does exist as a real process, then one can suppose – despite the fact that it is difficult to prove – that it is a very common phenomenon. It would fit in with our expectations if we could demonstrate it precisely in the psychical life of children. Here, we are reminded of the fear commonly felt by children that their parents know all their thoughts, without having been told them – a fear which is the exact parallel to, and perhaps the source of, adult belief in God’s omniscience. A short while ago, a trustworthy woman, Dorothy Burlingham, wrote a paper entitled ‘Kinderanalyse und Mutter’. In this, she shared her observations which, if they can

be confirmed, would have to put an end to the remaining doubts about the reality of thought-transference. She took advantage of the situation (no longer a rare one) that mother and child were simultaneously undergoing analysis, and reported such peculiar events as the following. One day, the mother talks in her analysis session about a gold coin that plays a particular role in one of the scenes from her childhood. Shortly afterwards, after she has returned home, her little boy, aged around ten, comes to her room and brings her a gold coin that he wants her to look after for him. Astonished, she asks him where he found it. He was given it for his birthday, he says – but his birthday was several months ago and there is no reason for him to have remembered about the piece of gold just at that very moment. The mother tells the child's analyst about this coincidence and asks her to try to find out from the child why he did it. But the analysis of the child offers no explanation; the action had forced its way into his life on that day like a foreign body. A few weeks later the mother is sitting at her writing desk in order to make a note of the experience she described, as she had been encouraged to do. Then the child comes in and demands his gold coin back; he wants to take it with him to his analysis session in order to show it to his analyst. Again, analysis can't explain why the child wanted to do this.

And this takes us back to our starting point: psychoanalysis.

3

The Analysis[7] of the Psychical Personality[8]

Ladies and Gentlemen! I know that in your own relationships, be they with people or with things, you recognize the importance of the starting point. This was also the case with psychoanalysis. The fact that it began its work with symptoms, those things in the psyche that are most alien to the *Ich,* has made a difference to its initial reception and subsequent development. Symptoms originate from something that has been repressed, and as it were represent this repressed matter to the *Ich*; the repressed itself is, however, alien territory to the *Ich,* a 'foreign land within', just as reality is – if you will allow me to use the unusual expression – a 'foreign land without'. Symptoms took us down the route to the unconscious, to the drives, to sexuality – and it was at this time that psychoanalysis began to feel the brunt of very clever intellectual objections along the lines that humans were not merely sexual beings, but also knew nobler and higher impulses. One could have added that, elevated by their consciousness of these lofty impulses, they also frequently assume the right to think nonsense and to neglect the facts.

But you know better: you know that it has been our view right from the beginning that people become ill because of the conflict between the demands of their drives and the resistance to those drives that asserts itself against them, and never for one moment

did we forget this resisting, rejecting, repressing entity, which we imagined to be equipped with its own particular powers, the *Ich*-drives, and, moreover, which happens to coincide with the *Ich* of popular psychology. Given the laborious progress of scientific work in general, it simply was not possible for psychoanalysis in particular to study all the areas at once and to comment on all the problems in one breath. Eventually, we had made enough progress to be able to turn our attention away from what was being repressed to what was doing the repressing; and we came face to face with this *Ich,* which seemed to be so self-evident, quite sure that here, too, we would find things for which we could not have been prepared. It was not, however, easy to find an initial way in – and this is what I am going to tell you about. All the same, I have to say that I suspect that this, my portrayal of *Ich*-psychology, will have a different effect on you from the introduction into the psychical underworld that preceded it. Why that should be the case, I can't say for sure. I initially believed that this time you would find yourselves hearing mainly opinions, that is to say speculations, whereas in the past I have been talking to you primarily about facts, however strange and peculiar they may have been. But I was wrong: now that I have weighed it all up again, I have to say that the degree to which the actual material is intellectually processed is no greater in *Ich*-psychology than it was in the psychology of the neuroses. I also had to reject various other bases on which my expectations were founded; I now believe that our response is partly due to something intrinsic to the material itself, and partly due to

the fact that we are simply not used to dealing with such material. All the same, I shall not be surprised if you are even more hesitant and careful in passing judgement than you have been up to now.

The situation in which we find ourselves at the start of our investigation should itself show us the way. We want to make the *Ich* the object of this investigation, our own *Ich*. But can we do this? After all, the *Ich* really is the subject par excellence – so how is it supposed to become an object? Well, there is no doubt that this can happen. The *Ich* can take itself as an object; it can treat itself as it treats other objects; it can observe and criticize itself; heaven knows what other things it can do with itself. In such a case one part of the *Ich* sets itself in opposition to the other parts. The *Ich* can, then, be split; indeed, it splits itself, at least temporarily, while it is performing a number of its functions. The parts can join up with one another again afterwards. That is not exactly new; it is perhaps just an unusual emphasis on things that are generally known. But, on the other hand, we are familiar with the view that pathology, magnifying and coarsening things as it does, can make us aware of normal conditions that we would otherwise miss. Where it shows us a breach or cleft, a structure will be present in normal circumstances. If we throw a crystal to the ground, it smashes – but not in an arbitrary way: it breaks along its lines of cleavage into fragments whose boundaries may have been invisible, but were nevertheless predetermined by the crystal's original structure. Mentally ill people are also fissured and cracked structures such as

these. Even we can't deny them something of the reverent awe with which madmen were regarded by ancient peoples. They have turned away from external reality, but precisely because of this they know more about psychical, inner reality and can tell us much that we would otherwise not be able to access. We say that one group of these patients suffers from observation-delusions. They complain that they continually suffer from being observed by unknown powers (probably in fact people) even when performing the most intimate actions; and they have hallucinations in which these people announce what they have observed ('now he wants to say this; now he is getting dressed in order to go out', and so on). This observation is not quite the same as persecution but it is not far removed from it: it presupposes that someone mistrusts them, that someone expects to catch them doing something forbidden and for which they should be punished. What if these mad people were right? What if this kind of observing and punishing entity were present in all of us? If it had just separated itself sharply from the *Ich* and had been mistakenly displaced into external reality in the case of the insane?

I don't know whether you will share my feelings. Ever since I formed it, the idea, strongly influenced by this image of illness, that the separation of an observing entity from the rest of the *Ich* could be regular feature of its structure, remained with me, and I found myself driven to investigate further characteristics and relations of this entity that had been isolated thus. The next step is soon taken.

The very content of the observation-delusion makes it likely that this observation is only a preparation for judgement and punishment, and we accordingly guess that another function of this authority must be that which we call our conscience. There is hardly anything within us that we so frequently separate from our *Ich* and so easily set against this as precisely our conscience. I feel inclined to do something which would give me pleasure, but I refrain from doing it on the grounds that my conscience forbids it. Or the expectation of pleasure proves too strong, and I do something which the voice of my conscience objects to – for which it punishes me afterwards with painful reproaches, making me rue my actions. I could simply say that the particular voice or entity which I am beginning to distinguish within the *Ich* is the conscience. However, it is more prudent to maintain the independence of this voice, and to suppose the conscience to be one of its functions and self-observation, an indispensable prerequisite for the conscience's capacity to judge, to be another. And, since recognizing that something has a separate identity goes together with its being given a name of its own, I will from now on refer to this authority in the *Ich* as the *Über-Ich*.

I am now quite prepared for you to ask mockingly whether our *Ich*-psychology amounts to any more than taking everyday abstractions literally and coarsening them, transforming these phrases into things – by which little would be gained. I would reply: it will be difficult to avoid what is universally known; our *Ich*-psychology will depend less on new discoveries and more on finding

new ways to see and arrange old ones. So I suggest that you stick to your disparaging criticism for the time being and await further details. The facts of pathology provide a background for our endeavours, a background that you would seek for in vain in popular psychology. Let me proceed. No sooner have we befriended the idea of an *Über-Ich* as something that enjoys a certain autonomy, pursues its own aims, and is independent of the *Ich* as regards the energy it possesses, then a clinical picture imposes itself upon us which makes the severity, indeed the cruelty, of this authority and the fluctuations in its relationship with the *Ich* stand out particularly clearly. I have in mind the state of melancholia – or, more precisely, attacks of melancholy – that you too will have heard enough about, even if you are not psychiatrists. The most striking feature of this illness, whose cause and mechanisms we know far too little about, is the way in which the *Über-Ich* – whisper it: the conscience – treats the *Ich.* Whilst the melancholic can in periods of good health be as more or less severe towards himself as any other person, during an attack of melancholy his *Über-Ich* becomes excessively severe: it curses, humiliates and mistreats his poor *Ich*; threatens it with the direst punishments; reproaches it for actions committed long ago that were taken lightly at the time; and acts as if it had spent the whole intervening period gathering together accusations and had just been waiting for its present rush of strength to emerge with them and to condemn the *Ich* on their basis. The *Über-Ich* imposes the strictest moral standards on its helpless victim, the *Ich*; indeed it represents the claims of morality as a whole, and we see at a glance

that our moral feeling of guilt is the expression of the tension between the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich*. It is a most peculiar experience to see morality, which is allegedly bestowed on us by God and so deeply rooted in us by him, to be merely a periodic phenomenon.[9] For after a certain number of months the whole moral thrust passes off; the *Über-Ich's* criticism is silent; the *Ich* is rehabilitated and once again enjoys all its 'human rights' until the next attack. Indeed, in some forms of illness the reverse takes place in these interim periods: the *Ich* finds itself in a state of blessed exultation; it feels triumphant, as if the *Über-Ich* had lost all its power or had merged with the *Ich*; and this liberated, manic *Ich* allows itself to satisfy all its lusts without any inhibitions. Processes rich in unsolved riddles!

You will undoubtedly expect me to give you more than one illustration if I am telling you that we have learnt a number of things about the formation of the *Über-Ich* – in other words, about the origins of the conscience. There is a well known remark of Kant's that brings our conscience and the starry heavens into conjunction with one another, and a pious person falling back on this saying could easily be tempted to revere both of these as masterpieces of creation. The stars certainly are magnificent – but, when it comes to the conscience, God's work was uneven and careless, as a large majority of people were given only a modest measure of it, or such a small amount that it is hardly worth mentioning. We are by no means failing to recognize the fragment of psychological truth contained within the assertion that the conscience was divine in origin, but this assertion requires

interpretation. The conscience may really be something within us – but it isn't there right from the start. Thus it is, rightly speaking, the opposite to sexuality, which genuinely is present from the very beginning of life and does not appear only later on. But young children are notoriously amoral; they have no inner inhibitions to stop their impulses from striving for pleasure. The role that the *Über-Ich* later adopts is initially played by an external power, by parental authority. Parental influence rules the child by offering it proofs of love and by threatening it with punishments which suggest to the child a loss of love and which must, therefore, be feared in themselves. This objective fear is the precursor to the later conscience-based fear; so long as this objective fear dominates, there is no need to talk about the *Über-Ich* or the conscience. Only as things develop further does the secondary situation arise, which we are all too ready to take as the normal state of affairs: the external restrictions are internalized, and the *Über-Ich* takes the place of the parental authority and observes, directs, and threatens the *Ich* in the same way as the parents did the child earlier on.

However, the *Über-Ich,* which in this way takes on the power, the function, and even the methods of the parental authority, is not simply the successor of this authority but is really the legitimate heir to its body. It proceeds directly from this; we will learn shortly how this happens. For the moment, though, we must dwell on a discrepancy between the two. The *Über-Ich* seems to have made a one-sided choice: it has taken on the harshness and severity of the parents, their forbidding and punishing functions, and has not taken

up and continued their loving care. If the parents really have ruled with a rod of iron, we can easily understand it if the child, too, develops a severe *Über-Ich* – but, contrary to our expectations, experience shows that the *Über-Ich* can acquire the same unrelentingly harsh character even if the parents were gentle and kind and avoided threats and punishments wherever possible. We shall return to this contradiction later, when we come to deal with the transformation of the drives in the formation of the *Über-Ich.*

I can't tell you as much as I would like about the transformation of the parental function into the *Über-Ich,* partly because this process is so complicated that its description doesn't fit into the parameters of the kind of introduction I want to present to you, and partly because we ourselves don't believe that we have fully understood it yet. So you will have to make do with the following suggestions. This process is based on a so-called identification – that is to say, one person's *Ich* assimilating another person's *Ich* – the consequence of this being that the first *Ich* behaves in certain respects like the second one; it copies it, and so to speak absorbs it into itself. This identification has been not inappropriately compared to the way in which a cannibal assimilates another person. Identification is a very important form of bonding with another person; it is probably the most primitive form, and is not the same as making an object-choice. The difference can be expressed along these lines: if the boy identifies with the father, he wants to *be* like the father; and if he turns him into his object-choice, he wants to *have* him, to possess him. In the first case his *Ich*

changes and becomes like his father's; in the second case this is not necessary. Whilst identification and object-choice are broadly independent of one another it is also possible for someone to identify with the very person whom one has, for example, taken as a sexual object, and to change one's *Ich* in accordance with this other person's. It is said that the influencing of the *Ich* by the sexual object occurs particularly in the case of women and is characteristic of femaleness. I must already have spoken to you in the earlier lectures about what is by far the most instructive relationship between identification and object-choice. We can observe it just as easily in children as we can in adults, in normal and sick people alike. If someone has lost a love-object or has been forced to give one up, he will often make up for it by identifying with the object, by building it up again in his *Ich,* so that in this case the object-choice as it were regresses to identification.

I am myself thoroughly unsatisfied with this account of identification, but it will be enough if you can agree with me that the beginning of the *Über-Ich* can be described as an instance of successful identification with the parental authority. Now, the decisive fact with respect to this interpretation is that this new creation of a superior authority in the *Ich* is most intimately linked with the fate of the Oedipus complex, so that the *Über-Ich* appears as the heir of this emotional attachment that is so important for childhood. As we know, on abandoning the Oedipus complex, the child has to relinquish the intensive object-investments that he focused on his parents; and to make up for this object-loss the

identifications with his parents, which have probably been present in his *Ich* all along, become enormously strengthened. These kinds of identifications, the remnants of relinquished object-investments, will repeat themselves often enough later in the child's life, but it is entirely in keeping with the emotional importance of this first instance of such a transformation that its outcome should be allocated a special place in the *Ich.* Detailed investigation also tells us that the *Über-Ich* is stunted in its power and growth if the child is only partly successful in overcoming his Oedipus complex. As it develops further, the *Über-Ich* also takes on the influence of those people who come to take the place of the parents, in other words educators, teachers, ideal role-models. Normally, it distances itself ever more from the original parental figures; it becomes so to speak more impersonal. Nor should we forget that the child's opinion of his parents changes as he passes through the various stages of life. At the time when the Oedipus complex gives way to the *Über-Ich* they are seen to be quite magnificent; later, they lose much of their gloss. At this later point, too, the child will still identify with the parents; indeed, these identifications even regularly make important contributions to the formation of character – but now they concern only the *Ich:* they no longer influence the *Über-Ich,* which has been determined by the earliest parental imagos.

I hope you have already formed the impression that the postulation of the *Über-Ich* really describes a structural relationship and is not simply the personification of an abstract thing like the conscience. Now we have to mention another important function

that we attribute to this *Über-Ich.* It is also the vehicle of the *Ich*-ideal – and the *Ich*-ideal is what the *Ich* measures itself against; what it strives to emulate; the ideal whose demands for ever greater perfection it endeavours to fulfil. No doubt this *Ich-ideal* is what remains of the child's old image of the parents; it is the expression of admiration in the face of that perfection which the child attributed to them at that time.

I know that you have heard much about the feeling of inferiority which is supposed particularly to characterize neurotics. It especially haunts so-called belles-lettres. An author who uses the phrase 'inferiority complex' believes that, by doing so, he has fulfilled the demands of psychoanalysis and has raised his work onto a higher psychological plane. In truth, 'inferiority complex' is an invented phrase that is barely ever used in psychoanalysis. It doesn't mean anything simple to us, never mind anything elementary. It seems to us to be a short-sighted error to trace it back to the perception in oneself of some kind of organic defect, as the school of so-called Individual Psychologists likes to do. The feeling of inferiority has strong erotic roots. The child feels inferior if it notices that it is not loved; and the same goes for the adult. The only organ that really is regarded as inferior is the stunted penis – the girl's clitoris. But what mostly causes the feeling of inferiority is the relationship between the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich:* this feeling, just like the feeling of guilt, is an expression of the tension between the two. It is very difficult to distinguish at all between a feeling of

inferiority and a feeling of guilt. It would perhaps be useful to see the former as the erotic complement to the moral feeling of inferiority. We have paid little attention to this question of the boundaries of psychoanalytical concepts.

Precisely because the inferiority complex has become so popular, I should allow myself to entertain you with a brief digression. An historic figure of our time, who is still alive but who has currently retreated into the background, suffers from a particular atrophying of a limb due to damage sustained at birth. A well-known writer of our day, who particularly loves to work on the biographies of prominent people, has also dealt with the life of the man I have in mind.[10] Now, it may indeed be difficult to suppress the 'urge to psychoanalyse' if one is writing a biography. For this reason our author ventured on an attempt to base the hero's entire character-development on the feeling of inferiority that his physical defect must have awakened. In the process, he overlooked a small but not unimportant fact. It is usual for mothers whom fate has provided with a sick or otherwise handicapped child to seek to compensate for this unfair disadvantage with an excess of love. In this particular case, though, the proud mother behaved differently: she withdrew her love from the child because of his affliction. When the child had later become a hugely powerful man, his actions proved quite unambiguously that he had never forgiven his mother. If you bear in mind the significance of the mother's love for the child's psyche,

you will no doubt be able to correct the biographer's inferiority theory in your own minds.

Let us now return to the *Über-Ich.* We have said that its functions are observation, the conscience, and the maintenance of the *Ich*-ideal. It follows from our account of its origin that it is based on an unimaginably important biological fact (namely the human child's long period of dependency on its parents) as well as on a fateful psychological one (namely the Oedipus complex) – both of which are, moreover, intimately connected to one another. For us, the *Über-Ich* represents all our moral boundaries; it is the advocate of our urge to strive for perfection; in short, it represents all that we have been able to grasp psychologically of the so-called higher side of man. As it itself goes back to the influence of parents, teachers, and other such people, we shall discover still more about its meaning if we turn to these, its sources. As a rule, parents and authorities analogous to them follow the rules set down by their own *Über-Ich* in the upbringing of children. No matter to what degree their own *Ich* may have clashed with their *Über-Ich,* they are strict and demanding in bringing up their children. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhoods and are glad to be able now to identify themselves with their own parents, who in their time imposed such severe restrictions on them. Thus the child's *Über-Ich* is not constructed on the model of the parents themselves but, in fact, on that of the parents' *Über-Ich:* it contains similar material; it becomes the carrier of traditions, of all the age-old

values which have been passed down in this way from generation to generation. You will easily guess that taking the *Über-lch* into account greatly helps us not only to understand human social behaviour (for example delinquency) but also to gain some practical hints for upbringing. The so-called materialist views of history probably commit the offence of underestimating this factor. They brush it aside with the remark that the 'ideologies' of humans are nothing other than the product and the superstructure of the prevailing economic conditions. That is the truth, but it is very probably not the whole truth. Mankind never lives entirely in the present: in the ideologies of the *Über-lch,* the past, the traditions of the race and the people, lives on, only slowly giving way to the influences of the present and new developments; and so long as it operates through the *Über-lch,* the past plays a powerful role in human life, independent of economic conditions.

In 1921 I attempted to apply the distinction between the *Ich* and the *Über-lch* to mass psychology. I arrived at a formula along these lines: psychologically speaking a 'mass' is a grouping of individuals who have all absorbed the same person into their *Über-lch* and who, on the basis of this shared element, have identified with one another in terms of their *Ich.* This formula, of course, only applies to masses who have a leader. If we possessed more of these kinds of applications of psychoanalysis we would no longer be alienated by the notion of the *Über-lch*; we would become entirely free of that awkwardness that still comes over us if we, accustomed as we are

to the atmosphere of the underworld, venture into more superficial, higher layers of the psyche. Of course, we don't believe that we have had the last word on *Ich*-psychology by separating off the *Über-Ich.* It is, rather, a first step – only in this case, it is not just the first step that is difficult.

But now another problem awaits us, at the opposite end of the *Ich* so to speak. This problem is posed by an observation made during analytical work, an observation that is actually very old. As so often happens, it has taken us a long time to appreciate its true value. As you know, the whole of psychoanalytical theory is in fact built on the perception of the resistance offered by the patient when we attempt to make him conscious of his unconscious. The objective sign of resistance is that his associations break down or totally diverge from the topic at hand. He can also become subjectively aware of the resistance by the fact that he feels distressed when he approaches the topic. But this latter sign may also be absent. In this case, we tell the patient that we conclude from his behaviour that he is now in a state of resistance, and he replies that he knows nothing about that; he just notices that it is more difficult to come up with associations. It turns out that we were right; but in that case his resistance was also unconscious, just as unconscious as the repressed material which we were trying to bring to the surface. We should long ago have asked the question: from which part of a patient's psyche does an unconscious resistance of this kind arise? The beginner in psychoanalysis will instantly leap in with the

answer: unconscious resistance is precisely that – the resistance of the unconscious. An ambiguous, useless answer! If by this he means that resistance arises from the repressed material, then we have to say: absolutely not! We must, rather, attribute a strong upward-driving force to the repressed material, an urge to thrust its way through to consciousness. Resistance can only be an expression of the *Ich,* which originally carried out the repression and now wants to uphold it. This is how we have always viewed it, even in the early days. Now that we have postulated a special authority within the *Ich,* representing the demands for restriction and rejection (that is, the *Über-Ich),* we can say that repression is the work of the *Über-Ich:* the *Über-Ich* either does this work itself, or it gets the obedient *Ich* to act on its behalf. If we are now confronted by a case in which a patient doesn't become conscious of his resistance in analysis, then that means one of two things: either the *Über-Ich* and the *Ich* can work unconsciously in quite important situations or – and this would be even more significant – parts of both, the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* themselves, are unconscious. In both cases, we have to bear in mind the disagreeable realization that (*Über-)Ich* and conscious by no means coincide with one another – and nor do repressed and unconscious.

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Ladies and Gentlemen! I feel the need to pause for breath (as you will no doubt be relieved to hear) and, before I continue, I must apologize to you. I want to add some points to the introduction to

psychoanalysis which I began fifteen years ago,[11] and I have to behave as if you, too, had done nothing in the meantime except practise psychoanalysis. I realize that this is an improper supposition, but I am helpless; I can't do otherwise. It probably has to do with the fact that it is exceedingly difficult to give someone who is not himself a psychoanalyst an insight into psychoanalysis. Believe me, we would be loath to give the impression that we were members of some secret society, practising some secret science. And yet we have to recognize – and state as our conviction – that nobody has the right to meddle with psychoanalysis who has not acquired certain knowledge that can only be acquired by being analysed yourself. When I gave my lectures fifteen years ago, I sought to spare you certain speculative parts of our theory – but the new discoveries that I am going to speak about today are derived from precisely these.

Let me return to our topic. Doubtful as to whether the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* are themselves unconscious or whether they only produce unconscious effects, we have, with good reason, decided in favour of the former possibility. Yes, large portions of the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* can remain unconscious; indeed, normally *are* unconscious. That means that the individual knows nothing about what they contain, and it takes a large amount of effort to make him conscious of this material. It is the case that *Ich* and conscious, repressed material and unconscious don't coincide. We thus feel the need to revise fundamentally our attitude towards the problem of conscious and

unconscious. At first we may be inclined completely to belittle the importance of consciousness as a criterion, since it has proved itself to be so unreliable. But we would be wrong to do so. It is the same with this as it is with our life: it is not worth much, but it is all that we have. Without the light that the quality of consciousness affords us, we should be lost in the darkness of depth psychology – but we must try to orient ourselves anew.

There is no need to elaborate on what is meant by 'conscious': it is beyond all doubt. The oldest and best meaning of the word 'unconscious' is the descriptive one: 'unconscious' is what we call a psychical process that we take to exist (because, say, we infer it from its effects) but that we know nothing of. That being the case, we have the same relationship to this as we do to a psychical process in another human being – only it doesn't belong to them: it belongs to us. If we want to be even more accurate, we shall modify our statement by saying that we call a process unconscious if we have to assume that it was activated *at the time* without our knowing anything about it *at the time*. This qualification reminds us that most conscious processes are conscious only for a short time; they very soon become latent but can easily become conscious again. We might also say that they have become unconscious if we were at all certain that they were still something psychical when they were in a latent condition. So far we would have learnt nothing new, nor would we have earned the right to introduce the concept of an 'unconscious' into psychology. Then, however, we

make a new discovery – one that, in fact, is already evident in the case of ‘slips’. When, for example, we are trying to explain a slip of the tongue, we are obliged to assume that the person concerned had intended to say something in particular. We can work out for certain what he intended to say from the way his speech was disrupted, but his intention had remained unfulfilled; it was therefore unconscious. If we subsequently put it to the speaker that he intended to make this remark, he can either recognize it as something familiar to him, in which case it was only temporarily unconscious, or he can deny that it has anything to do with him, in which case it was permanently unconscious. This experience justifies us in saying retrospectively that that which we have described as latent is in fact something unconscious. The consideration of these dynamic relationships now allows us to distinguish two kinds of unconscious: one that is easily transformed into something conscious (under conditions that frequently arise); and another, where this transformation takes place only with difficulty, involving a considerable amount of effort, and possibly never happening at all. In order to avoid any ambiguity as to whether we are talking about the one or the other unconscious, whether we are using the word in the descriptive or the dynamic sense, we avail ourselves of a legitimate, easy way out. We call that kind of unconscious that is only latent and thus easily becomes conscious the ‘preconscious’, and we keep the name ‘unconscious’ for the other kind. We now have three terms with which we can get by in describing psychical phenomena: conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Once again:

in a purely descriptive sense the preconscious is also unconscious – but we only refer to it in this way if we are speaking very loosely or if we are forced to defend the very idea that unconscious processes exist within the psyche.

You will, I hope, grant that this isn't too bad so far, and that it might be quite comfortably implemented. This may be so – but, unfortunately, psychoanalytic work has found itself compelled to use the word 'unconscious' in yet another, third, sense, and this may very well have caused confusion. We are under the new and strong impression that there is a large and important area of the psyche that the *Ich* knows nothing about, so that the processes that take place within it must be recognized as unconscious in the truly dynamic sense. Thus we have also understood the term 'unconscious' in a topographical or systematic sense; we have spoken of preconscious and unconscious 'systems' and of a conflict between the *Ich* and the unconscious (Ucs) system; and we have increasingly used the word to mean a psychical province rather than a quality that psychical things possess. The discovery, actually rather discomfiting, that parts of the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* are also unconscious in the dynamic sense, here comes as rather a relief; it allows us to get rid of a complication. We clearly have no right to call the area of the psyche that is alien to the *Ich* the 'Ucs system', since unconsciousness is not its exclusive characteristic. Very well; we will no longer use the term 'unconscious' in the sense of a system, and we will give that which we have thus far called 'unconscious' a better name, one which can no longer cause any

misunderstanding. Basing ourselves on Nietzsche's use of language, and following a suggestion made by G. Groddeck we shall henceforth call it the *Es.* This impersonal pronoun seems particularly appropriate to express the main character of this psychical province – namely its otherness vis-à-vis the *Ich.* The *Über-Ich, Ich,* and *Es* are now the three empires, areas, provinces that we find when we analyse[12] a person's psyche; and in what follows we shall be concerned with their mutual relationships.

But first, a short digression. I suspect you are dissatisfied to hear that the three qualities of consciousness and the three provinces of the psychical apparatus have not organized themselves into three harmonious pairs, and that you regard this as something along the lines of a muddying of our conclusions. I, however, believe that we should not be sorry about this: instead we should tell ourselves that we had no right to expect any such neat arrangement. Allow me to give you an analogy; it is true that analogies prove nothing, but they can make us feel more at home. I imagine a country with a huge variety of terrain (hills, plains, and lakes) and a mixed population – Germans, Magyars, and Slovaks – all of them, moreover, engaged in a whole variety of occupations. Now, they could be divided up in such a way that the Germans, who keep cattle, live in the hills; the Magyars, who grow grain and vines, live on the plains; and the Slovaks, who catch fish and weave reeds, live by the lakes. If this division were neat and clear-cut, a Woodrow Wilson would be delighted by it; it would also make it easier to teach geography. However, if you visited this area, you would

probably find less order and far more mixing together. Germans, Magyars and Slovaks would be living in among each other all over the place; there would be fields in the hills as well; cattle would also be kept on the plains. One or two things would, of course, be just as you expected, for fish can't be caught in the mountains and vines don't grow in water. Indeed, the general image of the area that you brought with you may be largely accurate – but when it comes to individual details, you would have to put up with departures from it.

You won't expect me to tell you much that is new about the *Es* except its name. It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know about it we have learnt from the study of dream-work and the formation of neurotic symptoms – and most of this is of a negative character: it can be described only as being whatever the *Ich* is not. The only way we can approach the *Es* is through analogies: we call it chaos, a cauldron of seething excitations. We imagine that at some point or other it opens onto the somatic realm, and thereby absorbs into itself those drive-needs that find their psychical expression in it – though we can't say in which particular substratum. It becomes filled with energy from the drives – but it has no organization, no unified will; it simply strives to gratify the needs of the drives whilst observing the pleasure principle. The laws of logic, above all the law of contradiction, don't apply to processes in the *Es.* Opposing impulses exist alongside one another, neither cancelling one another out nor drawing apart from one another; at most, they may meet to make compromise-

formations under the dominating economic compulsion to release energy. There is nothing in the *Es* that could be compared to negation; we are also surprised to find in it an exception to the philosophers' assertion that time and space are necessary forms of our own psychical acts. There is nothing in the *Es* that corresponds to a concept of time; no recognition of the passage of time; and – and this is particularly remarkable and awaits philosophical consideration – no change in its psychical processes as time passes. Both wish-impulses that have never gone beyond the bounds of the *Es,* and impressions that have been sunk into the *Es* through repression, are virtually immortal; even after decades, they behave as if they had only just happened. They can only be cancelled out, robbed of the energy invested in them, and recognized as belonging to the past, if they have been made conscious through psychoanalytical work; and the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests on this to no small extent.

I keep feeling that we have made far too little for our theory of the indubitable fact that repressed material remains unchanged over time. And yet this is what seems to offer us a way in to the most profound insights! Unfortunately I, too, have made no further progress in this area.

Needless to say, the *Es* knows nothing of value-judgements, good and evil, or morality. The economic or, if you like, quantitative factor, intimately connected with the pleasure principle, dominates all its processes. Drive-investments which demand to be released:

this, we believe, is all that the *Es* contains. It even seems that the energy of these drive-impulses is in a different state from that in which we find it in the other areas of the psyche. It seems far more mobile and more capable of being released, for otherwise those displacements and compressions would not occur that are so characteristic of the *Es* and that are so totally independent of the quality of what is invested with energy – in the *Ich* we would call this an idea. What wouldn't we give to be able to understand more about these things! You see, by the way, that we are in the position to attribute characteristics to the *Es* other than that of its being unconscious; and you recognize the possibility of part of the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* being unconscious without possessing the same primitive and irrational characteristics. We can characterize the actual *Ich,* in so far as it can be distinguished from the *Es* and the *Über-Ich,* best of all if we consider its relationship to the outermost superficial part of the psyche, which we call the perceptual-conscious system (Pcpt-Cs). This system is directed towards the external world; it mediates perceptions of it; whilst it is functioning, it generates the phenomenon of consciousness. It is the sensory organ of the whole apparatus, receptive, incidentally, not only to external excitations but to those that come from within the psyche as well. We hardly need to justify the view that the *Ich* is that part of the *Es* that has been modified through its proximity to the external world and by the influence that this latter has had on it; the part that is geared to take up stimuli and protect the organism against them, in the way that a tiny blob of living substance surrounds itself with a cortical

layer. The relationship to the external world has become decisive for the *Ich:* it has taken on the task of representing the world to the *Es* – to the benefit of the *Es,* which would pay no attention to the superior strength of these outside forces and would end up destroying itself by blindly striving to gratify its drives. In fulfilling this function the *Ich* must observe the external world and lay down an accurate image of it in the memory-traces of its perceptions; and, by means of a reality-test, it has to keep at bay anything that has been added to this image of the external world by internal sources of excitation. On behalf of the *Es,* the *Ich* controls the points of access to motility; but when we want to do something, it forces us to stop and think before we actually do it, in the process exploiting what it has remembered from past experiences. In this way, it dethrones the pleasure principle, which holds unrestricted sway over processes in the *Es,* and replaces it by the reality principle, which promises more security and greater success.

Our relationship to time, so difficult to describe, is also communicated to the *Ich* by the perceptual system; indeed, there can be hardly any doubt that this system's modus operandi provides the origins of our notion of time. However, what particularly makes the *Ich* stand out as being different from the *Es* is a tendency, totally lacking in the *Es,* to synthesize its contents, to bring together and unify its mental processes. When we come to deal with the drives in the psyche, as we shall do presently, we shall, I hope, succeed in tracing this essential characteristic of the *Ich* back to its source. It alone sets up that high degree of organization for all its best

achievements. It progresses from perceiving drives to controlling them, but this control is achieved only by the representamen of the drive being slotted into a bigger unit, absorbed into a larger pattern. In plain English, we may say that the *Ich* represents reason and prudence in the psyche while the *Es* represents untamed passions.

Thus far, we have allowed ourselves to be impressed by the numerous merits and capabilities of the *Ich*; it is now time to look at the other side of the coin. The *Ich* is after all just part of the *Es,* a part that has been expediently altered by its proximity to the dangerous and threatening external world. In a dynamic sense it is weak: it borrows its energy from the *Es,* and we are not completely ignorant of the methods – one could call them tricks – that it uses to filch further amounts of energy from the *Es.* One such method is, for example, its identification with objects that have been either retained or renounced. Object-investments proceed from the demands of the drives in the *Es.* Firsly, the *Ich* has to take note of them. But by identifying itself with the object, it recommends itself to the *Es* in the place of the object: it wants to divert the libido of the *Es* onto itself. We have already heard that, during the course of a person's life, the *Ich* absorbs a great number of such traces of former object-investments. On the whole, the *Ich* has to carry out the intentions of the *Es*; it has fulfilled its task when it has created the conditions under which these intentions can best be achieved. The relationship of the *Ich* to the *Es* could be compared with that of a rider to his horse. The horse provides the locomotive energy, and

the rider's privilege is to determine the destination, to guide the movement of the powerful animal. But between the *Ich* and *Es* the situation is all too frequently far from ideal: the rider has no choice but to guide the horse in whichever direction it wants to go.

There is one part of the *Es* that the *Ich* has separated itself from by resistances due to repression. Repression, however, is not carried over into the *Es:* the repressed material merges with the rest of the *Es*.

There is a proverb that warns us against us serving two masters at once. The poor *Ich* has an even more difficult time of it: it serves three tyrannical masters, is constantly trying to harmonize their claims and demands. These claims are always divergent and often seem irreconcilable; no wonder the *Ich* so often fails in its task. The three tyrants are the external world, the *Über-Ich,* and the *Es.* If we observe the *Ich's* efforts to cope with them simultaneously – or, rather, to obey them all simultaneously – we can't regret having personified it, having set it up as a special being. It feels itself hemmed in from three sides, threatened by threefold dangers; and, when it feels too hard pressed, it reacts by developing fear. As it originates in the experience of the perceptual system, the *Ich* is meant to represent the claims of the external world; but at the same time it wants to be the faithful servant of the *Es,* to stay on good terms with it, to recommend itself to the *Es* as an object, to draw its libido on to itself. In its attempts to mediate between the *Es* and reality, it is often forced to cloak the Ucs commands of the *Es* with

its own Pcs [preconscious] rationalizations, to hush up the conflicts of the *Es* with reality, and, with diplomatic dishonesty, to feign consideration for reality, even if the *Es* remains obdurate and uncompromising. On the other hand its every movement is being watched by the severe *Über-Ich,* which holds up certain behavioural norms, paying no regard to the difficulties presented by the *Es* and the external world, and in the event of its inability to comply, punishing it with tense feelings of inferiority and guilt. Thus the *Ich* – driven along by the *Es,* held back by the *Über-Ich,* repulsed by reality – struggles to master its economic task of creating harmony among the forces and influences acting within it and upon it; and we understand why we are so often unable to stop ourselves from crying out: life is so difficult!' If the *Ich* is forced to admit its weakness it breaks out into fear: objective fear of the external world; conscience-based fear of the *Über-Ich*; and neurotic fear of the strength of the passions in the *Es*.

I should like to present you with a simple diagram which shows the structural relationships of the psychical personality as I have described them to you.



You see here that the *Über-Ich* merges into the *Es*; indeed as the heir to the Oedipus complex it is intimately connected with the *Es,* and is further removed from the perceptual system than the *Ich* is. The *Es* consorts with the external world only via the *Ich,* in this diagram at least. It is certainly difficult to say at the moment to what extent the diagram is correct: in one respect it is undoubtedly wrong. The space occupied by the unconscious *Es* would actually have to be incomparably greater than that taken up by the *Ich* or the preconscious. I would ask you to improve that in your imagination.

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To conclude this distinctly demanding and, perhaps, not terribly illuminating account, I should like to add another word of warning. When you think about this division of the personality into *Ich, Über-Ich,* and *Es,* you mustn't imagine the kinds of clear boundaries that are artificially drawn up in political geography. We can't do justice

to the particular nature of the psyche if we imagine it in terms of the linear contours that we might find in a drawing or in primitive painting; it is more like the blurry fields of colour used by modern artists. After we have separated them, we have to let them flow back into one another. Don't judge too harshly this first attempt to depict the elusive psyche. It is very probable that the way in which these psychical divisions develop greatly varies from person to person; possible that their function itself may vary, and that they may temporarily regress. Something of this kind seems to apply to the most recent and delicate of these divisions, phylogenetically speaking: that between the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich*. There is no doubt that the same thing results from psychical illness. We can also well imagine that certain mystical practices may succeed in upsetting the normal relationships between the individual areas of the psyche so that, for example, perception may be able to grasp what is going on deep within *Ich* and *Es* – something that would otherwise be inaccessible to it. We can safely doubt that this route leads to the ultimate truths that would offer us salvation. All the same we must admit that the therapeutic efforts of psychoanalysis have chosen a similar line of approach. For the intention of psychoanalysis is to strengthen the *Ich*; to make it more independent of the *Über-Ich*; to widen its field of vision; and to extend its organization so that it can appropriate new portions of the *Es*. 'Where *Es* was, there shall *Ich* be.'

It is a long-term cultural project, rather like the draining of the Zuider Zee.

4
Fear and the Drives

Ladies and Gentlemen! You won't be surprised to hear that I have several new things to report about our concept of fear and the fundamental drives of the psyche; nor will it surprise you to hear that none of these new discoveries will represent the ultimate solution to the outstanding problems. I am speaking here of 'concepts' with a particular intention in mind. We are facing the most difficult tasks, but the difficulty has nothing to do with, say, our observations being incomplete (in fact, it is precisely the most common and familiar phenomena that throw up those particular puzzles); nor does it concern the remoteness of the speculations that they cause us to make (speculation is barely involved in this area). Rather it is genuinely a question of concepts – that is, of introducing the right abstract ideas and applying them to the raw material that we have observed in order to bring order and clarity to it.

I devoted lecture number 25 of my earlier series to *fear*. I must briefly recapitulate its contents. We said that fear was an affective state, that is to say, a combining of certain sensations of the pleasure-unpleasure series with their corresponding release-innervations and our perception of these; we also said, however, that it was probably the residue of a certain significant event rendered innate through heredity, thus comparable to the hysterical

attack inherited by the individual. We suggested that the event that left this kind of affective trace behind it was the process of being born, during which the changes to heart-rate and respiration, which are particularly characteristic of fear, served a purpose. Thus the first fear of all would have been a toxic one. We then took as our starting point the difference between objective fear and neurotic fear, the former being a – to us, wholly understandable-seeming – response to danger (that is, to an injury that we expect external forces to inflict upon us); and the latter being thoroughly baffling and as it were pointless. In our analysis of objective fear we boiled it down to a state of increased sensory awareness and motor tension, and called this condition *apprehensiveness.* In this perspective, the fear response arises from such apprehensiveness. This response has two possible outcomes. Either the *development of fear,* the repetition of the initial traumatic experience, restricts itself to a signal, in which case the remaining response can adapt itself to the new danger situation by fleeing or defending itself; or the initial experience retains the upper hand, and the development of fear exhausts the whole response, in which case the emotional state becomes paralysing and unsuitable for the present situation.

We then turned to neurotic fear and said that it could be observed in three sets of circumstances. First, as a free-floating, generalized anxiety, prepared to temporarily latch on to any new possibility that might arise, in other words, as a so-called fearful expectancy (as happens, for example, in a typical fear-neurosis). Second, we find it firmly attached to certain ideas in the so-called phobias,

which we may indeed see as still bearing some relation to an external danger, but where we have to consider the fear to be exaggerated beyond all measure. Third and finally, we have the fear that occurs in hysteria and other forms of severe neurosis; the fear that either accompanies symptoms or appears on its own, either in an attack or in a state that persists for some time – never caused, however, by any visible external danger. We then asked ourselves two questions. First: what are people afraid of in neurotic fear? And second: how can one reconcile this with the objective fear of external dangers?

Our investigations have by no means been unsuccessful: we have gathered some important pieces of information. So far as fearful expectancy is concerned, clinical experience has taught us to recognize a routine connection between this and the libidinal balance in sexual life. The most common cause of fear-neurosis is frustrated arousal. A libidinal excitation is provoked but not gratified, not used; anxiety then takes the place of this libido that has been diverted away from its purpose. I even believed myself justified in saying that this ungratified libido directly transforms itself into fear. This theory was supported by certain phobias that occur quite regularly in small children. Many of these phobias are totally baffling to us; however, others, such as the fear of being alone and the fear of strangers, do allow of a definite explanation. Loneliness, like strange faces, awakens the child's longing for the mother it knows and loves; the child can't control or balance all this libidinal excitation, but transforms it into fear. So this fear in

children can't be classed as objective fear but as neurotic fear. Children's phobias and the expectation of fear involved in fear-neurosis provide two examples of one way in which neurotic fear arises, namely through the direct transformation of the libido. I shall immediately introduce you to a second mechanism, which will prove not to be so very different from the first.

For it is the process of repression that is responsible for fear in hysteria and other neuroses. We believe that we can describe this process more completely than before if we keep separate what happens to the idea that is to be repressed from the amount of libido attached to it. It is the idea that is repressed, possibly even distorted beyond recognition; its quantum of affect is, however, routinely transformed into fear, quite irrespective of whether the nature of this affect be aggression or love. Now it makes no essential difference for what reason a particular amount of libido has become unusable; it doesn't matter whether it be due to infantile weakness of the *Ich,* as in the case of children's phobias; as a consequence of somatic process in sexual life, as in the case of fear-neurosis; or through repression, as in the case of hysteria. Thus the two mechanisms which bring about neurotic fear really amount to the same thing.

During these investigations we noticed a highly significant relationship between the development of fear and the formation of symptoms, namely that they can stand in for each other and can take each other's place. For example, an agoraphobic's illness begins

with an attack of fear in the street. This would then repeat itself every time he returned to the street. Now he creates a symptom – 'phobia of streets' – which we can also call an inhibition, a restriction of the *Ich's* function; and by doing so, he spares himself an attack of fear. We can see this in reverse if we interfere with symptom-formation, as, for example, is possible in the case of obsessive acts. If we prevent the sick person from carrying out his washing rituals, he gets into an almost unbearable state of fear, against which his symptom has evidently been protecting him. Indeed, it seems that the development of fear is the earlier, the symptom-formation the later of the two, as if symptoms are created in order to prevent the state of fear from breaking out. And this goes together with the fact that the first childhood neuroses are phobias, states which so clearly demonstrate how an initial development of fear is replaced by a later symptom-formation. We get the impression that these relationships offer us the best entry-point to an understanding of neurotic fear. At the same time, we also succeeded in answering the question as to what people are afraid of in neurotic fear, and we thus established a link between neurotic and objective fear. What people fear is evidently their own libido. There are two differences between this fear and objective fear: firstly, the danger is an internal rather than an external one; and secondly, the person does not consciously recognize it.

In the case of phobias we can clearly see how this internal danger is transformed into an external one; in other words, how neurotic fear is transformed into what seems to be objective fear. Let us

suppose (to simplify a state of affairs that is often very complicated) that the agoraphobe routinely fears the stirrings of inner temptation which are aroused in him by encountering people in the street. His phobia causes him to displace his fear, and he now becomes afraid of an external situation. What he gains by doing this is obvious: he believes he can protect himself better thus. People can rescue themselves from an external danger through flight – but attempting to flee from an internal danger is a much more difficult undertaking.

At the end of my original lecture on fear, I myself expressed the opinion that these various results of our investigation don't exactly contradict one another, but nor do they entirely coincide. As an affective state, fear is the reproduction of an old event that threatens danger. Fear serves the purpose of self-preservation and signals a new danger; it arises from libido that has somehow become unusable, also arising during the process of repression; it is replaced by symptom-formation – that is to say, it is as it were annexed by the psyche. We feel that something is missing; something that would turn these fragments into a whole.

Ladies and Gentlemen! The analysis of the psychical personality into an *Über-Ich, Ich* and *Es,* that I presented to you in the last lecture, has forced us to orient ourselves anew with regard to the problem of fear. By saying that the *Ich* is the only seat of fear, that the *Ich* alone can produce and feel fear, we have taken up a new, firm position which offers us a different perspective on a number of situations. And, after all, we would not know whether there would

be any point in speaking of a 'fear in the *Es*' or in attributing a capacity for anxiety to the *Über-Ich.* On the other hand we have happily welcomed the notion that the three main types of fear (objective fear, neurotic fear, and conscience-based fear) can so easily be seen to correspond to the three dependencies of the *Ich* (the external world, the *Es,* and the *Über-Ich).* This new perspective places in the foreground something that is already familiar to us, namely the fact that fear functions as a signal to us of a dangerous situation. Meanwhile, the question as to what fear is made up of has become less interesting to us, and the relations between objective and neurotic fear have cleared themselves up and simplified themselves in a surprising way. It is, incidentally, worth noting that we now understand the apparently complicated cases of fear-formation better than we understand those that are thought to be simple.

For we have recently investigated how fear comes about in certain phobias, which we class as fear-hysteria, and we have chosen to investigate cases concerning the typical repression of wish-impulses arising from the Oedipus complex. We had expected to find that the libido invested in the mother-object is transformed into fear as a consequence of repression, and that it now appears as a symptom, as attached to the father-substitute. I can't demonstrate the individual steps of such an investigation to you; suffice it to say that the surprising result was quite the reverse of what we had expected. Repression does not cause fear: fear already exists, and it

causes repression. But what kind of fear can it be? It can only be the fear of a threatening external danger, in other words an objective fear. It is true that the little boy becomes afraid of his libido's demands; in this case, he is afraid of his love for his mother, thus this is in fact an instance of neurotic fear. But being in love with his mother seems to him to be an internal danger that he must remove himself from by renouncing this object only because it gives rise to an *externally* dangerous situation. The result of our investigations is the same in all cases. We must, however, admit that we were not prepared to find that the internal danger from our drives would turn out to be a condition of and preparation for an external, objective danger-situation.

However, we have still not said anything about what the objective danger is that the child fears as a result of being in love with his mother. It is the punishment of castration he fears; the loss of his penis. You will, of course, object that this is not a real danger. We don't go around castrating our little boys for being in love with their mothers during their Oedipal phase. But we can't dismiss it quite so simply. It does not primarily depend on whether the boy really is castrated: the crucial thing is that the danger is one that threatens the child from outside – and that he believes in it. And not without reason, for he is threatened often enough with having his penis chopped off during his phallic phase, at the time of his early masturbation; and allusions to this punishment may no doubt often be reinforced in him phylogenetically speaking. We suppose that in the primal human, the jealous and cruel father did actually castrate

the growing boy; and circumcision, which is so often part of the primitives' ritual of sexual maturity, is in this perspective an easily recognizable relic of this. We realize that this view is far from being generally shared but we must hold on to the fact that the fear of castration is one of the commonest and strongest motive forces of repression and, therefore, of the formation of neurosis. Our conviction was given the ultimate degree of security by analysis of cases in which castration was not, admittedly, carried out, but in which boys were circumcised as a cure or as a punishment for masturbation – something that was by no means a rare occurrence within the Anglo-American community. It is very tempting to go into the castration complex in more depth at this point, but we want to stick to our current topic. Fear of castration is, of course, not the only motive for repression; to start with, it does not apply to women, who do indeed have a castration complex but who can't be afraid of being castrated. Instead of fearing castration, women fear a loss of love – evidently a continuation of the fear an infant feels in the absence of its mother. You will understand which objective danger-situation is indicated by this fear. If the mother is absent or if she has withdrawn her love from the child, it can no longer be sure that its needs will be gratified, and it may possibly be exposed to the most painful feelings of tension. Don't simply dismiss the idea that these fear-determinants basically repeat the situation of the primal fear at birth, which, of course, also meant being separated from the mother. Indeed if you pursue one of Ferenczi's lines of thought, you can also add the fear of castration to this series, for

the loss of the male member makes a sexual reunion with the mother (or with a mother-substitute) impossible. I might mention, incidentally, that the common fantasy of returning to the womb is a substitute for this coital desire. There would be many more interesting things and surprising connections to report here, but I must stay within the limits of an introduction to psychoanalysis. So I shall just draw your attention to the way in which psychological discoveries advance into the territory of biological facts.

Otto Rank, whom psychoanalysis has to thank for many valuable contributions, also has the merit of having heavily emphasized the significance of the act of being born and of being separated from the mother. Nevertheless, we have all found it impossible to accept the extreme conclusions that he drew from this factor for the theory of neurosis and even for analytical therapy. He had already discovered the core feature of his theory, namely that we model all our later danger-situations on the fear we experience at birth. If we stay with this point for a moment we will be able to say that, in fact, every stage of human development is given its own particular fear-determinant, that is, a danger-situation that is appropriate to it. The danger of psychical helplessness fits together with the stage of the early immaturity of the *Ich;* the danger of losing love or a love-object corresponds to the dependency of the first years of childhood; the danger of castration goes with the phallic phase; and, finally, the fear of the *Über-Ich,* which occupies a special position, corresponds to the latency period. During the course of development the old determinants that create fear should disappear,

since the danger-situations that correspond to them lose their force as the *Ich* gains in strength. But this is the case only to a very incomplete degree. Many people can't overcome the fear of loss of love; they never become sufficiently independent of the love of other people and, in this respect, their behaviour continues to be infantile. The fear of the *Über-Ich* should not normally ever end, since conscience-based fear is indispensable in social relationships and it is only in the rarest of cases that an individual can become independent of his community. A few of the old danger-situations also manage to survive into later life by modifying their fear-determinants and bringing them up to date. Thus the danger of castration, for example, is preserved beneath the mask of syphilidophobia. On the one hand, we are aware as adults that we will no longer be punished with castration if we indulge our sexual desires. But on the other hand, we have learnt that allowing our drives such freedom brings with it the threat of serious illness. There is no doubt that the people we call neurotic remain infantile in their attitude to danger and have not overcome obsolete fear-determinants. Let us accept that this is a contribution to our characterization of neurotics, even if we can't so easily say why it should be the case.

I hope you have not lost the thread of my argument, and that you have not forgotten that we are in the process of investigating the relationship between fear and repression. We have learnt two new things along the way: firstly, that fear makes repression and not, as we thought, vice versa; and secondly, that a feared drive-situation

can ultimately be traced back to some external danger. The next question will be this: how do we now imagine the process of repression to be carried out under the influence of fear? I imagine it thus: the *Ich* notices that gratifying an emerging drive-demand would conjure up one of the well-remembered danger-situations. This drive-investment must, then, somehow or another be suppressed, cancelled out, made impotent. We know that the *Ich* succeeds in its task if it is strong and if it has managed to assimilate the drive-impulse concerned into its organization. In the case of repression, however, the following happens: the drive-impulse still belongs to the *Es* and the *Ich* feels weak. In this case, the *Ich* calls upon a technique that is basically identical to that involved in normal thought. When we think, we are in fact trying out various courses of action, using only small amounts of energy – rather like a commander pushing little figures around on a map before setting his troops into motion. The *Ich,* then, anticipates the gratification of the alarming drive-impulse and allows it to reproduce the sensations of unpleasure felt at the start of the feared danger-situation. The automatic mechanism of the pleasure-unpleasure principle is thereby set in motion, and this carries out the repression of the dangerous drive-impulse.

'Stop!' you will exclaim. 'We can go no further with you!' You are right: I will have to make some additional remarks if this is to seem acceptable to you. First of all, I must concede that I have tried to translate into the language of our normal thought something that must, in fact, be a process, certainly neither conscious nor

preconscious, that takes place between quanta of energy in some unimaginable substratum of the mind. But we can't seriously object to that: there really is no other way to do it. It is more important that we clearly distinguish between what happens in the *Ich* during repression and what happens in the *Es.* We have just said what the *Ich* does. It invests energy on a trial basis and uses a fear-signal to awaken the pleasure-unpleasure automatism. Several reactions then become possible – or a combination of reactions in varying degrees. Either the person suffers from a full-blown attack of fear and the *Ich* totally withdraws from the offensive excitation; or, alternatively, it resists the excitation by setting up an opposing investment in the place of the trial investment. This combines with the energy of the repressed impulse to form symptoms, or is absorbed by the *Ich* as a reaction-formation, as a strengthening of certain tendencies, as a permanent change. The more the development of fear can be restricted to a mere signal, the more the *Ich* can use defensive actions which amount to a psychical binding of the repressed impulse – and the more the procedure can approach something like a normal processing of the impulse, without, of course, ever reaching it. Incidentally, we should pause here for a moment. You will, of course, have already assumed yourselves that that thing we call 'character', so difficult to define, is to be ascribed entirely to the *Ich.* We have already gleaned some of the things that create 'character'. Above all, there is the assimilation of the early parental authority as the *Über-Ich,* which is no doubt the most important and decisive element; then there is the identification with both parents

as they are later on, and with other influential people; and there are the same identifications as residues of abandoned object-relationships. Let us now add to this list of elements that are always present in character-formation the reaction-formations that the *Ich* acquires – first through carrying out its repressions and, later, in the more normal way of rejecting undesired drive-impulses.

Now let us return to the *Es*. It is not so easy to guess what happens during the process of repression to the drive-impulse that the organism is fighting against. We mainly want to ask this: what happens to the energy, the libidinal charge of this drive-impulse? How is it used? You will remember that our earlier assumption was that it was precisely this that was transformed by repression into fear. However, we can no longer dare to say that. The modest answer is more likely to be this: its fate is probably not the same in every instance. There is probably an intimate correspondence between what happens every time in the *Ich* and what happens in the *Es* with respect to a repressed impulse, and it should be possible for us to discover something about it. For, since we have allowed the pleasure-unpleasure principle, which is awakened by the fear-signal, to play a part in repression, we need to amend our expectations. This principle entirely dictates the processes in the *Es*. We credit it with being able to bring about really profound changes in the drive-impulse in question. We are prepared to find that there will be all sorts of different consequences of repression, consequences that may be more or less extensive. In some cases, the repressed drive-impulse will retain the libido invested in it, will

carry on existing, unchanged, in the *Es,* even if it is under constant pressure from the *Ich.* At other times, it seems to be the case that it is totally destroyed, whereupon the libido is finally diverted into other channels. I said that this was what happened when the Oedipus complex is resolved in the normal manner–in the desirable instance, therefore, of being not simply repressed but destroyed in the *Es.* Clinical experience has further shown us that in many cases, instead of the usual result of repression, a degradation of the libido takes place; the libidinal organization regresses to an earlier stage of development. That can, of course, only happen in the *Es;* and, if it does happen, then it does so under the influence of the same conflict that is introduced by the fear-signal. Obsessional neurosis, in which libido regression and repression are combined, is the most striking example of this type.

Ladies and Gentlemen! I fear this account will seem difficult to grasp – and you will guess that it is by no means exhaustive. I regret having caused you any displeasure. However, the only goal I can set myself is to give you an impression of the nature of our findings and the difficulties involved in studying them. The more deeply we probe in our study of psychical processes, the more we become aware of their richness and complexity. Many simple formulas, which at first seemed to be appropriate to the topic, later turned out to be inadequate; and we are constantly having to modify and improve them. In my lecture on the theory of dreams [Lecture 29, 1 in this volume] I led you into a zone in which hardly a single new discovery had been made in fifteen years; here, where

we are dealing with fear, you see everything seized by change and flux. And not only are these things new, but they have not yet been fundamentally worked through; perhaps it is also because of this that it is difficult to describe them. But bear with me, and we will soon be able to leave the topic of fear – though that doesn't mean to say that it will have been resolved to our satisfaction. All the same, I hope we have made some progress. And en route we have gained all kinds of new insights. For instance, the study of fear now allows us to add a new trait to our depiction of the *Ich.* We said that the *Ich* was weak compared to the *Es,* that it was a faithful servant, endeavouring to carry out its orders, to fulfil its demands. I don't intend to retract this statement. But on the other hand this *Ich* is at the same time the better-organized part of the *Es;* the part that is orientated towards reality. We must not exaggerate the distinction between the two, nor should we be surprised if the *Ich* were for its own part able to exert an influence on the processes in the *Es.* I believe that the *Ich* exerts this influence by using the fear-signal to set the almost omnipotent pleasure-unpleasure principle into action. Admittedly, it does show its weakness again immediately afterwards, since during the act of repression it does without a part of its organization, and it has to allow the repressed drive-impulse to remain permanently removed from its influence.

And now let me make just one more remark about the problem of fear. Neurotic fear has transformed itself into objective fear in our hands, into fear of certain externally dangerous situations. But we can't leave it here; we must take a further step – but one that will

be a step backwards. We must ask ourselves this: what really is the dangerous thing, the thing we are actually afraid of in such a danger-situation? Our fear is evidently not an objective one of injury to our person, which need not have any psychological significance. No: our fear relates to something in the psyche that is set up by such injury. Birth, for example, our model for the state of fear, can after all hardly be viewed in itself as an injury, even though it may involve a risk of such. The essential thing about birth, as with every danger-situation, is that it creates a state of highly tense excitation in the psyche, which is felt as unpleasure and which we can't master by discharging it. If we call a state such as this, in which the efforts of the pleasure principle come to nothing, a *traumatic* factor, then we end up (via the series neurotic fear – objective fear – danger-situations) with this simple statement: the feared thing, the object of our fear, is invariably the appearance of a traumatic factor that can't be dealt with according to the norms of the pleasure principle. We immediately see that we have not been secured against objective injury through being endowed with the pleasure principle – merely against a particular injury to our psychical economy. It is a far cry from the pleasure principle to the self-preservation drive; and the intentions of the two don't by any means coincide with one another from the outset. However, we see something else as well – and perhaps this is the solution we are looking for. Namely, we see that we are dealing with, above all, relative quantities. Only the 'quantity' of excitation turns an experience into a traumatic factor, paralyses the operation of the

pleasure principle, gives the danger-situation its significance. And if it does happen thus, if these puzzles can be resolved so prosaically – then why should it not be possible for traumatic factors of this kind to occur within the psyche with no relation to the supposed danger-situation; traumatic factors in which fear is thus not awakened as a signal, but arises anew, with fresh reasons for doing so? Clinical experience tells us for certain that this really does happen. Only the later repressions exhibit the mechanism that we have described, whereby fear is awakened as a signal of a previous danger-situation. The initial, original repressions arise directly from traumatic factors occurring when the *Ich* encounters an excessive libidinal demand; these repressions form their fear anew, though, of course, in accordance with the pattern established at birth. The same may apply to the development of fear in the case of fear-neurosis brought about by somatic damage to the sexual function. We shall no longer maintain that it is the libido itself that is transformed into fear in this process. But I can see no objection to the notion of a twofold origin of fear: first, as a direct consequence of a traumatic factor; and second, as a signal that some such traumatic moment is threatening to repeat itself.

Ladies and Gentlemen! I am sure you are delighted at the prospect of hearing no more about fear. But this won't do you much good, since what follows is no better. I intend to lead you without further ado into the area of libido theory or drive theory, where there have likewise been some new developments. I would not like to say that

we have made such vast progress in this area that it would be worth your while to go to great lengths to follow it. No: it is a field in which we laboriously fight for orientation and understanding; you should simply be witnesses to our efforts. Here, too, I will have to repeat some things I mentioned in my earlier lectures.

The theory of the drives is, so to speak, our mythology. The drives are mythic in essence, magnificent in their elusiveness. We can't ignore them for a moment in our work – yet, at the same time, we are never sure that we are actually seeing them clearly. You know what the common attitude is to the drives. People postulate as many different types of drive as they happen to need at any particular time: drives for esteem, for imitation, for play, for company, and many others of this kind. We as it were pick them up, let each one do its particular work, and then drop them again. We were always bothered by the feeling that something serious and powerful was lurking behind this plethora of adventitious little drives, something we should like to approach with care.

Our first step was modest enough. We told ourselves that we should probably not go too far wrong if we were to distinguish between two main drives, types of drives, or groups of drives, according to the two great needs: hunger and sex. Even though as a rule we jealously defend the independence of psychoanalysis from all other branches of science, in this particular instance – so we thought – we were standing fair and square in the purview of the incontrovertible biological fact that living creatures serve two

purposes, self-preservation and species-preservation, purposes that seem to be entirely independent of one another, that – so far as we know – don't share any common derivation, and whose interests often conflict with one another in the animal realm. Biological psychology was what we were really doing here, so we believed; we were studying the psychical concomitants of biological processes.

This view provided psychoanalysis with two central terms: *'Ich* drives' and 'sexual drives'. We took the former to include everything concerned with the preservation, maintenance, and aggrandisement of the individual. To the latter we had to attribute all the richness involved in infantile and perverse sexual life. As we came to know the *Ich* as the restricting, repressing force during our investigation of neurosis, and the sexual urges as the restricted and repressed ones, we believed that the conflict between the two groups of drives was perfectly easy to grasp. At first we studied only the sexual drives, and we called their energy 'libido'. We used them to attempt to clarify our notions as to what the nature and attributes of the drives might be. This is the role of libido theory.

A drive, then, differs from a stimulus in that it originates from sources of stimulation within the body, acts as a constant force, and the individual can't flee from it in the way that he can from an external stimulus. Where a drive is concerned, we can distinguish between its source, its object, and its aim. The source is a state of excitation somewhere within the body; the aim is the removal of

this excitation; and en route from the source to the aim, the drive takes effect on the psyche. We imagine it as a particular quantum of energy, pressing to flow in a particular direction. It is this pressure that gives it the name ‘drive’. We speak of active and passive drives, but we ought rather to speak of active and passive drive-aims; for a good deal of activity has to be expended even to achieve a passive aim. The aim can be achieved in the individual’s own body, but an external object is usually introduced, in which case the drive achieves its external aim; its internal aim invariably remains the change within the body that is felt as gratification. We don’t yet know whether the drive’s relationship to the somatic source lends it a specific quality – and, if so, what kind of quality this is. According to the evidence of analytical experience, there are two indubitable facts: first, that drive-impulses from one source can connect up with drive-impulses from other sources and share their further fate; and, second, that it is quite possible for one drive-gratification to be replaced by another. Let us simply admit that we don’t understand this particularly well. The relationship of the drive to aim and object is also open to modification; both can be exchanged for others – but the relationship to the object is nevertheless the easier of the two to loosen. There is a certain type of modification of the aim and exchange of object in which our social values are taken into account – and this is what we call *sublimation.* Moreover, we still have reason to distinguish *aim-inhibited* drives. These are drive-impulses that come from familiar sources and have an unambiguous aim, but which, however, stop short of gratification, this resulting

in a permanent object-investment and, simultaneously, an eternally unsatisfied urge. Affection is one example of this type of relationship, which undoubtedly stems from sexual need yet usually does without this need being gratified. You see how much about the characteristics and destinies of the drives still eludes us. Here, we should also be mindful of another difference between the sexual drives and the self-preservation drives, a difference that would be of the greatest theoretical significance if it were to concern drives as a whole group. The sexual drives are striking to us because of their plasticity, because of their ability to exchange their aims, because of their interchange-ability (that is to say, one drive-gratification allows itself to be easily replaced by another), and because of the way that they can be deferred (the 'aim-inhibited' drives have just given us a good example of this). We should love to be able to say that the self-preservation drives have none of these characteristics – to say that these are inflexible, admit of no deferring, are imperative in a very different way, and have a totally different relationship to repression and fear. However, if we think about this even for a moment we immediately see that not all the *Ich* drives are exceptional in this way: it is only true of hunger and thirst, and is clearly grounded in something peculiar to their drive-sources. A good deal of the apparent confusion also comes from the fact that we have not considered separately any changes the drive-impulses which originally belonged to the *Es* might experience under the influence of the *Ich*.

We are on firmer ground when we investigate how the drives serve the sexual function. Here we have obtained some quite decisive insights that you are also aware of. It is, then, not the case that we can detect one sexual drive that carries with it right from the outset the urge to achieve its aim – namely the sexual function, the unifying of two sex cells. Rather, we see a large number of partial drives, from various regions and parts of the body, which strive for gratification relatively independently of one another, and find this gratification in something that may be called *organ-pleasure.* The genitals are the latest of these *erogenous zones,* and we will no longer deny their organ-pleasure its name: *sexual* pleasure. Not all of these impulses that are striving for pleasure are incorporated into the ultimate organization of the sexual function. Some of them are cast aside as useless (by repression or in another such way); a few are diverted from their aims in the strange way I have just mentioned, and are used to strengthen other impulses; and others remain preserved in secondary roles, serve the purpose of carrying out preliminary actions, and that of arousing fore-pleasure. You have heard that several phases of provisional organization can be recognized in the course of this prolonged development; and how its various aberrations and dead-ends can be explained in the context of this history of the sexual function. We call the first of these pre-genital phases the *oral* one, because, in accordance with the way in which the infant is nourished, the erogenous mouth-zone also dominates what we might call the sexual activity of this period of life. During the second phase, *sadistic* and *anal* impulses push

themselves into the foreground; there is definitely a connection here with the cutting of the teeth, the strengthening of the musculature, and the control over the sphincter functions. We have recently learnt many interesting details about this striking stage of development. The third pre-genital phase is the *phallic* one, in which the male member (and what corresponds to it in the case of the little girl) gains a significance for both sexes that it will never lose again. We have reserved the term *genital* for the final phase of sexual organization, which becomes established after puberty, it being only in puberty that the female genitals find the recognition long since granted to the male ones.

So far, this recapitulation is just a pale shadow of the original. And you mustn't suppose that everything I left out this time no longer applies. This recapitulation was necessary for us to be able to link our existing knowledge to our account of the progress we have made since then. We can flatter ourselves that we have learnt many new things about precisely the early organizations of the libido, and that we have grasped the meaning of our previous information more clearly. I shall at least give you a few individual examples of this. In 1924, Abraham demonstrated that one can distinguish between two stages in the sadistic-anal phase. In the earlier of the two, the destructive tendency to destroy and lose things prevails; the later stage is characterized by the 'object-friendly' tendency to retain and to own them. Thus, in the middle of this phase, we start to take the object into account for the first time, this being a forerunner of a later love-investment. We are equally justified in

positing a similar subdivision in the first, oral phase. The first sub-stage concerns only the oral incorporation of things; the relationship between the child and the object (the mother's breast) is entirely free from ambivalence. The second stage, distinguished by the child's new ability to bite things, may be called the *oral-sadistic* stage; here, we find the first signs of ambivalence, which then become so much more distinct in the next phase, the sadistic-anal one. The value of these new differentiations becomes particularly evident if we look for the predispositional points in the libido-development in the case of certain neuroses such as obsessional neurosis and melancholia.[13] Recall at this point what we learnt about the connection between fixation of the libido, disposition, and regression.

Our attitude to the phases of libido organization has as a whole altered slightly. Earlier, we predominantly emphasized the way in which one phase gives way to the next; but now we want to focus on the facts that demonstrate how much of each earlier phase continues to exist side by side with and behind the libido's later organization, obtaining permanent representation in the libidinal balance and in the individual's character. Studies that have taught us how often regressions to earlier phases take place under pathological conditions, and that particular forms of regression are characteristic of particular forms of disease, have become even more important in this respect. However, I can't go into that here; it belongs to a specialist discussion of the psychology of neurosis.

We have been able to study drive-transformations and similar processes particularly in the case of anal-eroticism (when the erogenous anal zone provides a source of excitation) and we were surprised at the multiplicity of uses that these drive-impulses are put to. It is perhaps not easy to free oneself from feeling the usual disdain that has come to be associated with precisely this area as human society has developed. Let us therefore bring to mind the point made by Abraham that, embryologically speaking, the anus corresponds to the 'primal mouth', which has wandered off down to the end of the intestines. We then discover that, as we come to set less store by our own faeces, our own excrement, this drive-interest arising from anal sources switches to objects which can be given away as *gifts*. And rightly so, as faeces were the first gift that the infant could give. He relinquished his faeces out of love for the woman who was caring for him. This old interest in faeces is subsequently turned into a high regard for *gold* and *money* (this is altogether analogous to the shifts in meaning that characterize the development of a language); however, it also contributes to the emotion invested in *child* and *penis*. All children (who do indeed cling to the cloaca-theory) are convinced that babies are born out of the bowel like pieces of faeces; the act of defaecation is their model for the act of giving birth. But the penis, too, has its forerunner in the column of faecal matter which fills and stimulates the bowel's mucous membrane tube.[14] If the child has come reluctantly enough to realize that there are human beings who don't possess a penis, this member seems to him to be something that can be detached

from the body, and he draws an unmistakable analogy between this and his excrement, which was after all the first piece of bodily substance that he had to renounce. A large quantity of anal-eroticism thus becomes invested in the penis instead – although the interest in this part of the body also has an oral root that is perhaps even more powerful than the anal-erotic one; for, once the child has been weaned, his penis also inherits something from his mother's nipple.

It is impossible to understand humans' fantasies, the associations influenced by their unconscious, or the language of their symptoms without knowing what lies beneath them. On this level, faeces, money, gifts, the child and the penis are all treated as if they had the same meaning; they are also represented by the same symbols. Nor should you forget that I could give you only very incomplete information. However, I can perhaps just mention in passing that the interest in the vagina, which is awakened later, is also mainly anal-erotic in origin. This is not surprising, since the vagina itself is – to use a happy turn of phrase of Lou Andreas-Salomé's – 'on hire' from the rectum. In the lives of homosexuals, who have not managed to complete a certain part of their sexual development, the vagina is also represented by the anus again. We often dream of a place that used to be a single room but which is now divided into two by a partition wall, or vice versa. This always signifies the relationship of the vagina to the rectum. We also get a very clear picture of the way in which the girl's totally un-female desire to have a penis is normally transformed into the desire for a baby –

and then for the penis-bearing man who can give her the baby. Thus here, too, we can see that a part of what was originally an anal-erotic interest is absorbed by the later genital organization.

While we were studying the pre-genital phases of the libido, we also gained several new insights into character-formation. We became aware of a triad of characteristics that are quite often found together: orderliness, thrift and obstinacy; and we deduced by analysing such people that these characteristics are the result of their absorbing their anal-eroticism and using it in other ways. Thus we speak of an *anal character* where we find this striking combination, and we draw a certain contrast between this and unmodified anal-eroticism. We found a similar, perhaps even stronger, relationship between ambition and urethral-eroticism. We gleaned a remarkable allusion to this relationship from the legend that Alexander the Great was born in the same night in which a certain Herostratus – motivated purely by a desire for notoriety – set fire to the much admired temple at Ephesus. As if the ancients would not have known there was a connection! You know, of course, the extent to which urination is connected with fire and fire-extinguishing. Naturally, we expect that other character traits will turn out to be residues or reaction-formations of particular pre-genital libido formations; however, we can't yet demonstrate this.

However, it is now about time for me to hark back historically as well thematically and to address myself once again to problems of the most general kind concerning the drives. Our libido theory was

initially based on the antithesis of the *Ich* drives and the sexual drives. When we then later began to study the *Ich* itself more closely and came to grasp the concept of narcissism, this very distinction began to lose its substance. In rare cases, we can see that the *Ich* takes itself as an object, that it behaves as if it were in love with itself – hence the term *narcissism,* borrowed from the Greek legend. But that is just an extremely exaggerated version of what normally happens. We come to see that the *Ich* is always the main reservoir of libido: libidinal investments of objects both proceed from this and return to it again, while the greater part of this libido permanently remains in the *Ich.* Therefore, we find constant transformation of *Ich-libido* into object-libido, and object-libido into *Ich*-libido. However, this means that the two can't be any different in nature; that there is no point in separating the energy of one from the energy of the other. In fact, we can either drop the name 'libido' altogether, or we can use it to mean the same as psychical energy as a whole.

This did not remain our view for long. The notion that there was an antithesis within the drives soon presented itself in another, even clearer, way. However, I have no wish to go into all the ins and outs of how I made this new discovery in the theory of the drives; it, too, is essentially based on biological considerations, and I shall present you with the finished product. We suppose that there are two essentially different types of drive: the sexual drives, understood in the broadest sense (or *Eros* if you prefer this name),

and the *aggressive drives,* whose aim is destruction. If I put it to you like this, you will hardly take it as anything new; it seems to be an attempt at a theoretical transfiguration of the banal antithesis of love and hate, which perhaps coincides with every other polarity of attraction and repulsion that physics postulates for the inorganic world. But it is remarkable that this hypothesis is, all the same, felt by many to be something new and, indeed, something highly undesirable, something that should be got rid of as soon as possible. I imagine that a strong affective element is responsible for this rejection. Why did we ourselves take such a long time to come down in favour of an aggression drive? Why did we hesitate to use for our theory facts that lie ready to hand and are familiar to everyone? If we wanted to ascribe a drive with such an aggressive aim to an animal, we would probably meet only minimal resistance. But it seems outrageous to adopt this as part of the human constitution; it contradicts too many religious presumptions and social conventions. No: humans are good by nature – or at least by inclination. If they occasionally show themselves to be brutal, violent, or cruel, then these are fleeting black clouds passing across their emotional life, mostly in response to provocation of some kind, perhaps merely as a result of the inappropriate social rules that they have so far invented for themselves.

Unfortunately, history and our own experiences do no bear this out but, rather, confirm the judgement that the belief in the 'goodness' of human nature is one of those most dreadful illusions that humans expect will beautify and ease their existence – but that

in reality cause nothing but damage. We need not pursue this polemic as we have not supported the hypothesis of a special aggressive and destructive drive in humans because of what history or life has taught us, but because of general considerations, which came to light when we were evaluating the phenomena of *sadism* and *masochism*. You know that we speak of sadism if sexual satisfaction is dependent on the sexual object suffering pain, maltreatment, and humiliation; and we speak of masochism if the individual needs to be this maltreated object himself. You also know that normal sexual life includes a certain proportion of both these urges and that we call it a perversion if it forces back the other sexual aims, putting its own aims in their place. And it can hardly have escaped you that sadism is more intimately related to maleness and masochism to femaleness; it is as if a secret affinity existed between them, although I must tell you at once that we have made no further progress down this path. Both, sadism and masochism alike, are really puzzling phenomena for the libido theory. This is particularly the case with masochism, and it is only right and proper that the thing that was the bone of contention in the one theory should become the cornerstone of the theory that replaces it.

We therefore believe that sadism and masochism represent two excellent examples of the merging of the two kinds of drive (namely Eros and aggression) and we now propose that this relationship is paradigmatic, and that all drive-impulses that we are able to look at involve such ‘mergences’ or ‘fusions’ of the two kinds of drive – in all sorts of different proportions of course. In the

process, the erotic drives would introduce the diversity of their sexual aims into the mix, whereas the others [that is, the destructive ones] would only allow of a variety of mitigations and debasements in their one unchanging tendency. This postulate paves the way for studies that in due course may acquire great significance for our understanding of pathological processes. For mergences may also disintegrate, and we may reasonably suppose that these 'drive de-mergences' affect function in the most severe way. But these views are still too new; nobody has tried so far to put them to any practical use.

Let us return to the specific problem that masochism presents us with. If we disregard its erotic component for the moment, it proves the existence of an urge that has self-destruction as its aim. The *Ich* – though I am thinking much more here of the *Es,* the whole person – originally includes all the drive-impulses. If this also applies to the destructive drive, then it follows that masochism is older than sadism; but that sadism is the destruction-drive turned outwards, which acquires the characteristic of aggression in the process. A certain amount of the original destruction-drive may still remain within the individual. It seems that we become aware of it only under two conditions: if it combines with erotic drives to become masochism, or if it turns against the world as aggression – with a greater or lesser erotic component. Now we can't help but see the significance of the possibility that aggression can't find satisfaction in the external world because it comes up against real obstacles. It will then perhaps retreat and increase the extent of the self-

destruction reigning within the individual. We shall hear that this is in fact what happens, and how important this process is. Impeded aggression seems to mean severe damage; it really does look as if we have to destroy other things and people in order to avoid destroying ourselves, in order to protect ourselves from our self-destructive tendency. Undoubtedly a sad revelation for the moralist!

The moralist, however, will be able to console himself for a long time to come with the improbability of our speculations. The very idea of a strange drive that is occupied in destroying its own organic home! The poets may speak of such things – but poets are irresponsible, they enjoy the privilege of poetic licence. It is true that similar ideas are not alien to physiology as well as to poetry (for example, the mucous membrane of the stomach digesting itself). But we have to admit that our notion of a self-destructive drive needs support on a broader basis. We can't venture to postulate something so far-reaching merely because a few poor fools have bound their sexual satisfaction to some peculiar condition. I believe that a deeper study of the drives will give us what we need. The drives don't only rule psychical life, but also vegetative life, and these organic drives display a characteristic that deserves our most serious attention. That is: they turn out to be striving to re-establish an earlier state of things. Whether this is a general characteristic of all drives we will only later be able to judge. We can assume that from the very moment at which such an established state is disturbed a drive arises to create it again, and phenomena are produced that we may call a *compulsion to repeat.*

Thus embryology is an isolated part of the compulsion to repeat; the capacity to re-create lost organs stretches right back into the animal kingdom, and the healing drive that we have to thank, along with our therapeutic activities, for our power of recovery, may be the remnant of this capacity that is so magnificently developed in the lower animals. The spawning migration of fish, perhaps the migration of birds, possibly everything that we call a manifestation of instinct in the case of animals takes place under the command of the compulsion to repeat, which expresses the *conservative nature* of the drives. In the realm of the psyche, too, we don't need to search long for manifestations of the same compulsion. We noticed that the forgotten and repressed experiences of earlier childhood are reproduced during analytical work in dreams and reactions (particularly in transference), although their reawakening runs counter to the pleasure principle's interests, and we explained this to ourselves by saying that in these cases a compulsion to repeat takes precedence even over the pleasure principle. Similar things can also be observed outside analysis. There are people who, all their lives, always repeat to their own detriment the same reactions without correction, or who even seem to be persecuted by inexorable fate – whilst closer investigation shows that they unwittingly bring this 'fate' upon themselves. In such cases, we ascribe a *demonic* character to the compulsion to repeat.

But what can this conservative character of the drives contribute to our understanding of our self-destructive tendency? What earlier state would such a drive want to re-establish? Well, the answer lies

close to hand, and opens up all sorts of perspectives. If it is true that life once arose – in an inconceivably remote age and in unimaginable ways – from inanimate matter then, according to our reckoning, a drive must have at that time come into being that wants to abolish life again and to re-establish the inorganic state. If we can see in this drive the self-destructive tendency we postulated, then we can regard this tendency as a manifestation of the *death-drive,* always present in any vital process. And now the drives that we believe in divide themselves into two groups: the erotic drives, which want to bundle together living substance to create ever greater unities, and the death-drives, which set themselves against this urge and want to lead living matter back to the inorganic state. The co-operation and opposition of both drives produces the phenomena of life that death puts to an end.

You will perhaps shrug your shoulders and say: 'that's not science, it's Schopenhauerian philosophy'. But why, Ladies and Gentlemen, should a bold thinker not have hit upon something that sober and painstaking detailed research subsequently confirms? And, after all, everything has been said already, and many people said similar things before Schopenhauer. And, moreover, what we are saying isn't even strictly Schopenhauer. We are not saying that death is the only aim of life; we are not overlooking the fact that there is life as well as death. We are recognizing two fundamental drives and are ascribing to each its own aim. How the two combine in the process of life; how the death-drive is made to serve the intentions of Eros, especially in its turning outwards as aggression:

these are tasks remaining for future research. We can get no further than the place where such a vista opens out before us. The question of whether the conservative character might not apply to all drives without exception, whether the erotic drives are not also trying to bring back an earlier state as they strive to synthesize living matter into greater unities – we will also have to leave this question unanswered.

We have diverged rather a long way from our basis. I want to tell you by way of an addendum what caused these reflections on the theory of drives. It was the same thing that led us to revise the relationship between the *Ich* and the unconscious, namely the impression we gained from analytical work that the patient who puts up resistance so often knows nothing about it. But he is unconscious not only of the fact of resistance, but also of the motives for this. We had to search for these motives or this motive and found them, much to our surprise, in a strong need for punishment that we could only class with masochistic wishes. The practical significance of this discovery is no less than its theoretical significance, as this need for punishment is the worst enemy of our therapeutic efforts. It is satisfied by the suffering connected with neurosis, and it clings on to illness because of this. It seems that this factor, the unconscious need to be punished, is involved in every neurotic illness. In this respect, cases in which neurotic suffering allows itself to be dissolved and replaced by a different type of suffering are really convincing. I shall recount an experience of this type to you. I once succeeded in freeing a mature spinster from a

complex of symptoms which had condemned her to a tormented existence for around fifteen years and had quite prevented her from taking any part in life. She now felt herself to be healthy again and plunged into assiduous activity in order to develop her talents (which were by no means minimal), and to snatch a bit of recognition, pleasure, and success while she still could. But every one of her attempts ended either with someone telling her or with her recognizing herself that she had become too old to achieve anything in this area. After every such outcome, the obvious thing would have been a relapse into illness, but she could no longer bring this about; instead of this, an accident would always befall her which would put her out of action for a long time and would cause her to suffer. She would fall and sprain her foot or damage her knee; she would injure a hand whilst she was busy doing something or another. Once it was pointed out to her how great a part she herself played in these apparently chance events she so to speak changed her technique. Instead of accidents, mild ailments – catarrh, tonsillitis, influenza-like symptoms, rheumatic swellings – would appear for the same reasons until she decided to resign herself to inactivity, whereupon the whole business finally came to an end.

There is, we believe, no doubt about where this unconscious need for punishment comes from. It acts like a part of the conscience, as if our conscience carried on into the unconscious; it will also have the same origin as the conscience – that is to say, it will correspond to a piece of aggression that was internalized and taken over by the

Über-Ich. If only the words were a bit less incongruous we should be justified, for all practical purposes, in calling it 'an unconscious sense of guilt'. Theoretically, we are in fact in some doubt as to whether we ought to suppose all the aggression turned back from the outer world to be annexed by the *Über-Ich* and consequently turned against the *Ich,* or whether we ought to suppose part of this aggression to be carrying out its silent and sinister activity as a free destruction-drive in the *Ich* and the *Es.* It is probable that there is a division of this kind, but we know nothing further about it. When the *Über-Ich* is initially set up, this authority is certainly endowed with that element of aggression towards the parents for which the child could create no release outwards on account of his love-fixation and external difficulties; and, because of this, the severity of the *Über-Ich* doesn't have to correspond to the harshness of the child's upbringing. It is highly possible that, when aggressiveness has to be suppressed on later occasions, the drive takes the same route that was opened up to it during that decisive period.

People with an excessively powerful unconscious sense of guilt betray themselves in analytical treatment through the negative therapeutic reaction so unwelcome from a prognostic point of view. Normally, if a patient is given a solution to his symptoms then we would expect these symptoms to disappear, at least temporarily; but in the case of these people we find, on the contrary, a momentary increase in their symptoms and their suffering. It is often sufficient just to praise them for their behaviour in the treatment, or to utter a few optimistic words about the way their analysis is progressing,

to bring about an unmistakable worsening of their condition. The non-analyst would say that he lacked the 'will to get better'; if you view this analytically, you will see this behaviour as an expression of the unconscious sense of guilt, which provides an ideal breeding ground for illness with its attendant sufferings and handicaps. The problems that the unconscious sense of guilt has opened up, its relationship to morality, education, criminality and delinquency, are currently the favoured areas of research for psychoanalysts.

Here we have unexpectedly left the psychical underworld and have emerged into the open marketplace. I can take you no further, but I must detain you with one last train of thought before I take my leave of you this time. We are quite used to saying that our culture is built up at the cost of sexual urges that are inhibited by society – indeed, are partly repressed, but are also partly used to achieve new aims. We have also admitted, proud though we are of our cultural achievements, that it is not easy for us to fulfil the demands of this culture, to feel content within it, because the restrictions imposed on our drives mean that a serious psychological burden is laid upon us. Now, what we have recognized as true of the sexual drives applies to the same – perhaps even to a greater – extent to the other drives, the aggression drives. It is these above all that make human communal life difficult and threaten its survival; restriction of aggression is the first, perhaps the most difficult, sacrifice that society has to demand of the individual. We have learnt in what an ingenious way this rebellious element is tamed. The institution of the *Über-Ich,* which grabs for itself the

dangerous aggressive impulses, is like setting a garrison into the province that is inclined to revolt. But on the other hand, viewed purely psychologically, we must admit that the *Ich* doesn't feel content when it is sacrificed in this way to the needs of society if it has to submit itself to the destructive inclinations of aggression that it would very much have liked to use itself against others. It is as if that dilemma of 'eat or be eaten' that rules the organic living world were being carried on in the psychical realm. Happily, the aggression drives are never alone, but are always blended with the erotic ones. Given the conditions of man-made civilization, these latter have much to soothe and prevent.

5
Femaleness

Ladies and Gentlemen! The whole time that I have been preparing to address you, I have been struggling with an inner difficulty. I feel so to speak unsure of my licence. Yes, it is true that fifteen years of work has changed and enriched psychoanalysis, but for all that, an introduction to psychoanalysis could be offered without any changes or additions. I have it constantly in mind that these lectures lack a *raison d'être*. I am telling analysts too little and nothing in the slightest bit new; while I am telling you too much – and am saying it about things that you are ill-equipped to understand, that are not your field. I have searched for excuses and have tried to justify each individual lecture on different grounds. The first lecture, on the theory of dreams, was meant to plunge you straight back into the analytical atmosphere and to show you how durable our views have proved themselves to be. I was provoked to write the second one, which traced the path from dreams to so-called occultism, by the opportunity it offered me to speak freely about an area of research in which there is nowadays an ongoing battle between prejudiced expectations and passionate resistances; and I could reasonably hope that you would accompany me on this little excursion as your powers of judgement have been educated by the example of psychoanalysis to be tolerant. The third lecture, which concerned the analysis of the psychical personality, certainly placed the

toughest demands on you, so alien were its contents, but I could not possibly withhold these first makings of an *Ich*-psychology from you, and if we had already had these makings fifteen years ago, I would have had to have mentioned them then. Finally, the last lecture, which was probably a great strain for you to follow, contained necessary corrections, new attempts to solve the most important puzzles, and my introduction would have become positively misleading if I had remained silent about these. You see how, if you try to excuse yourself, it ultimately turns out that everything was unavoidable, was predestined. I submit to fate, and I would ask you to do likewise.

Today's lecture, too, shouldn't really find its way into an introduction, but it can give you an example of a detailed piece of analytical work, and I can say two things to recommend it. First, it concerns only facts that we have observed and is almost entirely devoid of speculative additions; and second, it deals with a topic that has a claim on your interest like hardly any other. Throughout the ages, humans have pondered over the riddle of femaleness:

> Heads in hats of hieroglyphics,
> heads in turbans and black birettas,
> heads in wigs, and a thousand other
> poor perspiring human heads – (Heine, *Nordsee*)[15]

You, too, will have puzzled over this in so far as you are men; we don't expect this of the women among you, for you are yourselves this riddle. 'Male' or 'female' is the first distinction you make when

you encounter another human being, and you are accustomed to make this distinction with absolute certainty. Anatomical science shares your certainty in one respect, and in one respect alone. What is unquestionably 'male' is the male sexual product, the spermatozoon, and its vehicle; what is unquestionably 'female' is the egg and the organism that harbours it. In the case of both sexes, organs have been formed that exclusively serve the sexual function, and that probably developed from the same innate disposition into two different forms. Moreover in both sexes the other organs, the bodily forms and tissues (the so-called secondary sexual characteristics) are influenced by gentler, although this is inconstant and varies in degree. And then science tells you something that runs counter to your expectations and is probably liable to confuse you. And that is: it draws your attention to the fact that parts of the male sexual apparatus can also be found in the body of the female, albeit in a stunted form, and vice versa. Science considers this phenomenon as pointing to *bisexuality*, as if the individual were neither a man nor a woman but always both, only one much more than the other. You are then asked to accustom yourselves to the idea that the proportions in which male and female elements are combined in individuals are subject to substantial variations. However, given the undeniable fact that in all but the very rarest cases only *one* kind of sexual product – eggs or sperm-cells – is present in any one individual, you must inevitably have your doubts as to the decisive importance of these elements, and come to the

conclusion that ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness’ must be determined by some unknown quantity that lies beyond the grasp of anatomy.

Is it perhaps within the grasp of psychology? We are accustomed to use ‘male’ and ‘female’ as psychical qualities as well, and have in just the same way transferred the notion of bisexuality over into the psyche. Thus we speak of humans regardless of whether they be male or female acting in a ‘male’ way in one respect, and in a ‘female’ way in another. But you will quickly realize that this is merely submitting to anatomy and convention. You can give the concepts of ‘male’ and ‘female’ *no* new content. The difference between them is not a psychological one: if you say ‘male’, then you usually mean ‘active’, and if you say ‘female’, then you usually mean ‘passive’. Now, it is quite true that there is such a relationship. The male sexual cell is actively mobile; it seeks out the female one – and this, the egg, is not mobile; it passively awaits the male. Indeed, this behaviour on the part of the elementary sexual organisms is paradigmatic for the way in which the male and female individuals behave during sexual intercourse. The male pursues the female for the purpose of sexual union, seizes hold of her, and penetrates her. But by saying this, you have reduced the quality of maleness to the factor of aggression so far as psychology is concerned. You will doubt that you have thereby hit upon anything really essential if you consider that in some classes of animal the females are the stronger and more aggressive, and the males are active only in the single act of sexual union. Spiders are one

example of this. Moreover, functions of caring for and rearing the young, which seem to us to be so specifically female, are not necessarily connected with the female of the species in the case of animals. In the case of quite high species we can observe that the sexes share the task of caring for the young, or even that the male alone devotes himself to it. Even in the realm of human sexual life, you soon see how inadequate it is to offer a blanket definition of male behaviour as active and female behaviour as passive. The mother is active in every sense with regard to her child; even when it comes to the act of suckling, you can just as well say that she suckles the child as that she allows the child to suck from her. The further you then move away from the sphere of sexuality in its more narrow sense, the more clear that 'error of superimposition'[16] becomes. Women can display great activity in many different directions; men can't co-exist with their own land unless they develop a high degree of passive submissiveness. If you were now to claim that these facts proved precisely the point that men, like women, are bisexual in the psychological sense, then I would infer from this that you have decided in your own minds to identify 'active' with 'male' and 'passive' with 'female'. But I advise you against this. It seems to me to serve no useful purpose, and it adds nothing new to what we already know.

We could think of characterizing femaleness psychologically in terms of a preference for passive goals. This is, of course, not the same as passivity: a large amount of activity may be necessary to

carry through a passive aim. Perhaps what happens is that in the case of women, a preference for passive behaviour and passive goals, deriving from their role in the sexual function, extends to some degree into other areas of their life, the precise degree depending on whether this influence exerted by the sexual side of life abates or increases. At the same time, though, we must be careful not to underestimate the influence of the social order that also forces the female into passive situations. This is all still very unclear. There is one particularly constant relationship between femaleness and the drives that we don't want to overlook. The suppression of aggression, which is constitutionally prescribed for and socially imposed upon women, offers an ideal situation for strong masochistic impulses to develop – impulses that succeed, as we are aware, in erotically annexing the destructive inclinations that have been turned inwards. Thus masochism is, as people say, genuinely female. But if you encounter masochism in men, as so often happens – then what else can you do but say that these men display very clear female traits?

Now you are already prepared for the fact that psychology, like anatomy, won't solve the riddle of femaleness. The solution to this must no doubt be found elsewhere, and can't be found until we have discovered how living beings ever came to be divided into two sexes at all. We know nothing about this, and yet the division into male and female is one of the most striking characteristics of organic life. It is this that distinguishes it from inanimate nature. In the meantime, we find plenty to keep us busy if we study those

individual humans who are characterized as manifestly or predominantly female by the fact that they possess female genitalia. As befits its peculiar nature, psychoanalysis does not want to describe what the female is – it would find this task well-nigh impossible – but investigates how the innately bisexual child develops into a female. We have recently discovered some things about this, thanks to the fact that several of our excellent female analyst-colleagues have begun to work on this question. The discussion of this topic has taken on a particular frisson due to the difference between the sexes as, every time a comparison seemed to turn out to be unfavourable to their gender, our ladies could express their suspicion that we, the male analysts, had not managed to overcome certain deeply rooted prejudices against femaleness, and that we were now reaping our due reward by the bias afflicting our research. On the other hand, we found it easy to avoid impoliteness, standing as we were on the ground of bisexuality. We needed only to say: 'that doesn't apply to you. You're an exception; in this respect you're more male than female.'

We also approach our investigation of female sexual development with two expectations in mind. The first one is that here, too, the constitution won't adapt itself to its function without a struggle; and the second is that the decisive changes will already have been set in motion or completed before puberty. Both are quickly confirmed. Furthermore, a comparison between what happens with girls and what happens with boys tells us that it is more difficult and

complicated for a little girl to develop into a normal woman, since this involves two extra tasks to which there are no counterparts in the development of the man. Let us trace the parallels right from the beginning. Of course, the material is different to start with in boys and girls; we don't need psychoanalysis to tell us that. The difference in the way the genitals are formed is accompanied by other physical differences which are too well known to warrant a mention. In the disposition of the drives, differences appear which give us an idea of what the older woman will be like. The little girl tends to be less aggressive, defiant and self-sufficient than the little boy; she seems to have a greater need for people to show affection towards her and, because of this, she seems to be more dependent and amenable. The fact that it is much easier to teach the girl to control her excretions is very probably just the result of this amenability. Urine and faeces are, as we know, the first gifts that the child gives to whoever looks after it, and control over them is the first concession that can be wrested from the child's drives. We also get the impression that the little girl is more intelligent and lively than a boy of the same age; she is far more obliging in her dealings with the outside world and, at the same time, forms stronger object-investments. I don't know whether this apparent developmental head-start has been confirmed by more exact observations, though it is at any rate quite clear that the girl certainly can't be called intellectually backward. But these differences between the sexes don't really come into it; they are

outweighed by individual variations. We can disregard them for our immediate purposes.

Both sexes seem to pass through the early stages of libido-development in the same way. We might have expected the little girl to be demonstrating less aggression already in the anal-sadistic phase, but this is not so. By analysing children's play, our female analysts have discovered that the little girl's aggressive impulses leave nothing to be desired either in quantity or intensity. Once boys and girls enter the phallic phase the differences between them are totally eclipsed by the similarities. We just have to accept that little girls are to all intents and purposes little men. In the case of the boy, this phase is, as we know, distinguished by the fact that he has discovered how to obtain pleasurable sensations from his little penis, and to connect its aroused state with his notions of sexual intercourse. The girl does the same with her even smaller clitoris. It appears that in her case all onanistic activity concerns this penis equivalent, and that both sexes have yet to discover the actual vagina. We do, it is true, hear isolated reports of early vaginal sensations as well, but it is doubtless not easy to distinguish between these and sensations in the anus or atrium, and there can be no question of them playing any kind of major role. What we can be sure of is that the clitoris is the leading erogenous zone in a girl's phallic phase. Yet things are not meant to stay that way: as the girl turns into a woman, the clitoris is meant to fully or partly cede its sensitivity and therewith its significance to the vagina. This may be

reckoned one of the two tasks that have to be accomplished in order for womanhood to be completely achieved, whereas the more fortunate man, when sexually mature, merely has to continue doing what he had already been trying out during his early flush of sexuality.

We shall come back to the role of the clitoris. Let us now turn to the second task with which the girl's development is burdened. The boy's first love-object is the mother; she also remains as such during the formation of his Oedipus complex and, basically, throughout his whole life. For the girl, too, the mother – along with the other women who care for her, and who merge into the mother-figure – has to be the first object; the initial object-investments occur almost on the same pattern as the gratification of the major and simple needs of life, and the circumstances in which the child is cared for are the same for both sexes. In the Oedipus situation, however, the father has become the girl's love-object, and in the normal course of development we would expect her to find her way from the father-object to her object-choice. The girl has, then, to exchange her erogenous zone and object over the course of time, whilst the boy retains both of his. The question then arises: how does this happen? And, in particular, how does the girl shift her attachment from her mother to her father? Or, to put it another way: how does she switch from her male phase into the female one which is biologically determined for her?

Now, it would be an ideally simple solution if we could suppose that, at a certain age, some elementary influence of attraction between the sexes suddenly started to make itself felt and impelled the little woman to the man, whilst the same law could allow the boy to remain with his mother. Moreover, we could even suppose that the children are thereby following the pointer given to them by their parents' sexual preferences. But we are not going to have it this easy; we barely know whether we are seriously to believe in that mysterious force that the poets go into such raptures about and that defies further analysis. Painstaking investigation has provided us with information of quite a different kind, for which the material at least was easy to obtain. For you must know that a very large number of women remain until very late on tenderly dependent on the father-object or indeed even on their real father. We have made a number of surprising discoveries about such women with intensive and prolonged attachments to the father. We did of course know that there had been a preliminary stage of mother-attachment. But we did not know that it could be rich in content and so long-lasting; nor did we know that it could leave behind so many causes of fixations and tendencies. During this time, the girl's father is just an irksome rival; in some cases, the mother-attachment lasts beyond the age of four. Almost everything that we later find in the girl's relation to her father was already present in her attachment to the mother and has subsequently been transferred to the father. In short, we come to the conclusion that we can't understand women if

we don't sufficiently appreciate this phase of *pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother.*

Now, we are very keen to know what the libidinal relations of the girl to the mother are. The answer is: they are extremely diverse. Since they run through all three phases of infantile sexuality, they also take on the characteristics of the individual phases, and express themselves through oral, sadistic-anal, and phallic desires. These desires represent both active and passive impulses; if we relate them to the differentiation of the sexes that appears later–which, however, we should avoid doing so far as possible – we can call them 'male' and 'female'. They are, moreover, completely ambivalent in nature, being just as much tender and affectionate as they are hostile and aggressive. The latter desires often become apparent only after they have been transformed into images of fear. It is not always easy to pin down the precise ways in which these early sexual desires are formulated; the two desires that express themselves most clearly are the desire to give the mother a baby, and the corresponding desire to bear her a child. Both of these belong to the phallic period and, peculiar enough though they be, they are established beyond all doubt by analytical observation. The appeal of these investigations lies in the surprising details which they give to us. Thus, for example, we discover that the fear of being murdered or poisoned, which can later form the core of a paranoid illness, is already present in the pre-Oedipal period, and is related to the mother. Or, to take another case: you will remember an interesting episode from the history of analytical research that

caused me much discomfiture. At the time when our main interest was directed at uncovering infantile sexual traumas, almost all my female patients told me that they had been seduced by their fathers. Eventually I began to realize that these reports were untrue, and I thus came to understand that hysterical symptoms were derived from fantasies, not from real events. Only later could I recognize that this fantasy of being seduced by the father was the expression of the typical female Oedipus complex. And now we find the seduction-fantasy again in the pre-Oedipal prehistory of the girl – only, the seductress tends to be the mother. Here, though, there are some real grounds for the fantasy, as it was actually the mother who aroused (indeed, perhaps even initially introduced the child to) pleasurable sensations in the genitals whilst seeing to its bodily needs.

I dare say that you are ready to suspect this depiction of the extent and strength of the sexual relations between the little girl and her mother to be very much exaggerated. You have, after all, plenty of opportunity to observe little girls, and you notice nothing of this sort about them. But this objection is unjustified: there is plenty to see in children if you know how to observe them properly, and, moreover, you might want to consider how little of his sexual desires a child is able to bring to preconscious expression or communicate at all. We are, then, quite within our rights to study in retrospect the traces and consequences of this emotional world in people with whom these developmental processes had attained a particularly distinct or even excessive form. By isolating and

exaggerating them, pathology has after all always done us the service of making things recognizable that would normally have remained hidden. And, given that we carried out our investigations on people who are by no means severely abnormal, we can, I believe, regard their results as credible.

We shall now turn our attention to the single question of how this powerful attachment to the mother comes to be destroyed. We know that destruction is its usual fate; it is destined to make way for the attachment to the father. Here we stumble upon a fact that shows us the way to proceed. This step in development does not simply involve a change of object. No: the turning away from the mother occurs under the influence of hostility; the attachment to the mother ends in hate. This sort of hatred can become very conspicuous and can last a whole lifetime; later on, it can be carefully over-compensated for, although what tends to happen is that one part of it is overcome and another part remains in existence. The events of later life have, of course, a strong effect on this. However, we shall restrict ourselves to studying hatred at the time when the child turns to the father and questioning its motivation. We then hear a long list of accusations and grievances against the mother, which are supposed to justify the child's hostile feelings towards her; these very greatly in value, and we shall be discussing them further. Some are obvious rationalizations, and we have yet to discover the true sources of hostility. I hope you will find it interesting if I conduct you through all the details of a psychoanalytical investigation this time.

The reproach against the mother that goes back furthest is that she gave the child too little milk, this being construed as a lack of love. Now, there is a certain justification for this reproach so far as contemporary families are concerned. The mothers often don't have enough nourishment to give the child and make do with suckling it for perhaps six or nine months. In the case of primitive peoples, children are breast-fed until they are two or three. The figure of the wet-nurse generally merges with that of the mother; where this doesn't happen, the reproach against the mother takes another form – namely that she was too quick to send away the wet-nurse, who fed the child so willingly. But, regardless of what the real facts may have been, there is no way that the child's reproach can be so often justified as it is made. It seems far more that the child's greedy desire for its first nourishment is altogether insatiable; that it never gets over the loss of the mother's breast. I should not be at all surprised if the analysis of a primitive who was still allowed to suck at his mother's breast when he was already walking and talking brought the same reproach to light. The fear of being poisoned is also probably connected with the withdrawal of the breast. Poison is the nourishment that makes us ill. Perhaps the child also traces his early illnesses back to this denial of the breast. It takes quite a bit of intellectual training before we can believe in chance; the primitive, the uneducated person, certainly the child as well, are all able to give a reason for everything that happens. Perhaps this reason was originally a motive in the animistic sense. Even today, the belief persists in certain strata of our society that no one can the

without having been killed by someone else, preferably by the doctor. And the usual neurotic reaction to the death of somebody you are close to is to blame yourself for having caused this death.

The second accusation against the mother flares up when the second child appears in the nursery. If possible, this grievance remains connected with the mother's refusal of the breast. The mother could not or would not give the child any more milk because she needed the nourishment for the new arrival. In cases where two children are born so close together that lactation is adversely affected by the second pregnancy, there are, of course, real grounds for this reproach and, remarkably enough, even when the gap is only eleven months, the older child is not too young to realize what is going on. However, it is not just the milk that the child begrudges the unwanted intruder and rival, but all the other signs of maternal care. He feels dethroned, robbed, as if his rights have been infringed; he directs a jealous hatred onto his little brother or sister and begins to feel rancour towards his unfaithful mother, which very often expresses itself through an unpleasant change in his behaviour. He might become 'naughty', irritable, or disobedient, and he un-learns everything he has been taught about controlling his excretions. This has all been known for a long time and is taken to be self-evident, but we rarely have the correct ideas as to the strength of these jealous impulses, about the tenacious hold they have on the child, and about the degree of influence they exert on his later development. Particularly so as these jealous impulses are constantly supplied with fresh nourishment in later

childhood, and the whole shattering experience is repeated with the birth of every new sibling. Moreover, it makes no difference if the child happens to remain the mother's favourite: the child's demands for love are boundless; they demand exclusivity; and they allow no sharing.

A large source of the hostility of the child to the mother is found in its manifold sexual desires, which vary depending on which libidinal phase the child is in, and which mostly can't be satisfied. The most powerful of these sexual denials occurs during the phallic phase, when the mother forbids the child to play with its genitals – often with dire threats and with all the signs of disapproval – a pleasurable activity that she herself introduced it to. We might consider those to be motives enough for the girl to turn away from the mother. In that case, we could judge this estrangement between them to be the unavoidable consequence of the nature of infantile sexuality, of the excess of the child's demands for love and the fact that the sexual desires can't be fulfilled. Perhaps we might even believe this, the child's first love-relationship, to be doomed to come to an end precisely because it *is* the first such, for these early object-investments tend to be largely ambivalent; a strong inclination towards aggression is always present alongside the powerful feeling of love, and the more passionately the child loves its object, the more sensitive it becomes to disappointments and denials from this object's direction. Eventually, love has to capitulate to the accumulated hostility. Or one might reject the notion of this kind of primal ambivalence in the love-investments

and point out that it is the particular nature of the mother–child relationship that leads just as inevitably to the child's love being destroyed, since even the mildest upbringing can't help but exert compulsion and introduce restrictions, and every one of these encroachments on its freedom has to provoke a reaction in the child, namely an inclination to rebellion and aggression. It could, I believe, be interesting to discuss these possibilities – but an objection arises all of sudden which forces our attention in another direction. All these factors – the slights, the disappointments in love, the jealousy, the seduction and the subsequent prohibition – also come into play in the *boy*'s relationship with the mother, but don't manage to estrange him from the mother-object. Unless we can find something that is specific to the girl, something that either doesn't occur at all in the boy or doesn't occur in the same way, then we won't have explained how the girl's attachment to the mother comes to an end.

I believe that we have discovered this specific factor and, what's more, where we might have expected to find it, albeit in a surprising form. Where we might have expected to find it, I say, for it lies in the castration complex. The anatomical difference between the sexes must, after all, manifest itself in psychical consequences. However, it was a surprise to learn from analyses that the girl blames her lack of a penis on her mother, and doesn't forgive her for disadvantaging her in this way.

You gather, then, we are also ascribing a castration complex to women. And with good reason, although it can't have the same content as it does with the boy. In his case, the castration complex arises after he has seen the female genitalia and has learnt that his member, which he holds in such high regard, is not necessarily part of the body. He then remembers the threats that he incurred when playing with this member; he starts to believe them; and from then onwards he falls prey to the *fear of castration* which becomes the most powerful driving force in his further development. The girl's castration complex begins likewise with the sight of the opposite sex's genitals. She immediately notices the difference and – it must be admitted – what it signifies, too. She feels seriously diminished, often expresses a wish 'to have something like that as well', and lapses into *penis envy,* which leaves behind ineradicable traces in her development and in the formation of her character and which, even in the best circumstances, will not be overcome without her expending a great deal of psychical effort on the task. The fact that the girl recognizes her lack of a penis doesn't mean to say that she submits to it lightly. On the contrary, she clings to the wish to have something like that for a long time; carries on believing that it might be possible for an incredible number of years; and even when her knowledge of reality has long since caused her to give up any idea that this wish might be fulfilled, analysis can still prove that it has remained preserved within the unconscious and has retained a considerable amount of energy invested in it. The desire to obtain the longed-for penis after all can even be a factor impelling the

adult woman to seek analysis; and what she, understandably enough, expects from analysis – for instance the capacity to pursue an intellectual career – can often be recognized as a sublimated version of this repressed desire.

We cannot very well doubt the significance of penis envy. Just listen to the claim – an example of male 'unfairness' – that envy and jealousy play an even greater role in the psyche of women than they do in that of men. Not that we take these qualities to be absent in men, or that we take them to be solely based on penis envy in the case of women; but we are inclined to attribute their stronger presence in women's case to the influence of the latter. However, some analysts are now tending to devalue the significance of that first wave of penis envy in the phallic phase. They believe that what they find of this attitude in women is principally a secondary formation that comes about on the occasion of some later conflict by regression to the early infantile impulse in question. Now, that is a general problem of depth psychology. In the case of many pathological – or even merely unusual – drive-employments (for example all the sexual perversions) the question arises as to how much of their force is to be attributed to early infantile fixations and how much to the influence of later experiences and developments. In such cases it is almost always a matter of the kinds of complementary theories that we proposed when we were discussing the aetiology of the neuroses. Both factors are responsible to varying degrees: a less on the one side is compensated for by a more on the other. In all cases, the infantile

factor sets the trend; it does not always determine the issue, though it often does. Precisely in the case of penis envy I should like to come down quite decidedly in favour of the predominance of the infantile factor.

The girl's discovery that she is castrated is a turning-point in her development. Three lines of development proceed from this: the first one leads to sexual inhibition or to neurosis; the second to a change of character in the sense of a masculinity complex; and the third, finally, to normal femaleness. We have discovered a fair amount, though not everything, about all three. The essential content of the first one is that the little girl, who has up to that point lived a male existence, who has been able to gain pleasure for herself by stimulating her clitoris and has connected this activity to her (often active) sexual desires directed towards her mother, allows the influence of penis envy to spoil her enjoyment of her phallic sexuality. Her self-esteem is damaged by the comparison with the boy who is so much better equipped, so she renounces the masturbatory gratification that she gained from her clitoris, repudiates her love for her mother, and in the process frequently represses a good deal of her sexual urges as a whole. The turning away from the mother doubtless doesn't take place overnight, for the girl initially considers her castration to be an individual misfortune; only gradually does she extend this to include all other females, and finally her mother too. Her love was directed towards the *phallic* mother; the discovery that the mother is castrated makes it possible for the girl to drop her as a love-object so that her

motives for feeling hostility, which have long been mounting up, gain the upper hand. This means, then, that the discovery that the woman has no penis affects the girl in the same way that it affects the boy, and, later perhaps, the man: it devalues women for them.

You all know what immense aetiological importance our neurotic patients attribute to their masturbation. They blame it for all their complaints, and it requires a great deal of effort on our part to get them to believe that they are mistaken. But we ought actually to concede that they are right, for masturbation is the executive agent of infantile sexuality, from the mis-development of which they most certainly do suffer. Now, neurotics mostly blame the masturbation that takes place during puberty; that of early childhood, which is what in fact matters, they have mostly forgotten. I wish I had the opportunity to explain to you at length how important all the factual details of early masturbation are in determining later neurosis or the character of the individual – whether it was discovered or not; how the parents fought it or permitted it; whether he managed to suppress it himself. All these details leave permanent traces in his development. But I am in fact glad that I need not do so: it would be a difficult, protracted task, and at the end of it you would embarrass me because you would quite certainly ask me to give you practical advice as to how a parent or educator should deal with masturbation in small children. The development of girls, which I am outlining at present, gives you an example of the child herself making an effort to free herself from masturbation. But she is not always successful. Where penis envy

has awakened the strong impulse against clitoral masturbation and where this will, however, not subside, there follows a violent struggle for freedom in which the girl herself as it were takes on the role of the deposed mother, and starts to express the conflict between the dissatisfaction she feels with her inferior clitoris and the gratification it provides her with. Many years later, when masturbatory activity has long since been suppressed, she still continues to be interested in it, and we must interpret this interest as a defence against a temptation that she still fears. It expresses itself in her starting to feel sympathy for people to whom similar difficulties can be attributed; it is a motivating factor in her entering into a marriage; indeed, it can even determine her choice of a husband or lover. The settling of early childhood masturbation really is not easy; nor is it a matter of indifference.

By giving up clitoral masturbation, the girl also renounces a certain amount of activity. Passivity now has the upper hand, and the turning to the father is completed mainly with the help of passive drive-impulses. You will realize that a developmental wave of this kind, which removes phallic activity from the picture, smoothes the ground for femaleness. If, in the process, not too much is lost through repression, this femaleness can turn out to be normal. The desire with which the girl turns to the father is most probably originally the desire for the penis that the mother denied her and which she now expects the father to give her. The female situation is, however, only established once the desire to have a penis is replaced by the desire to have a baby – that is, when the

baby takes the place of the penis in accordance with an ancient symbolic equivalence. It doesn't escape our notice that the girl has already wished for a baby earlier, during the undisturbed phallic phase; that was, of course, the meaning behind her playing with dolls. But this playing did not actually express her femaleness: it served her identification with the mother, with the intention of replacing passivity by activity. She played the mother, and the doll was herself; now she could do everything to the child that her mother used to do to her. Only once the desire for a penis enters into it does the doll-child become a child of the father – and from then onwards it becomes the strongest female aim and desire. The female is delighted if this childhood desire finds its real fulfilment at some later point, but particularly so if the child is a little boy who comes complete with the longed-for penis. In the phrase 'a child of the father' the stress often enough rests on the child rather than on the father. Thus her old 'male' desire to posses a penis is still faintly visible through the fully fledged femaleness. But perhaps we should, rather, take this desire for a penis to be a specifically female one.

With the transference of the desire for a child-penis onto the father, the girl enters into the situation of the Oedipus complex. The hostility towards the mother, which did not need to be created from scratch, is now greatly reinforced, as the mother becomes a rival who receives everything from the father that the girl desires from him. The girl's Oedipus complex has long concealed from us her pre-Oedipal attachment to her mother that is, however, so important

and that leaves behind so many lasting fixations. For the girl, the Oedipal situation is the outcome of a long and difficult development; a kind of temporary solution. It gives her 'breathing space', and is something she is in no hurry to abandon, particularly as the latency period will soon begin. And here, we notice a difference between the sexes that probably has serious consequences so far as the relationship between the Oedipus complex and the castration complex goes. The boy's Oedipus complex, in which he desires his mother and would like to do away with his rival, his father, develops naturally from the phase of phallic sexuality. The threat of castration, however, forces him to give up this attitude. Under the impression that he is in danger of losing his penis, he abandons, represses, in the most normal cases fundamentally destroys his Oedipus complex, and as its heir a severe *Über-Ich* is put in place. Almost the opposite happens with the girl. Instead of destroying the Oedipus complex, the castration complex lays the ground for it; penis envy drives the girl to detach herself from her mother and to seek refuge in the haven of the Oedipus complex. Once the fear of castration has disappeared, so too has the primary motive that forced the boy to overcome the Oedipus complex. The girl remains in it for an indefinite period; she dismantles it only late and then incompletely. In these circumstances, the formation of the *Über-Ich* must suffer: it can't achieve the strength and independence that lend it its cultural significance – feminists never like it when we point out the effects of this fact on the average female character.

Now, let us go back a bit. We mentioned as the second of the possible reactions to the discovery of female castration the development of a powerful masculinity complex. By this we mean that the girl as it were refuses to recognize the unpalatable fact; she, defiantly rebellious, exaggerates even more strongly the maleness she has demonstrated up until this point; clings to her clitoral activity; and takes refuge in identifying with the phallic mother or with the father. What is it that might determine this outcome? We can only imagine that it is a constitutional factor, a greater degree of activity such as is usually characteristic of a male. After all, the essential thing about this process is that at this point of development the wave of passivity that facilitates the switch to femaleness is avoided. The most extreme achievement of this masculinity complex seems to us to be the way it influences the object-choice in the sense of manifest homosexuality. It is true that analytical experience teaches us that female homosexuality is rarely or never a direct continuation of infantile maleness. It seems to be part of it that even such girls take their fathers as the object for a while and enter into the Oedipal situation. Then, however, the inevitable disappointment they feel in their fathers forces them to regress to their early masculinity complex. We mustn't exaggerate the significance of these disappointments; the girl who is destined for femaleness is not spared them, either, but they don't have the same effect on her. The superior strength of the constitutional factor seems indisputable, but the two phases in development of female homosexuality are beautifully reflected in the practices of

homosexuals, who just as often and just as clearly play the roles of mother and child with one another as they do those of man and wife.

What I have been telling you is, so to speak, the prehistory of women. It is a product of most recent years, and may have been interesting to you as an example of detailed analytical work. As women are our topic, I shall allow myself this time to mention by name a few women whom this investigation has to thank for their important contributions. Dr Ruth Mack Brunswick was the first to describe a case of neurosis that led back to a fixation in the pre-Oedipal state and that had never reached the Oedipus situation at all. It took the form of paranoid jealousy and proved accessible to therapy. The assured observations of Dr Jeanne Lampel-de Groot established the fact, so unbelievable as it is, of the girl's phallic activity towards the mother; and Dr Helene Deutsch demonstrated that the love-acts of homosexual women reproduce the mother–child relationship.

It is not my intention to trace the further course of femaleness through puberty until the time of maturity. In any case, our knowledge would be insufficient for the purpose. However, I will bring together a few characteristics in what follows. Taking up from the prehistory I wish here only to emphasize that the development of femaleness remains exposed to disturbances by the residual phenomena of women's 'male' prehistory. Regressions to the fixations of those pre-Oedipal phases occur very frequently; in the

course of some women's lives, there is a repeated alternation between times in which maleness or femaleness gains the upper hand. Part of that which we men call the 'riddle of women' may possibly be derived from this expression of bisexuality in women's lives. But another question seems to have become ripe for discussion during the course of our investigations. We have called the driving force of sexual life the 'libido'. Sexual life is governed by the polarity of male–female; thus what immediately suggests itself to us is to consider the relationship of the libido to this polarity. It would not be surprising if it turned out that every sexuality were assigned its own particular libido, so that one kind of libido would pursue the aims of male sexuality and another the aims of female sexuality. But nothing like this is the case. There is only one libido, and it serves both the male and the female sexual functions. We can't say that it is either gender itself; even if we were to call it male, in accordance with the traditional equation of activity and masculinity, we mustn't forget that it also represents urges with passive aims. All the same, there is no justification for the collocation 'female libido'. Furthermore, we get the impression that more compulsion is applied to the libido if it is forced into the service of the female function and that – teleologically speaking – nature takes the claims of this function into account much less carefully than it does in the case of the male. And the reason for this may – again, I mean this teleologically – be that the achievement of the biological aim is entrusted to the aggression of the man, and has been to some extent made independent of the woman's consent.

The sexual frigidity of women, which we encounter so often that it seems to confirm this pattern of discrimination, is a phenomenon that is not satisfactorily understood. Sometimes it is psychogenic, in which case it is open to influence; but in other cases we are led to assume that it is constitutionally determined or, even, that an anatomical factor might be involved. I promised to offer you a few more psychical peculiarities of mature femaleness as we encounter them in analytical observation. We don't take these assertions to be any more than averagely true; nor is it always easy to know what is due to the sexual function, and what to social discipline. Thus we ascribe a high degree of narcissism to females, which also influences their object-choice, so that for the woman being loved is a far more powerful need than to love. The effect of penis envy still plays a part in the physical vanity of the woman, for she has to rate her charms all the more highly as a belated compensation for her original sexual inferiority. The sense of shame – a characteristic that is commonly regarded as being inherent in females, but that has much more to do with convention than one might think – was originally intended to mask the defective genitalia. We don't forget that it later assumed other functions. One tends to think that women have not contributed much to the discoveries and inventions of the history of our civilization – but perhaps they might have invented a technology after all: that of plaiting and weaving. If this is the case, we would be tempted to guess the unconscious motive behind this achievement. Nature herself might be regarded as having given us the paradigm for imitation by making the pubic

hair, which hides the genitals, grow at puberty. The step that still remained to be taken consisted in entwining the fibres, whereas in the body they protruded from the skin and were just matted together. If you reject this idea as fantasy and consider the influence of the lack of a penis on the formation of femaleness to be an *idée fixe* on my part, then I am, of course, defenceless.

The determinants of the woman's object-choice are often enough rendered unrecognizable by social circumstances. Where the choice is allowed to show itself freely, it often occurs in accordance with the narcissistic ideal of the man whom the girl had wished to become. If the girl remains stuck in her attachment to her father – in other words, in the Oedipus complex – then she chooses according to the father-type. Since, when she turned from her mother to her father, the hostile aspect of her ambivalent feelings remained directed towards her mother, a choice of this sort ought to guarantee a happy marriage. But very often we find an outcome that in general threatens this way of settling the ambivalence conflict. The hostility that was left behind creeps up on the positive attachment and extends to the new object. In time, the husband, who firstly inherited from the father, becomes the mother's heir as well. Thus it can easily happen that the second half of a woman's life is taken up with the battle with her husband just as the first, shorter, period was taken up with the rebellion against her mother. Once the reaction has been lived out, a second marriage can easily turn out to be much more satisfactory. Another change in the nature of the woman, for which a married couple are unprepared, may

occur after the first child has been born. Under the influence of her own motherhood, the woman's identification with her mother can be revived – something the woman has striven against until her marriage – and can seize for itself all the available libido so that the compulsion to repeat reproduces an unhappy marriage between her parents. That the old factor of the lack of a penis has not yet forfeited its strength is demonstrated by the different reactions of the mother to the birth of a son or a daughter. Only the relationship with the son brings the mother complete satisfaction: it is quite the most perfect of all human relationships and is more likely than any other to be free from ambivalence. The mother can transfer onto the son all the ambition that she had to suppress in herself; she can expect him to satisfy all that remains of her masculinity complex. Even the marriage is not secure until the woman has also managed to turn her husband into a child and can play the role of mother towards him.

We can recognize two strata in the woman's identification with her mother: the pre-Oedipal one, which is based on the affectionate attachment to the mother and takes her as a model; and the later one, derived from the Oedipus complex, which wants to get rid of the mother and take her place with the father. Much of both of them remains left over for the future; we are no doubt justified in saying that neither is overcome to a sufficient degree in the course of development. But the phase of affectionate pre-Oedipal attachment is the decisive one for the woman's future, for, during this phase, she prepares to acquire those qualities that will later

enable her to play her part in the sexual function adequately and to perform her valuable social achievements. It is through this identification that she acquires the power of attraction for the man that converts his Oedipal attachment to his mother into the ardour of love. However, what so frequently happens is that it is the *son* who obtains that which the man had courted for himself. We get the impression that the love of a man and that of a woman are a psychological phase apart from one another.

The fact that we have to attribute little sense of justice to women is no doubt connected to the predominance of envy in their psyche, as the demand for justice is envy that has been modified in a particular way, and it lays down the conditions under which women can let envy go. We also consider women's social interests to be weaker and their capacity to sublimate their drives to be lower than those of men. The former is no doubt derived from the unsocial character that is undoubtedly a characteristic of all sexual relationships. Lovers find sufficiency in each other, and even the family unit resists becoming absorbed by wider organizations. The capacity for sublimation is subject to the greatest individual fluctuations. Despite this, I can't refrain from mentioning an impression that keeps presenting itself to us in analytical work. A man of around thirty strikes us as being a useful, somewhat not yet fully formed individual, and we expect that he will take full advantage of the developmental possibilities that psychoanalysis opens up to him. However, a woman of a similar age often shocks up by her psychical rigidity and unchangeability. Her libido has

taken up its final positions and appears to be incapable of exchanging them for others. There are no paths open to her for further development: it is as if the whole process had already run its course, as if it remained beyond influence from now on, perhaps even as if the difficult development that leads to femaleness had exhausted all the individual's possibilities. As therapists, we lament this state of affairs, even when we manage to end the patient's suffering by overcoming her neurotic conflict.

That is all I have to say to you about femaleness. It is most certainly incomplete and fragmentary; it may also sound unfriendly at times. Don't forget, though, that we have portrayed women only in so far as their essential nature is determined by their sexual function. Granted, this influence extends a very long way, but we must still bear in mind that the individual woman may be a human being in other respects as well. If you want to know more about femaleness, you should question your own experiences, or turn to the poets, or wait until science can give you more profound and coherent information.

6
Explanations, Applications, Orientations

Ladies and Gentlemen! May I for once, fed up, so to speak, with the dry tone of these lectures, speak to you about things that have very little theoretical significance but which, however, closely concern you, in so far as you are favourably disposed towards psychoanalysis? Let us imagine this scenario: in an idle moment you pick up a German, English or American novel in which you expect to find a description of the people and conditions as they are today. After a few pages you encounter a remark about psychoanalysis, and, very soon, you encounter further such remarks, even if the context doesn't seem to demand them. You must not imagine that this is a case of applying depth psychology in order to gain a better understanding of the characters or their actions in the text, though there are other, more serious, works of literature that genuinely attempt to do this. No: these are mostly derisive remarks, by which the author wants to display his intellectual superiority, how well-read he is. Moreover, you don't always get the impression that he really knows what he is talking about. Or you may attend for your recreation a social gathering; it doesn't necessarily have to be in Vienna. After a short while, the conversation turns to psychoanalysis. You hear the most diverse people proffering their opinions, mostly in a tone of unwavering certainty. They are usually contemptuous, often abusive; at the very least, they are derisive

again. If you are careless enough to let it slip that you know something about the subject, everyone falls upon you; they demand information and explanations, and you are very soon convinced that all these severe judgements have been based on no prior information, that hardly a single one of these opponents has ever picked up an analytical book or, if they have, that they never got beyond the first resistance they felt towards the new material they encountered.

You may perhaps also expect an introduction to psychoanalysis to tell you which arguments you can use to correct these patent mistakes about analysis; which books you could recommend to those who want better information; or even which examples from your own reading or experience you should call upon in discussion in order to change people's attitudes. I beg you to do none of these. It would be useless; it would be best if you hid your superior knowledge altogether. If that is no longer possible, then restrict yourself to saying that you believe, so far as you are orientated in the subject, psychoanalysis to be a special branch of science, extremely difficult to understand and to judge; that you understand it to concern very serious things, so that it couldn't be dealt with by a couple of jokes, and that it would be preferable to find an alternative plaything for social entertainment. Nor, of course, do you get involved in attempts at interpretation if incautious people recount their dreams; and you will also resist the temptation to

court favour for analysis by telling everyone about the people it has cured.

However, you can raise the question as to why these people – the writers of books as well as the conversationalists – behave so badly, and you will be inclined to suspect that it is not just these people who are responsible, but psychoanalysis as well. I also believe this to be the case. What you experienced as prejudice in literature and society is the after-effect of an earlier judgement – namely the judgement that the representatives of official science had passed on the young psychoanalysis. I have already complained about this once before in an historical account of the subject and I shall not do so again – perhaps even once was already once too often – but really, there was no limit to the injury that the scientific opponents of psychoanalysis would have allowed themselves to do to logic as well as to decency and good taste. It was a situation such as actually occurred in the Middle Ages, when a wrong-doer or even a mere political opponent was put in the pillory and exposed to abuse from the mob. And you are perhaps not fully aware of the extent to which the mob mentality reaches into our society, and what mischief humans will permit themselves to get up to if they feel themselves to be part of the mass and above personal responsibility. At the start of those times I stood pretty much alone; I soon realized that polemicizing would achieve nothing – and nor was there any point complaining or invoking the aid of more benign spirits, as there were in fact no higher powers before whom I could bring my case. Thus I took another path; I made use of applied psychoanalysis

for the first time by explaining the behaviour of masses as a manifestation of the same resistance that I had to fight in individual patients. I refrained from polemic myself, and influenced my followers, as they gradually started to gather, to do likewise. The method was good and the ban under which analysis was placed at that time has since been lifted – but, in the same way that an old belief carries on existing as superstition, or that a theory abandoned by science remains preserved as a popular conviction, so too that original anathematization of psychoanalysis in scientific circles continues to survive today, in the mocking contempt of the lay people who write books or make conversation. So you will no longer be surprised by this.

Now, however, you mustn't expect to hear the glad tidings that the struggle for analysis is over, and that it ended with analysis being recognized as a science and being admitted onto the university syllabus. There is no question of that. The battle continues; it just takes more respectable forms. There is also a new development: a type of buffer layer has arisen in the scientific community between analysis and its opponents – that is to say, people who will allow that there is something in analysis (and who will even say so, subject to some rather entertaining qualifications) but who make up for it by rejecting other aspects of it, as they cannot proclaim loudly enough. It is not easy to work out what determines their choice. It seems to be based on personal sympathies. One person objects to sexuality, another to the unconscious; symbolism seems to be particularly unpopular. These

eclectics don't seem to consider that the edifice of psychoanalysis, unfinished though it may be at the moment, already represents a unified structure from which people can't just break off whatever elements they happen to like the look of. Not a single one of these half- or three-quarter-followers gave me the impression that their rejection was based on examination of the actual material. Some very distinguished men also belong in this category. Granted, they are excused by the fact that their time, like their interest, belongs to other subjects, namely those in the mastery of which they have achieved such significant things. But would it not then be preferable if they were to reserve their judgement instead of so decisively taking sides? In the case of one of these great men, I once succeeded in making a quick conversion. He was a world-famous critic, who had followed the intellectual currents of the age with benevolent understanding and prophetic perspicacity. I only got to know him after he had passed his eightieth year, but he was still enchanting in conversation. You will easily guess who I mean.[17] And, moreover, I was not the one who brought psychoanalysis into our conversation. He did so by comparing himself to me in the most modest way possible. 'I am just a literary man', he said, 'whereas you are a scientist and discoverer. But there is one thing I must say to you: I have never had sexual feelings towards my mother'. 'Yes, but you won't necessarily have known anything about it', I replied; 'these are, of course, processes that the adult is not at all conscious of. 'Ah, so *that's* what you mean', he said, relieved, and shook my hand. We chatted for a few hours longer on the best of terms. I later

heard that he repeatedly spoke favourably about analysis during the short period between our meeting and his death, and that he loved using the new word he had learnt: ‘repression’.

A well-known saying urges us to learn from our enemies. I confess that I have never succeeded in doing so, but I thought all the same that it could be instructive for you if I were to examine all the reproaches and objections which the opponents of psychoanalysis have levelled at it, and if I were then to point out all the obvious injustices and breaches of logic contained within them. But ‘on second thoughts’[18] I told myself that this would not be in the slightest bit interesting, but would become tiresome and unpleasant, and would in fact become precisely what I have been so carefully avoiding all these years. So you will forgive me if I don’t pursue this path any further, and if I spare you the judgements of our so-called scientific opponents. We are, after all, almost always dealing here with people whose sole qualification is the impartiality that they have preserved by remaining distant from the experiences of psychoanalysis. But I know that you won’t let me off so lightly in other cases. After all, you will tell me reproachfully, there are so many people to whom my last remark doesn’t apply. These people, you will object, haven’t steered clear of analytical experiences; they have analysed patients, may perhaps even have been analysed themselves. They were even your colleagues for some time, yet have arrived at other views and theories, on the basis of which they have forsaken you and have founded independent schools of

psychoanalysis. I ought, you will say, to explain the possibility and significance of these defecting movements that crop up so frequently in the history of analysis.

Very well, I will try to do this; although, admittedly, only briefly, for it reveals less for an understanding of analysis than you might expect. I know you are thinking first and foremost of Adlerian Individual Psychology, which is viewed (for example in America) as an equally important parallel to our psychoanalysis, and tends to be mentioned in the same breath. In reality, the two have little to do with one another, but certain historical circumstances have resulted in Individual Psychology leading a kind of parasitic existence at the expense of our psychoanalysis. The determinants that we supposed to apply to this group of opponents only applied to the founder of Individual Psychology to a very limited extent. Its very name is unsuitable, and seems to be a product of embarrassment. We can't let ourselves be put off using it in the legitimate sense, as the opposite to mass psychology; and, moreover, our own work concerns first and foremost the psychology of the individual human. I don't wish to embark upon an objective critique of Adlerian Individual Psychology today; it doesn't fit into the plan of these introductory lectures. Besides, I have also already attempted it once, and I have little cause to revise what I said then. However, I shall illustrate the impression that it creates by means of a small event that took place in the years before there was any such thing as analysis.

Near to the little Moravian town where I was born and which I left as a three-year-old child, there is a modest spa, beautifully situated amidst greenery. As a schoolboy I spent several holidays there. Some twenty years later the illness of a close relative caused us to visit this place again. During a conversation with the resident physician who had attended my relative, I came to ask him about his dealings with the peasants – Slovaks, I believe – who constituted his sole clientele in winter. He said his medical practice took place in the following way: the patients would come to his room at his appointed surgery time and would line up. One after another would step forward and complain about his ailments. He might have pain in the small of his back, or stomach cramps, or tired legs, and so on. Then the doctor would examine him, and after he had found out what was the matter, he would call out the diagnosis to him – the same diagnosis every time. He translated the word for me, and it amounted to 'bewitched'. Astonished, I asked if the peasants did not object to his verdict being the same in every case. 'Oh no', he replied, 'they are extremely satisfied with the diagnosis; it is what they expected. Each one who steps back into the line indicates to the others through his expression and gestures: "yes, he is a man who understands".' Little did I imagine then under which circumstances I would encounter an analogous situation again.

For, whether someone be a homosexual or a necrophile, a fear-ridden hysteric, an isolated obsessional neurotic, or a raving madman, the Individual Psychologist of the Adlerian persuasion will in every case say that the motive force behind his condition is a

desire to assert himself, to over-compensate for his inferiority, to remain on top, to switch from the female to the male line. As young clinical students, we heard something very similar to this when we were presented with a case of hysteria. Hysterics, we were told, create their symptoms in order to make themselves interesting, in order to draw attention to themselves. What goes around, comes around! But even then, this little fragment of psychology seemed to us not to cover the riddle of hysteria; for example, it did not explain why sick people availed themselves of no other means of attaining their ends. Of course, *some* aspect of the Individual Psychologists' theory has to be right, some small particle within the whole. The self-preservation drive will attempt to exploit every situation for itself, and even the *Ich* will want to turn sickness to its own advantage. Psychoanalysis calls this the 'secondary illness-gain'. If one thinks of the facts of masochism – of the unconscious need for punishment and the neurotic self-harming tendencies, all of which suggest the hypothesis of drive-impulses that run counter to self-preservation – then, it is true, one no longer has much faith even in the universal validity of that banal truism on which the whole theoretical structure of Individual Psychology is built. However, the broad mass of people would strongly welcome such a theory that recognizes no complications, introduces none of those new terms that are so difficult to grasp, knows nothing of the unconscious, removes at one fell swoop the problem of sexuality that weighs so heavily on us all, restricts itself to revealing the devices that people use to make their lives comfortable. For the mass is itself

comfortable: it demands nothing more than a single reason to serve as an explanation; doesn't thank science for going into things at such length; wants simple solutions and to know that problems have been sorted out. If you consider the extent to which Individual Psychology complies with these requirements, you can't help remembering a phrase from *Wallenstein:*

> if the idea weren't so damned clever,
> you'd be tempted to call it downright stupid.[19]

Criticism in specialist circles, so relentlessly opposed to psychoanalysis, has generally handled Individual Psychology with kid gloves. True, one of the most respected psychiatrists in America published a paper against Adler, entitled 'Enough', in which he energetically discussed how tired he was of the Individual Psychologists' 'compulsion to repeat'. If others have behaved far more kindly, it is no doubt largely due to their antagonism towards analysis.

I need not say much about the other schools that have branched off from our psychoanalysis. The fact that this has happened neither proves nor disproves the validity of psychoanalysis. You only have to think of the strong emotional factors that make it difficult for many people to fit in with others or to submit to them, and of the even greater difficulty which is rightly emphasized in the saying *quot capita tot sensus.*[20] Once our differences of opinion had gone beyond a certain limit, the most useful thing was for us to part company and thereafter to go our separate ways – particularly if the

difference between the *theories* would mean a change in analytical *practice*. Let us say, for example, that the analyst disregards the individual's past, and seeks the cause of neurosis exclusively in current factors and future expectations. This means that he will fail to analyse the patient's childhood: he will adopt a totally different technique, and will have to make up for excluding the results from the analysis of the patient's childhood by increasing his own didactic influence and by directly recommending that the patient adopt particular aims in life. We, for our part, will then say: 'that may be a school of thought, but it is no longer analysis'. Or another analyst[21] may come to believe that the experience of fear at birth sows the seed for all later neurotic disturbances; it may then seem legitimate to him to restrict analysis to the effects of this one experience and to promise that a three- to four-month course of therapy will solve the problem. You will notice that I have chosen two examples that proceed from diametrically opposed premisses. It is an almost universal characteristic of these 'defecting movements' that each of them seizes a chunk from the wealth of psychoanalytical motivating forces (the drive for power, say, or ethical conflict, or the mother, or genitality, and so on) and, on the basis of having taking possession of such a chunk, makes itself independent. If it seems to you that such secessions are already more frequent today in the history of psychoanalysis than they are in other intellectual movements, I am not sure whether I would say that you are right. If it is the case, we have to blame the intimate relationships between theoretical opinions and therapeutic practice

that exist in psychoanalysis. Differences of opinion alone could be borne for much longer. People love accusing us psychoanalysts of intolerance. The sole expression of this loathsome characteristic was precisely our separating ourselves from those who thought differently. Otherwise, we have done them no harm. On the contrary, they came up trumps: since then, they have had a better time of it than before, for, by parting company from us, they have generally freed themselves from one of the burdens we groan under – from, say, the odium of infantile sexuality or the ridiculousness of symbolism – and are now deemed by the world at large to be halfway respectable – something that we, the ones who stayed behind, are still not. Moreover, they – with one notable exception[22] – were the ones who chose to exclude themselves.

What further claims do you make in the name of tolerance? Do you believe that, if someone has expressed an opinion that we consider to be fundamentally wrong, we should say to him: Thank you so much for voicing this contradiction. You are saving us from the danger of complacency, and you are giving us the opportunity to prove to the Americans that we really are as 'broadminded'[23] as they always desire us to be. Of course, we don't believe a single word you're saying, but that doesn't matter. You are probably just as right as we are. For who can ever really know what is right? Do allow us to represent your views in our literature despite our opposition. We hope you will be kind enough in return to support all those ideas of ours that you reject. This will obviously become standard practice in scientific circles in the future, once the misuse

of Einstein's theory of relativity has been completely carried through. It is true that we haven't got that far yet. At the moment, we restrict ourselves in the old fashion to representing only our own convictions; we expose ourselves to the risk of making errors, for these are unavoidable; and we reject what contradicts us. We have made extensive use in psychoanalysis of the right to change our minds if we believe we have come up with something better.

One of the first applications of psychoanalysis was that it taught us to understand the opposition that our psychoanalytical activities aroused in our contemporaries. Other applications, of an objective nature, can lay claim to a more general interest. Our first intention was, of course, to understand the disturbances of the human psyche because a remarkable experience had shown that, in the psyche, understanding and cure go hand in hand; that a traversable path leads from one to the other. For a long time, this was also our sole intention. But then we started to recognize the close relationship, indeed the internal identity, between pathological processes and so-called normal ones; psychoanalysis became depth psychology; and, as nothing that humans create or do can be understood without the help of psychology, the applications of psychoanalysis to countless areas of knowledge, especially the humanities, happened automatically, forced themselves upon our attention, and demanded that they be dealt with. Unfortunately our tasks encountered obstacles that, grounded as they are in the very nature of the situation, have still not been overcome even today. An application

of this type presupposes specialist knowledge that the analyst doesn't possess, while those who do possess it – the experts – don't know anything about analysis, and perhaps have no desire to know anything about it either. As a result of this, the analysts have undertaken dilettante forays into those areas of knowledge such as mythology, the history of civilization, ethnology, the science of religion and so on, with more or less adequate equipment often thrown together in a hurry. They were treated by the established experts in those fields no better than any interloper ever is. Their methods, like their findings, were initially rejected in so far as they attracted any attention at all. But the situation is constantly improving, and the number of people studying psychoanalysis in order to apply it to their specialist subjects is increasing in all areas, in the same way that colonists take over from the pioneers. We may expect a rich harvest of new discoveries here. Applications of analysis are always confirmations of it as well. In spheres where scientific work is further removed from practical activity, the inevitable differences of opinion will no doubt also turn out to be less bitter.

I feel strongly tempted to lead you through all the various ways in which psychoanalysis can be applied to the humanities. These are things that any person with intellectual interests would feel to be worth knowing; and it would be a well-deserved break for you to hear nothing about sickness and abnormality for a while. But I must resist the temptation: again, it would take us beyond the remit of

these lectures and, to be quite honest, I should not be equal to the task. It is true that I myself took the first step in a few of these areas, but today I can no longer command a view over the whole field, and would have much to study in order to get on top of all that has been added since I first began. Those of you who are disappointed by my refusal can take advantage of our periodical *Imago,* which is designed to cover non-medical applications of psychoanalysis.

However, there is just one topic that I can't pass over so lightly – and not because I understand a particularly large amount about it or because I have myself contributed so much to it. Quite the opposite: I have hardly ever concerned myself with it at all. But I have to mention it because it is so immensely important, so rich in hopes for the future – perhaps the most important part of all the work that analysis does. I refer to the application of psychoanalysis to education, to the upbringing of the next generation. I am at least pleased to be able to say that my daughter Anna Freud has made this her life's work, and in this way is making good my own neglect of the subject. It is easy to see how analysis came to be applied to upbringing. If we were treating an adult neurotic and tracked down the determining factors behind his symptoms, we were routinely taken back to his early childhood. Knowing what the later aetiological factors were was not sufficient either for understanding his symptoms or for producing the therapeutic effects. Thus it was necessary for us to familiarize ourselves with the psychical

peculiarities of his childhood, and we discovered all sorts of things that we could not have found out other than through analysis; we could also correct many of the beliefs that people generally hold about childhood. We recognized that the first years of childhood (until around five) are particularly significant for a number of reasons. First, because it is then that the early sexual blooming takes place that leaves behind decisive stimuli for adult sexual life. Second, because the experiences of this time encounter an immature and weak *Ich* and have a trauma-like effect on it. The *Ich* has no defence against the emotional storms that they call up other than repression, and in this manner acquires during childhood all its predispositions to later illnesses and functional disturbances. We have come to understand that the difficulty of childhood lies in the fact that within a short time-span the child is supposed to appropriate all the results of a cultural development that stretches out over millennia; this means that he has to learn – or, at least, *begin* to learn – to control his drives and to adapt to society. He can only achieve a part of this change through his own development; much has to be forced upon him by his upbringing. It comes as no surprise if the child often masters this task only incompletely. During these early years, many children – and certainly all of those who become manifestly ill later on – pass through states that may be put on a par with neurosis. In the case of some children, neurotic illness doesn't bide its time until adulthood, but sets in during childhood and keeps parents and doctors very busy indeed.

We have not hesitated to apply analytic therapy to such children as either demonstrated unambiguous neurotic symptoms or were en route towards unfavourable character-development. The concern that the opponents of analysis have expressed, namely that the child might be damaged by analysis, proved to be unfounded. What we gained from this undertaking was that we were able to use living subjects to confirm what we had inferred, so to speak from historical documents, in the case of adults. But what the children gained was also very pleasing. It transpired that the child is a very favourable subject for analytical therapy; the results are radical and permanent. Of course, the technique that we use to treat patients was devised for adults, so has to be considerably altered for children. Psychologically, the child is a quite different thing from the adult. It has yet to develop an *Über-Ich;* the method of free association doesn't take us very far; and, as the real parents are still present, transference plays a different role. The inner resistances that we fight against in the case of adults are, in the child's case, mostly replaced by external difficulties. If the parents make themselves into the vehicles of resistance, the aim of analysis or even the process of analysis itself is jeopardized, and it is therefore often necessary to combine the analysis of the child with some degree of analytical influencing of the parents. On the other hand, the unavoidable differences between the analysis of children and that of adults are lessened by the fact that some of our patients have preserved so many infantile character traits that in their case the analyst, again adapting himself to his subject, can't help but make

use of certain of the techniques for analysing children. It has so happened that analysis of children has become the domain of female analysts, and it will no doubt remain this way.

The recognition that most of our children pass through a neurotic phase in the course of their development has within it the makings of a public health issue. One has to ask whether it might not be expedient to come to the child's aid with analysis even if it were showing no signs of disturbance, as a health precaution, in the same way that we nowadays vaccinate healthy children against diphtheria without waiting to see whether or not they contract the disease. At present, the discussion of this question is only of academic interest; but I can venture to expand on it to you, although the very idea would seem to the great mass of our contemporaries to be a monstrous crime and, given the stance of most parents towards analysis, we must for the time being abandon all hope of it ever being carried out. Such a prophylactic against nervous illness, which would probably be highly effective, presupposes a totally different constitution of society. The watchword for applying psychoanalysis to upbringing can today be found elsewhere. Let us be clear about the primary task of education and upbringing. A child has to learn to control its drives. It is impossible to give it unrestricted freedom to follow its impulses. It would be a very instructive experiment for child psychologists – but the parents' lives would be intolerable and the children themselves would be greatly damaged, as we would see, partly immediately and partly later on. Upbringing must, then, inhibit, forbid, and suppress; and it has always amply fulfilled this

function. But analysis has shown us that it is precisely this suppression of drives that brings with it the danger of a neurotic illness. You will recall that we have examined in detail the ways in which this happens. Upbringing thus has to carve out a path between the Scylla of letting children go wherever their drives take them and the Charybdis of denying their drives any freedom at all. So long as this task isn't completely insoluble, then it must be possible for us to discover an optimum; the way in which upbringing can achieve the most and damage the least. It will be a question of deciding how much one may forbid; at what point; and by what means. And then we still have to take into account that children, the objects of educative influence, have very different constitutional dispositions, so that the same kind of upbringing can't possibly be equally good for all children. A moment's consideration tells us that education has thus far fulfilled its task very badly and has inflicted great harm upon children. If it does find the optimum and can carry out its task in the ideal way, then it can hope to wipe out one of the factors in the aetiology of illness – the influence of adventitious childhood traumas. There is no way it can get rid of the other factor – the power of an insubordinate drive-constitution. If we now bear in mind the difficult tasks that face the educator – recognizing the child's constitutional individuality; guessing from little signs what is going on in his immature psyche; giving him the right amount of love while yet asserting an effective degree of authority – then we will say to ourselves that the sole useful preparation for the job of educator is a fundamental grounding in

psychoanalysis. It would be best for the educator to have been analysed himself, since without experiencing it on your own person you can't, after all, really call it your own. The analysis of teachers and educators seems to be a more effective prophylactic measure than analysis of children themselves; there are also fewer obstacles involved in putting it into practice.

Just in passing, mention might be made of the possibility that the upbringing of children can benefit indirectly from psychoanalysis – a benefit that can be increasingly influential as time goes on. Parents who have themselves experienced analysis and have much to thank it for, including an insight into the mistakes of their own upbringing, will treat their children with better understanding and will spare them much that they themselves were not spared. Other investigations into the origins and prevention of delinquency and criminality run parallel with the efforts of analysts to influence upbringing. Here, too, I am merely opening doors for you and showing you the rooms behind them; I am, however, not leading you into them. I know that if your interest remains loyal to psychoanalysis you will be able to learn much about these things that is new and valuable. However, I don't wish to leave the topic of upbringing without recalling a certain aspect of it. It has been said – and no doubt rightly so – that every upbringing is partisan; that it strives to fit the child into the prevailing social order without considering how valuable or stable this order may be in itself. If one is convinced as to the deficiencies of our contemporary social institutions, one can't justify continuing to put the

psychoanalytically orientated upbringing into its service. One has to set it another, higher goal; one that has liberated itself from the prevailing social demands. However, I believe that this argument is out of place here. The demand exceeds the legitimate function of psychoanalysis. Likewise it is not the concern of the doctor summoned to treat pneumonia whether the patient is a good man, a suicide, or a criminal; whether he deserves to remain alive and whether one should wish this for him. The other goal that one wants to set for upbringing will also be partisan – and it is not the analyst's job to choose between the parties. And that is quite apart from the fact that psychoanalysis would be denied any influence on upbringing if it professed to intentions that are incompatible with the existing social order. Psychoanalytical education will be assuming an unwarranted responsibility if it sets out to mould its pupils into revolutionaries. It has done its work if it sends them away as healthy and efficient as possible. It contains enough revolutionary elements itself to ensure that those who have been brought up with it will not take the side of reaction and suppression in later life. I would even go so far as to say that revolutionary children are not desirable from any point of view.

Ladies and Gentlemen! I still want to say a few words to you about psychoanalysis as therapy. I already discussed the theoretical side of this subject fifteen years ago, and I can't formulate it any differently today; but I will say something about our experiences in the intervening period. As you know, psychoanalysis began as therapy; it has far outgrown this, but has never abandoned its

origins and still relies on contact with patients for deepening our knowledge and developing further. The accumulated impressions from which we developed our theories can be obtained in no other way. Our therapeutic failures keep setting us new tasks; the demands of real life are an effective protection against an overgrowth of the speculation that we, nevertheless, can't do without in our work. We already discussed a long time ago the means by which psychoanalysis helps sick people, when it does help them, and in which ways it does so; now we want to ask how much it achieves.

You are perhaps aware that I have never been a therapeutic enthusiast; there is no danger of my misusing this lecture to extol its virtues. I would rather say too little than too much. At the time when I was still the only analyst, people who were apparently favourably disposed to my cause used to say to me: 'that's all very nice and clever, but just show me one case that you've cured by analysis.' That was one of the many formulas that succeeded each other over the course of time, with the function of casting aside this inconvenient novelty. Nowadays, it is just as outdated as many others – a pile of letters of thanks from patients who have been cured can be found in any analyst's files. The analogy doesn't end there. Psychoanalysis really is just as much a therapy as is any other treatment. It has its triumphs and its defeats, its difficulties, its limitations, its particular uses. At one time an accusation levelled at psychoanalysis was that it was not to be taken seriously as therapy, as it did not dare to publish statistics of its successes. Since then the

Psychoanalytical Institute in Berlin, founded by Dr Max Eitington, has published a report on its results during its first decade. The number of successful cures gives us neither a reason to boast nor a reason to be ashamed. But such statistics are not in the slightest bit instructive, for the material that is compiled is so heterogeneous that only very large figures would tell us anything. It would be better for people to examine their own experiences. Here, I should like to say that I don't believe that our cures can even begin to compete with those of Lourdes. There are so many more people who believe in the miracles of the Blessed Virgin than in the existence of the unconscious. If we turn to earthly competition, though, we have to compare psychoanalytical therapy with the other methods of psychotherapy. Nowadays, we hardly need to mention the organic physical treatment of neurotic states. As a psychotherapeutic procedure, analysis doesn't stand in opposition to the other methods used in this specialized branch of medicine. It neither invalidates nor excludes them. It would fit in perfectly well with our theory for a doctor who wants to call himself a psychotherapist to use analysis along with all the other methods of curing his patients, depending on the particular nature of the case and the favourable or unfavourable nature of external circumstances. In reality, it is the question of technique that forces medical practice to divide into specialisms. Thus surgery and orthopaedics had to be separated from one another. Psychoanalytical practice is difficult and demanding; it isn't something that can be handled easily, as if it were a pair of glasses

that you put on to read and take off again to go for a walk. Psychoanalysis either to possess the doctor tends completely or not at all. Psychotherapists who also use analysis every now and again are, so far as I know, not on firm analytical ground; they have not accepted analysis as a whole but have watered it down, removed its 'sting', perhaps; we can't count them as analysts. This, I believe, is regrettable; but a combination in medical practice of an analyst with a therapist who restricts himself to the other methods would serve a very useful purpose.

Compared with the other psychotherapeutic procedures, psychoanalysis is beyond any doubt the most powerful. Moreover, it is only right and proper that it should be so; it is also the most arduous and time consuming, and it is not used in minor cases. In suitable cases, it can remove disturbances and effect changes that we would not even have dared to hope for in pre-analytical times. But it also has its very perceptible limitations. The therapeutic ambition of some of my followers has led them to take the greatest pains to surmount these obstacles, so that all neurotic disturbances might become curable by psychoanalysis. They have tried to compress analytical work into a shorter period; to increase transference to such an extent that it is superior to any resistance; to unite it with other methods of influence in order to force a cure. These efforts are certainly praiseworthy, but, in my opinion, they are in vain. Moreover, they bring with them the danger of becoming oneself forced out of analysis and getting swept into a boundless sea of experimentation. I have a nasty suspicion that the

expectation that all neurotic illness can be cured derives from the lay belief that the neuroses are quite superfluous, things that have no right whatsoever to exist. In truth they are serious, constitutionally determined conditions that seldom restrict themselves to a few outbursts but mostly persist for long periods or for the individual's entire life. Our analytical experience that we can greatly influence them once we have dealt with the historical factors that prompted the illness and any adventitious factors that prove helpful has caused us to neglect the constitutional factor in the therapeutic practice, though at the same time we can't do it any harm either; but we should always bear it in mind when it comes to theory. The very fact that psychoses are wholly inaccessible to psychoanalytical therapy ought, given their close relationship to the neuroses, to make us lower our expectations with regard to the latter. The therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis remains limited by a whole series of significant and scarcely assailable factors. In the case of a child, where we might count on the greatest successes, the difficulties are the external ones connected with the parental situation, difficulties which, however, are part of being a child. In the case of adults it is primarily two factors that are involved: the degree of psychical rigidity, and the form of the disease with all the deeper-rooted determinants that lie behind it. The first factor is often unjustifiably overlooked. However great the plasticity of the psyche may be, and no matter how possible it may be to renew old states, some things can't be brought back to life. Some changes seem to be final; they correspond to scars that have

formed after processes have run their course. At other times, we get the impression of a general ossification of the psychical life; the psychical processes that could very well be directed along other paths seem incapable of leaving the old ones. But perhaps this is the same as what we said before, just seen from another perspective. All too often it seems that we can sense that therapy lacks only the necessary driving force that would set a change in motion. Some particular dependency, some particular drive-component, is too strong in comparison with the forces that we can mobilize in opposition to it. This is generally so in the case of the psychoses. We understand them to the extent that we would no doubt know where to apply the levers – but they would not be able to lift the burden. This even links up with our hopes for the future, namely that our knowledge of the effects of hormones – you know what I mean by this – will offer us the means of successfully fighting against the quantitative factors of illness. Today, though, we are a long way from this. I realize that the uncertainty in all these matters gives us a constant incentive to perfect the analytical technique and particularly that of transference. The beginner in analysis in particular will remain doubtful in the case of a failure as to whether he should blame the peculiarities of the case or his own unskilful handling of the therapeutic procedure. But, as I have already said, I don't believe we will achieve much by making efforts in this direction.

The second limitation of analytical success is provided by the form that the illness takes. You already know that the areas to

which we can apply analytical therapy are those of the transference neuroses, phobias, hysteria, obsessional neuroses, and, in addition to these, further character abnormalities that have been developed in the place of such illnesses. Anything else – narcissistic or psychotic conditions – is more or less unsuitable. Now, it would be wholly legitimate to protect oneself from failure by carefully excluding such cases. If we took this precaution, the statistics for analysis would be greatly improved. However, there's a catch. Our diagnoses very often follow only after the event; they are rather like the Scottish king's tests for identifying witches that I read about in Victor Hugo. This king declared that he possessed an infallible method for recognizing a witch. He had a suspected witch blanched in a cauldron of boiling water and then tasted the brew. Then he was able to say: 'Yes, that was a witch'; or, 'No, that wasn't one'. It is similar with us – only *we* are the ones who suffer. We can't judge the patient who comes for treatment, nor the candidate who comes to us to be trained, until we have studied him analytically for a few weeks or months. We are in fact buying a pig in a poke. The patient comes along with vague, general complaints that don't admit of a conclusive diagnosis. After this trial period it may turn out to be an unsuitable case. If so, we send him away if he is the candidate, or carry on working with him for a while longer if he is the patient, to see whether we might not be able to see things in a more favourable light. The patient gets his revenge by adding to our list of failures; the rejected candidate, if he is paranoid, does it by, say,

writing books on psychoanalysis himself. You see, all our caution was no use to us.

I am concerned that these detailed observations rather exceed your interest. But I would be even more sorry if you were to think that I intended to diminish your respect for psychoanalysis as a therapy. Perhaps I have really set about it unskilfully, for I wanted the opposite: to excuse the therapeutic limitations of analysis by pointing out that they are unavoidable. With the same intention in mind, I shall turn to another point, namely to the reproach against analytical treatment that it takes up a disproportionately long time. The reply to this is that psychical changes just are completed only slowly; if they appear quickly, suddenly, it is a bad sign. It is true that the treatment of a severe neurosis can easily be drawn out over several years, but if the treatment is finally successful, you must ask yourselves how long the illness would have lasted. Probably a decade for every year of treatment. In other words, the illness would never have been cured at all, as we so often see in the case of ill people who are left untreated. In some cases we have reasons to resume analysis after many years; if, say, the patient had developed new pathological reactions in response to new situations, although he had been healthy in the interim period. The first analysis simply hadn't brought all his pathological tendencies to light, and it was natural for analysis to cease as soon as it was successful. There are also people who are so seriously afflicted that they have to be kept under analytic care for their whole lives and are taken back into analysis again from time to time. However, these people would

otherwise be completely incapable of existing, and we must be thankful that they can be sustained by this intermittent and recurrent treatment. The analysis of character disturbances also involves spending a long time on the treatment, but it is often successful – and do you know of any other therapy with which we could even set about taking on this task? Therapeutic ambition may feel unsatisfied by these results – but tuberculosis and lupus have taught us that you can be successful only when you have adapted the therapy to fit the disease.

I told you that psychoanalysis began as a therapeutic procedure. However, it was not as a therapeutic method that I sought to recommend it to your interest, but on account of the truths it contains: what it tells us about the thing that concerns humans above all – namely their own essential nature – and the connections that it reveals between the most diverse human activities. As a therapy, it is one among many, though, it is true, *primus inter pares*. If it had no therapeutic value, it would not have been discovered by observing sick people and would not have carried on developing for more than thirty years.

7
On the Question of a Weltanschauung[24]

Ladies and Gentlemen! The last time we met we concerned ourselves with little everyday worries; we were so to speak putting our own modest house in order. Let us now take a bold run at things and venture to tackle the question that has repeatedly been posed from other quarters: whether psychoanalysis leads to a definite *Weltanschauung* and, if so, to which.

Weltanschauung is, I fear, a specifically German concept; one which it could well be difficult to translate into foreign languages. If I attempt to define it, it would certainly seem clumsy to you. In my opinion, then, a *Weltanschauung* is an intellectual construction that gives a unified solution to all the problems of our existence on the basis of an overriding hypothesis; a construction that therefore leaves no questions open and gives everything that we are interested in its particular place. It is easy to see that the possession of a *Weltanschauung* is among the ideal desires of humans. By believing in it, one can feel secure in life; one knows what one should strive for, how one can most appropriately bring to bear one's emotions and interests.

If that is the character of our *Weltanschauung,* then the above question is easy to answer so far as psychoanalysis goes. As a specialized science, a branch of psychology – a 'depth psychology'

or psychology of the unconscious – it is quite unsuited to form its own *Weltanschauung;* it simply has to accept the scientific one. However, the scientific *Weltanschauung* is already markedly at variance with our definition. It is true that it, too, postulates the 'unified nature' of the explanation of the universe – but only as a programme that might be fulfilled sometime in the future. Otherwise it is distinguished by negative characteristics; by the fact that it is restricted to what is knowable at the time, and by its sharp rejection of certain elements that are alien to it. It asserts that there is no other source of knowledge of the universe than the intellectual processing of carefully examined observations – in other words, what we call research – and that it can't be accompanied by any other knowledge from revelation, intuition or divination. It seems that this view came very close to being the generally recognized one in the last couple of centuries. It was left to our century to make the arrogant objection that such a *Weltanschauung* was just as miserable as it was hopeless; that it overlooked the claims of the human spirit and the needs of the human soul.

This objection can't be repudiated energetically enough. It is entirely baseless, since 'spirit' and 'soul' are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as are any non-human things. Psychoanalysis has a particular right to speak on behalf of the scientific *Weltanschauung* in this regard, because it can't be reproached for neglecting the part played by the psyche in its picture of the universe. Its contribution to science consists precisely in having extended research to the area of the psyche. Without such

a psychology, science would most certainly be very incomplete. But if one includes the investigation of the intellectual and emotional functions of humans (and animals) in science, it becomes clear that nothing is changing in the scientific attitude as a whole; no new sources of knowledge or methods of research have presented themselves to us. Intuition and divination would be such, if they existed; but they can safely be reckoned as illusions, the fulfilments of wish-impulses. It is also easy to see that those demands of a *Weltanschauung* are only based on emotion. Science takes account of the fact that the human psyche creates such demands, and is ready to examine the sources of these demands – but doesn't have the slightest reason to recognize them as justified. On the contrary, it sees them as a reminder to distinguish carefully between knowledge and everything that is illusion, the result of such affective demands.

This by no means implies contemptuously casting these wishes aside or underestimating their value for human life. We are prepared to trace out which fulfilments these same have created for themselves in the achievements of art and in the systems of religion and philosophy; but, still, we can't overlook the fact that it would be wrong and highly inexpedient to permit these claims to be transferred into the sphere of knowledge. For this would open up the routes that lead into the realm of psychosis – be it individual or mass psychosis – and would deprive of valuable energy those urges that turn to reality in order to gratify (so far as possible) their wishes and needs in it.

From the scientific point of view, one can't avoid being critical here and proceeding to make rejections and denials. It is inadmissible to say that science is one area of human intellectual activity, that religion and philosophy are others of at least equal value, and that science has no call to interfere with either of these; that they all have an equal claim to be true, and every person is free to choose where he draws his convictions from and what he wants to place his belief in. Such a view is regarded as particularly distinguished, tolerant, broadminded and free from narrow prejudices. Unfortunately it is not tenable; it shares all the pernicious aspects of an unscientific *Weltanschauung* and is in practice pretty much the same thing. It is a simple fact that the truth can't be tolerant, that it doesn't allow compromises and limitations; and that research regards all areas of human activity to be its own, and has to become uncompromisingly critical if any other power seeks to seize a part of it for itself.

Of the three powers that are capable of challenging science, religion alone is the serious enemy. Art is almost always harmless and beneficent; it has no desire to be anything other than illusion. Except in the case of a few people who are, as we say, 'possessed' by art, it doesn't venture to encroach on the realm of reality. Philosophy is not opposed to science; it behaves as if it were itself a science and works partly with the same methods, but distances itself from it by clinging to the illusion of being able to deliver a solid and coherent picture of the universe – one, though, that needs must fall apart with every new advance in our knowledge.

Methodologically, it goes wrong by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations and by recognizing other sources of knowledge such as, say, intuition. And often enough it seems that the poet's mockery of the philosopher may be justified:

> With his night-caps and the tatters of his night-gown
> He plugs the gaps in the structure of the universe.[25]

Philosophy, however, has no direct influence on the great mass of mankind: it is the concern only of a small number of what is already a very thin top layer of intellectuals, and is barely fathomable to everyone else. Religion, on the other hand, is an immense power that has the strongest human emotions at its disposal. We know that at one time it encompassed everything that plays a role in human intellectual activity, that it occupied the place of science, when there was still barely such a thing as science, and that it created a *Weltanschauung* of unparalleled consistency and uniformity that, however profoundly shaken it may have been, still persists to this day.

If we want to give a true account of the grandiose nature of religion, then we must bear in mind what it undertakes to do for humans. It gives them information about the source and genesis of the world, it assures them of protection and ultimate happiness in the ups and downs of life, and it guides their thoughts and actions by means of precepts to which it lends the full force of its authority. It fulfils, then, three functions. The first is that it gratifies the

human desire for knowledge. It does the same as science attempts to do with its own particular means, and here, therefore, enters into rivalry with it. It very probably has its second function to thank for the greater part of its influence. If it soothes man's fear of the dangers and vicissitudes of life, if it assures him of a happy ending and gives him comfort in misery, then science can't compete. This may indeed tell us how certain dangers can be avoided, and some unhappiness successfully fought against; it would be very wrong to dispute that it is a powerful help to humans – but in many situations it simply has to abandon man to his suffering and can only advise him to submit to it. It is in its third function, when it makes rules and issues prohibitions and restrictions, that religion is furthest removed from science. For science is content with examining and establishing the facts, although it is true that rules and pieces of advice for the way to behave in life may be deduced from its application. Indeed, in certain circumstances they are the same ones that are laid down by religion – but, however, for different reasons.

It is not quite clear how religion contrives to combine these three aspects. What is the explanation of the origins of the universe supposed to have to do with the inculcation of certain ethical precepts? The assurances of protection and happiness are more intimately connected with the ethical requirements. They are the reward for fulfilling these commands; only those who obey them can count on these favours, while punishment lies in store for the disobedient. Science, incidentally, involves something similar.

Anyone who disregards its applications, so it says, exposes himself to damage.

We can only understand religion's remarkable combination of instruction, consolation, and demands if we subject it to genetic analysis. We can take as our starting point the most striking aspect of the whole ensemble, the teaching about the origins of the universe – for why should a cosmogony be a standard part of the religious system? What it teaches, then, is that the world was created by a being similar to man, but a being that is magnified in all respects, in power, wisdom, force of passion – an idealized Übermensch. The notion of animals being creators of the universe points to the influence of totemism, which we will touch upon later, with a brief remark at the very least. It is interesting to see that there is always only one creator of the universe, even where people believe in many gods. Equally interesting is the fact that it is nearly always a man, although there is no shortage of allusions to female deities, and some mythologies have the creation of the universe beginning precisely with a male god triumphing over a female god who is degraded into a monster. Here we are touching on the most interesting individual problems, but we must hurry on. Our further path is made easy to recognize by the fact that this God/creator is directly called 'Father'. Psychoanalysis concludes that he really is the father, as magnificent as he once appeared to be to the small child. The religious person envisages the creation of the universe to be just like his own creation.

In this case, it is easy to explain how the consoling assurances and the strict ethical demands coincide with the cosmogony. For the same person to whom the child owes its existence, the father (or, probably more correctly, the parental authority made up of the father and mother), has also protected and watched over the weak, helpless child who is exposed to all the dangers lurking in the external world; he has felt secure under the father's protection. Once he has grown up himself, man, it is true, knows that he possesses greater powers, but his knowledge of life's dangers has also increased, and he rightly concludes that he has essentially remained just as helpless and unprotected as he was in childhood; that he is still a child vis-à-vis the world. Even now, therefore, he doesn't want to give up the protection that he enjoyed as a child. But he has long since also realized that his father is a being whose powers are severely limited and who is not endowed with every merit. Because of this he harks back to the image he remembers from his childhood of the father he overrated, elevates it into a deity, and shifts it into the present and into reality. Together, the emotional force of this remembered image and the person's continuing need for protection sustain his belief in God.

The third main point of the religious programme, its ethical precepts, also slots easily into this childhood situation. I would like to remind you of Kant's famous remark which mentions the starry heavens in the same breath as the moral law within us. However strange this juxtaposition may sound – for what might the celestial bodies have to do with the question as to whether one creature

loves another or kills him? – it does touch upon a great psychological truth. The same father (or parental authority) who gave the child his life and protected him from its dangers, also taught him what he may or may not do, instructed him to put up with certain restrictions being imposed on his drive-wishes, and made him aware of what consideration he would be expected to show towards his parents and siblings if he wanted to be tolerated and liked as a member of the family circle and, later, of larger groups. The child is brought up to know his social duties by a system of love-rewards and punishments. He is taught that his security in life depends on being loved by his parents (and other people, too) and on their being able to believe in his love for them. The adult then carries all these relationships into religion in an unchanged state. The prohibitions and commands of his parents carry on living within him as a moral conscience; and God rules the human world with the help of the same system of reward and punishment. The degree of protection and happiness allocated to the individual depends on his fulfilling the demands of morality; and the security with which man arms himself against the dangers of the outside world and his human environment is based on his love of God and the consciousness of being loved by him. Finally, prayer provides the individual with a direct influence on the divine will, and thus secures for him a share in the divine omnipotence.

I realize that countless questions will have occurred to you while you have been listening to me, and that you would very much like

to hear the answers to them. I can't undertake to do that here and now, but I am confident that none of these detailed enquiries would shake our thesis that the religious *Weltanschauung* is determined by our childhood situation. It is all the more remarkable, then, that it nevertheless has a forerunner – despite its infantile character. Without any doubt, there was once a time with no religion, with no gods. People call this the age of animism. Then, too, the world was full of spiritual beings similar to humans – we call them demons. They inhabited all the objects in the external world or were perhaps identical with them, but there was no supreme power who had created them all and still ruled over them, and to whom they could turn for protection and aid. The demons of the animistic age were mainly hostile to man, but it seems that man then had more confidence in himself than he had later on. He certainly suffered from a constant, terrible fear of these evil spirits, but he defended himself against them by means of particular actions to which he attributed the power to chase the demons away. Moreover, he did not consider himself to be powerless in other ways. If he desired something from nature – if, say, he wanted rain – he didn't pray to the weather-god, but he performed a magical act, expecting this to have a direct influence on nature; he himself made something similar to rain. In the struggle against the powers of his environment, man's first weapon was magic, the first forerunner of our modern technology. We suppose that the faith in magic derives from overestimating one's own intellectual operations, from the belief in the 'omnipotence of thought', which, by the way, we

encounter again in the case of our obsessional neurotics. We could imagine that the people of those times were particularly proud of their acquisitions in the way of language, which would necessarily have been accompanied by a great facilitation of thought. They attributed magical power to the word. This characteristic was later adopted by religion: 'And God said "Let there be light!" and there was light.' Incidentally the fact of magical actions shows that animistic man did not rely simply on the power of his wishes. He was far more inclined to expect results from performing an action that was supposed to prompt nature to imitate it. If he wanted rain, he spilled water himself; if he wanted to stimulate the ground to be fertile, he acted out sexual intercourse in the fields.

You know that it is difficult for anything to disappear once it has found psychical expression. You will, therefore, not be surprised that many manifestations of animism have lasted up until today, mostly as so-called superstition, existing alongside and behind religion. But more than that, you will hardly be able to reject the judgement that our philosophy has preserved essential features of the animistic way of thinking – the overestimation of the magic of the word, and the belief that objective processes in the world follow the direction that our thoughts want them to take. Granted, this would be an animism without the magical actions. On the other hand, we might expect that even in the animistic age there was already some kind of ethic governing rules for human dealings with one another. However, there is nothing to suggest that they were

more closely connected with animistic beliefs. They were probably the direct expression of power relations and practical needs.

It would be very well worth knowing what forced the transition from animism to religion, but I am sure you can imagine the darkness that still today shrouds these primeval epochs in the evolution of the human spirit. It seems to be a fact that the earliest form that religion took was that odd thing called totemism, the worship of animals, in the wake of which the first ethical precepts, the taboos, followed. In a book called *Totem and Taboo*, I once worked out a theory that traced this change back to a coup in the set-up of the human family. The main achievement of religion, as compared to animism, lies in the psychical annexing of the fear of demons. Nevertheless, the evil spirit has preserved a place for itself in the religious system as a relic of this prehistory.

So much for the prehistory of the religious *Weltanschauung*: let us now turn to what has happened since then and is still happening before our very eyes. The scientific spirit, strengthened by observing natural processes, has begun over the course of time to treat religion as a human matter and to subject it to critical examination. It could not stand up to this. Initially, it was the reports of miracles that provoked surprise and disbelief because they contradicted everything that sober observation had taught us, and betrayed all too clearly the influence of human imagination. Then its theories to explain the universe as it exists were rejected, as they testified to a lack of knowledge that bore the stamp of old

times and to which, thanks to an increased familiarity with the laws of nature, we knew ourselves to be superior. That the universe was supposed to have come into being through acts of procreation or creation, analogous to the way that the individual human comes into existence, no longer seemed to be the most obvious and self-evident answer, ever since the distinction between animate, sentient beings and inanimate ones had foisted itself on our thoughts and had made it impossible to cling to the original animistic beliefs. The influence of the comparative study of different religious systems and the impression they give of mutual exclusivity and intolerance towards one another should not be overlooked either.

Fortified by these preliminary studies, the scientific spirit finally summoned up the courage to venture to put the most significant and emotionally valuable aspects of the religious *Weltanschauung* to the test. We could always have seen – although we did not dare to say so until later on – that the assertions of religion that promise man protection and happiness if only he fulfils certain ethical requirements prove themselves to be unworthy of belief. It doesn't seem to be true that there is a power in the universe that watches over the welfare of the individual with parental care and leads everything that befalls him to a happy ending. It is far more the case that the fates of humans can be reconciled neither with the notion of universal benevolence nor with that – which partly contradicts it – of universal justice. Earthquakes, storm-tides and great fires do not distinguish between the good, devout man and the

villain and unbeliever. And if we leave inanimate nature out of it and consider the fate of individual man in so far as it is dependent on his relationships with other men, it is by no means the rule that virtue is rewarded and evil is punished: often enough the violent, the cunning, the ruthless seize all that is worth having in the world for themselves, and the pious walk away empty-handed. Dark and heartless powers devoid of all feeling determine the human fate; the system of reward and punishment that religion has ascribed to the governing of the universe seems not to exist. This is another occasion to abandon part of the theory of animation that managed to escape from animism into religion.

Psychoanalysis has made the last contribution to the criticism of the religious *Weltanschauung* by drawing attention to the fact that religion originates from childhood helplessness and derives its contents from the wishes and needs of childhood that are carried over into mature life. This did not exactly mean a refutation of religion, but it was nevertheless a necessary rounding off of our knowledge about it, and at least in one respect it did contradict it, for religion itself lays claim to a divine origin. And, it is true, it is not wrong to do so, provided that our interpretation of God is accepted.

To sum up, then, the judgement that science passes on the religious *Weltanschauung* reads thus: while the individual religions bicker about which one of them is in possession of the truth, we believe that the ‘truth’ aspect of religion can be completely

disregarded. Religion is an attempt to overcome the sensual world in which we are placed by means of the desired world that biological and psychological necessities have made us develop within ourselves. But it fails. Its theories bear the stamp of the times in which they originated, the ignorant childhood of humankind. Its consolations deserve no faith. Experience tells us that the world is not a nursery. The ethical demands that religion seeks to emphasize demand far more to be given an alternative foundation, as they are indispensable to human society and it is dangerous to link obedience to them with religious faith. If we attempt to assign a place to religion in the evolution of humankind, then it seems not to be an eternal inheritance, but a counterpart to the neurosis that the civilized individual has to pass through on his way from childhood to maturity.

You are, of course, free to criticize my description of things; indeed, I will help you to do so myself. What I told you about the gradual crumbling of the religious *Weltanschauung* was certainly incomplete in its abbreviated form. I did not give the sequence of the individual processes in quite the correct order; I did not trace the way in which differing forces interact in the awakening of the scientific spirit. I have also ignored the changes that took place in the religious *Weltanschauung* itself, both at the time when it held undisputed sway and then under the influence of burgeoning criticism. Finally, when it really comes down to it, I have restricted my remarks to a single form of religion – that of the Western peoples. In order to demonstrate my point as rapidly and

persuasively as possible I have so to speak created a kind of phantom, an imaginary model. Let us leave aside the question as to whether I would even have known enough to do it better and more completely. I know that everything I have said to you can be found elsewhere – and better expressed – and that there is nothing new about it. But I am firmly convinced that even the most careful treatment of the material that makes up the problem of religion would not shake our conclusions.

You know that the struggle of the scientific spirit against the religious *Weltanschauung* has not come to an end; that it is still currently being played out before our very eyes. However little psychoanalysis otherwise avails itself of the weapon of polemics, we none the less would not like to deny ourselves a look at this conflict. In the process, our position vis-à-vis these two types of *Weltanschauung* will perhaps become clearer. You will see how easily some of the arguments put forward by the proponents of religion can be rejected – although others might, on the other hand, well resist refutation.

The first objection that one hears is that it is presumptuous of science to take religion as an object of its investigations since religion is something sovereign, something superior to all human understanding, something that may not be approached with critical sophistry. In other words, science is not qualified to pass judgement on religion. According to this view, science is quite useful and estimable, so long as it keeps to its own sphere – but religion is not

its sphere; it has no business there. If we don't allow ourselves to put off by this brusque dismissal but go on to ask what this claim to exceptional status among all human concerns is based on, then the answer we receive – if we are graced with an answer at all – is that religion can't be measured by human standards as it is divine in origin; it has been revealed to us by a spirit unfathomable to humans. It seems to me that nothing could be easier to reject than this argument; it is just a clear case of *petitio principii,* of 'begging the question'.[26] What is being called into question is whether there really is a divine spirit and a revelation; and the matter is certainly not decided if we are told that the question can't be asked, as the Godhead can't be called into question. What is happening here is something that occasionally happens in analytical work. If an otherwise intelligent person rejects a suggestion on particularly stupid grounds, then this weakness in logic vouches for the existence of a particularly strong motive force to contradict the suggestion; a motive force that can only be affective in nature, a kind of emotional constraint.

We might also be given another reply, in which such a motive force is openly admitted. Religion can't be critically examined, because it is the highest, most precious, most sublime thing that the human spirit has ever produced; because it gives expression to the very deepest feelings; and because it is the only thing that makes the universe bearable and life worthy of humanity. In response, we need not dispute this estimate of religion, but can draw attention to another matter. We change the emphasis, and say that it is not a

case of the spirit of science attacking the realm of religion but, on the contrary, of religion attacking the sphere of scientific thought. Whatever the value and significance of religion may be, it has no right to restrict thought in any way, and thus also no right to except itself from having thought applied to it.

Scientific thinking is essentially no different from the normal process of thinking that we all, believers and non-believers alike, use when we are carrying out our everyday affairs. It just happens to have developed a particular form in certain respects; moreover, it is interested in things that have no immediate tangible use, and it makes a careful effort to keep individual factors and affective influences at a distance. It examines more stringently the reliability of the sensory perceptions on which it bases its conclusions; it creates new perceptions for itself that can't be obtained by everyday means; and it isolates the determinants of these new discoveries in deliberately varied experiments. It is endeavouring to achieve a correspondence with reality – that is to say, with that which exists outside us and independently of us and, as experience has taught us, is decisive for the fulfilment or frustration of our desires. This correspondence with the objective external world is what we call 'truth'. This remains the aim of scientific work, even if we leave aside its practical value. When, therefore, religion asserts that it can replace science, that it has to be true because it is benevolent and ennobling – then this is in fact an attack that should be repelled in the general interest. It is asking a great deal of a person who has learned to carry out his everyday affairs according to the rules of

experience and with due regard to reality to suggest that he should entrust precisely his most intimate interests to an authority that claims freedom from the rules of rational thought as its prerogative. And so far as the protection that religion promises its believers is concerned, I believe that none of us would want to get into a motor car if its driver were to declare that he drove without being distracted by traffic regulations, to wherever his flights of imagination happened to carry him.

The ban on thought that religion has imposed in order to preserve itself is also by no means without its dangers, either for the individual or for human society. Analytical experience has taught us that such a ban, even if it is originally restricted to one area, is inclined to widen out and to become a cause of serious inhibitions in people's lives. In females, this effect can also be seen as a consequence of being forbidden to concern themselves with sexuality – even to think about it. The biographies of almost all the eminent individuals of the past demonstrate the damaging nature of the inhibitions that religion imposes on thought. On the other hand, the intellect – or to give it its more familiar name, reason – is one of the powers that we might expect to exert a unifying influence on humans, those beings who are so difficult to hold together and who, therefore, are barely controllable. Just imagine how impossible human society would be if everyone only had his own particular multiplication table and his own personal units of weight and length. Our best hope for the future is that the intellect – call it the scientific spirit, call it reason – will over the course of time establish

a dictatorship over the human psyche. The very essence of reason guarantees that it will not subsequently fail to give human impulses of feeling and what is determined by them the position that they are entitled to. But the general compulsion exercised by such a domination of reason will prove to be the strongest bond that unifies the people and will prepare the way for future unions. Anything that opposes such a development in the way that religion's ban on thought does is a danger to the future of mankind.

We can now ask why religion doesn't end this battle it is bound to lose by openly declaring: It is indeed the case that I can't give you what people commonly call 'truth'; you have to stick to science if this is what you want. But what I *can* give you is something incomparably more beautiful, more comforting, and more ennobling than anything science might have to offer. And thus I say to you that it is true in another, higher sense. There's an easy answer to this. Religion can't make this admission, because if it did so it would forfeit all its influence on the great mass of people. The ordinary man in the street knows only one 'truth' – and that is 'truth' in the ordinary sense of the word. He can't begin to imagine what 'higher' or 'highest' truth is supposed to be. Truth seems to him to be no more capable of being measured by degrees than death; and he can't make the leap from what is beautiful to what is true. Perhaps you will believe, as I do, that he is right in this.

The struggle is, then, not at an end. The devotees of the religious *Weltanschauung* act according to the old saying that attack is the

best form of defence. They ask: What is this science that presumes to devalue our religion when it has given salvation and comfort to millions of humans for many thousands of years? What has science ever achieved? What further achievements can we expect of it? According to its own admission, it is incapable of comforting or elevating us. So let us leave this aside, difficult though it may be to abandon it. But what about its theories? Can they tell us how the universe came into being and what fate lies in store for it? Can it even manage just to draw a coherent picture of the universe for us, to show us where all its unexplained phenomena belong, or how the powers of the mind can operate on inert matter? If it could do that, we would not deny it our respect. But it has done nothing of the sort; it hasn't solved a single problem of this kind. It gives us fragments of alleged knowledge that it can't reconcile with one another; it gathers together whatever uniformities it can observe in the course of events, dignifies them with the name of laws and forces them to submit to its risky interpretations. And what a minuscule degree of certainty supports its conclusions! Everything it teaches applies only provisionally; what might today be extolled as the highest wisdom is thrown out the following day to be replaced, again on trial basis, by another. The latest mistake then gets called 'truth'. And this truth is what we are supposed to sacrifice the greatest good to! Ladies and Gentlemen! I believe, in so far as you are yourselves supporters of the scientific *Weltanschauung* that is being attacked here, you won't have been too profoundly shaken by this criticism. At this point I should like to remind you of a

particular phrase that was once uttered in Imperial Austria. The old man[27] was once receiving a deputation from a party that was a nuisance to him. 'This isn't ordinary opposition any more', he bellowed at them, 'it's factious opposition!' In a similar way, you will find that the reproaches made against science for having not yet solved the world's riddles are unjustly and spitefully exaggerated; it really has not yet had enough time for such great achievements. Science is very young – it is a human activity that we only developed late in the day. Let us bear in mind, to pluck out just a few dates, that it is only around 300 years ago that Kepler discovered the laws of planetary movement; that Newton, who split light into the colours of the spectrum and postulated the theory of gravity, died in 1727, that is to say, only a little more than 200 years ago; and that Lavoisier discovered oxygen shortly before the French Revolution. And individual existence is very short in comparison with the duration of mankind's evolution; I may be a very old man now but nevertheless I had already been born when Charles Darwin handed over his work on the species to the public. In the same year, 1859, Pierre Curie, the discoverer of radium, was born. And if you go further back, to the beginnings of exact natural science among the Greeks, to Archimedes, Aristarchus of Samos, who lived around 250 BC and was the forerunner to Copernicus, or even to the first beginnings of astronomy among the Babylonians, then you are covering only a small fragment of the time-span which anthropology claims for the evolution of man from his original ape-like form and which certainly encompasses more than a hundred

thousand years. And let us not forget that the last century brought with it such a wealth of new discoveries, such an acceleration of scientific progress that we have every reason to face the future of science with confidence.

We have to admit that the other objections are to some extent justified. This simply is the way that science proceeds: slowly, tentatively, laboriously. Nobody can deny it, nobody can change it. No wonder the gentlemen on the other side of the fence are dissatisfied: they are spoilt; they had an easier time of things with divine revelation. Progress in scientific work is made in a very similar way to progress in analysis. We bring certain expectations with us into our work, but we have to force them to take a back seat. Observation teaches us something new – now here, now there – and initially the pieces don't fit together. We make suppositions and construct makeshift hypotheses, and retract them again if they don't work out; we have to be patient and prepared for all eventualities; we must avoid jumping to early conclusions that might make us overlook new, unexpected factors – and all the palaver is worthwhile in the end, for our scattered discoveries fall into place and we come to understand a whole chunk of what is going on in the psyche. We have completed our task and are now free to move on to the next one. The only thing that the analyst has to do without is the help that experiments afford to research.

The criticism of science that I have just described also contains a large amount of exaggeration. It is not true to say that it blindly

reels from one experiment to the next, exchanges one error for another. As a rule the scientist works like the sculptor with a clay model, constantly changing his rough sketch, adding to it and taking away from it until he is satisfied with the degree of resemblance he has achieved to the object he has seen or imagined. Moreover, even today, there is – in the older and more mature sciences at least – already a solid basis of knowledge which will only be modified and developed, never demolished. Things don't look too bad for science.

And, finally, what do these passionate denigrations of science want to achieve? Yes, science may be incomplete at the moment and there may be inherent difficulties within it – but it remains indispensable to us and cannot be replaced by anything else. It is capable of undreamt-of perfection – whereas the religious *Weltanschauung* is not. This is complete in all its essentials; if it is a mistake, then it must remain one for ever. Moreover, no belittling of science can change anything about the fact that it attempts to take into account our dependence on the objective external world – whereas religion is an illusion and derives its strength from making concessions to the wishes and impulses of our drives.

It is my duty to mention some further types of *Weltanschauung* that are opposed to the scientific one; however, I do so unwillingly as I know that I lack any real competence to judge them. So you must bear this admission in mind during the following remarks, and if you find that your interest has been aroused, then you should seek better instruction elsewhere.

In the first place, I should mention the differing philosophical systems that have ventured to draw a picture of the universe as it is mirrored in the minds of the thinkers who mostly turn their gaze away from it. However, I have already attempted elsewhere to give a general characterization of philosophy and its methods, and I am probably eminently unsuitable to evaluate the individual systems. I shall ask you, then, to turn with me to two other phenomena which one can't pass over, particularly in our day and age.

The first of these *Weltanschauungen* is as it were a counterpart of political anarchism, and perhaps radiates from this. Certainly, intellectual nihilists of this kind were already around earlier on, but at the moment the theory of relativity of modern physics seems to have gone to their heads. They do indeed take science as their starting point, but they know how to force it to abolish itself, to make it 'commit suicide'; they set it the task of disposing of itself by refuting its own claims. This often gives us the impression that this nihilism may merely be a temporary stance that will only be maintained until that particular task has been completed. Once science has been disposed of, some sort of mysticism or, indeed, the old religious *Weltanschauung* may start to spread out in the space vacated by science. According to the anarchist theory, there is no such thing as truth, no assured knowledge of the external world. What we offer as scientific truth is not Truth: it is only the product of our own needs as they are bound to express themselves under changing external conditions – thus, once again, it is illusion.

Basically, we find only what we need, see only what we want to see. We can do no other. Since the criterion of truth – its correspondence with the external world – disappears, it is a matter of complete indifference which views we support. All are equally true and equally false. And nobody has the right to accuse anyone else of being mistaken.

It could be tempting for an epistemologically inclined mind to investigate the contrivances, the sophistries by which the anarchist succeeds in coaxing such conclusions from science. Here, we would be bound to encounter situations like the ones derived from the well-known example of the Cretan who says that all Cretans are liars. But I lack both the desire and the capacity to be drawn into this more deeply. All I can say is that the anarchist theory sounds so marvellously superior only so long as it is related to views about abstract things; it breaks down as soon as it starts to become involved in practical life. Now, the actions of men are governed by their opinions and knowledge, and it is the same scientific spirit that speculates on the structure of an atom or the origins of mankind and designs the construction of a bridge that can bear its load. If what we believed really were a matter of indifference; if there were no such thing as knowledge that was distinguished among our opinions by the fact that it corresponds with reality, then we might just as well build bridges out of cardboard as out of stone; we could inject a patient with tenth of a gramme of morphine instead a hundredth of a gramme; we could use tear-gas as a narcotic instead of ether.

But even the intellectual anarchists would energetically reject such practical applications of their theory.

The second opposing *Weltanschauung* is to be taken far more seriously, and in this case I also most strongly regret that I am not better orientated in the matter. I presume that you know more about this subject than I do and that you have long since adopted your position for or against Marxism. Karl Marx's investigations into the economic structure of our society and the influence of different economic forms on all aspects of human life have gained an indisputable authority in our age. Of course, I can't know to what extent it is right or wrong in its individual points. I gather that other, better informed people don't find it easy either. I find some of the propositions of Marxist theory rather odd, such as his idea that the evolution of the forms of society was a process of natural history, or that the changes in social stratification all proceed from one another as a dialectic process. I am not at all sure that I understand these statements correctly; moreover, they don't sound 'materialistic' but more like the residue of that obscure Hegelian philosophy that Marx was also trained in. I don't know how I can escape from my lay opinion that is accustomed to trace the formation of class society back to the struggles that were played out since the beginning of history between the human hordes that were only ever so slightly different from one another. The social differences, I believed, were originally differences of tribe or race. The victory was decided by psychological factors such as the extent

of the constitutional lust for aggression, but also by the cohesiveness of the organization within the horde and material factors such as owning better weapons. Living together on the same territory, the conquerors became the masters and the conquered became the slaves. Whilst this does not suggest anything like natural laws or dialectical transformations we can't fail nevertheless to recognize the influence that the progressive mastery of the forces of nature exercises on the social relationships between humans – in that they always place their newly won instruments of power in the service of their aggression, and use them against one another. The introduction of metals, of bronze and iron, put an end to whole cultural epochs and their social institutions. I genuinely believe that gunpowder and firearms overthrew chivalry and the rule of the aristocracy, and that Russian despotism was already doomed before it lost the war, for no amount of interbreeding within Europe's ruling families could have produced a race of tsars capable of withstanding the explosive force of dynamite.

Indeed, with the current economic crisis following the Great War we are perhaps only paying the price for the latest of our great triumphs over nature, namely the conquest of the air. That doesn't sound very comprehensible, but the first parts of this argument can at least be clearly recognized. English policy was based on the security guaranteed by having the sea washing around the country's entire coastline. The moment Blériot crossed the Channel in his aeroplane this protective isolation was shattered, and in that night

during peacetime when a German Zeppelin circled over London on a flying exercise, the war against Germany became a certainty.[28] Nor should we forget the threat of submarines in this connection.

I am almost ashamed to treat such an important and complicated topic in front of you with just a few inadequate remarks, and I am also aware that I have said nothing that is new to you. I simply want to draw your attention to the fact that the relationship of man to his mastery over nature, which gives him the weapons to fight against his fellow men, must necessarily influence his economic institutions. We seem to have digressed considerably from the problems of a *Weltanschauung*, but we will soon return to the point. The strength of Marxism clearly doesn't lie in its view of history or the predictions for the future that it bases on this view, but in its astute demonstration of the compelling influence that man's economic circumstances exert upon his intellectual, ethical and artistic attitudes. This theory uncovered a whole series of connections and interdependencies that we had almost completely failed to recognize until then. But we can't assume that the economic factors are the sole ones that determine the behaviour of humans in their social context. The indubitable fact that different individuals, races, and peoples behave differently under the same economic conditions in itself excludes the notion that the economic factor might be the sole dominant one. We can't begin to understand how psychological factors can be overlooked where the reactions of living human beings are concerned, for not only were such factors already involved in the creation of those economic

conditions, but also humans, even when they are ruled by these conditions, can do nothing but bring their original drive-impulses into it: their self-preservation drive, their lust for aggression, their need for love, and their urge to gain pleasure and to avoid unpleasure. In an earlier investigation we also emphasized the importance of the demands made by the *Über-Ich*, which represents tradition and ideals of the past and which will for a time resist the impetus of a new economic system. Finally we mustn't forget that the mass of humans, subjected to economic necessity, are also affected as the process of cultural development – or, as others might call it, civilization – takes its course. This process is certainly influenced by all the other factors, but is just as certainly independent of them in origin, being comparable to an organic process, and is for its own part very capable of having an effect on the other factors. It displaces the drive-aims and causes humans to resist things that had hitherto been tolerable; and, moreover, the progressive strengthening of the scientific spirit seems to be an essential part of it. If someone were in a position to show in detail how these differing factors – the general disposition of the human drives, their racial variations and cultural modifications – behave in the given circumstances of social class, professional activities and opportunities for earning a living; if someone were able to show how these factors inhibit and challenge one another – if someone could do téiat, then he would have added enough to Marxism for it to become a real social science. For sociology, too, concerned as it is with the behaviour of humans in society, can be nothing other

than applied psychology. Strictly speaking there are only two sciences: psychology, pure and applied, and natural science.

As we gained new insight into the far-reaching significance of economic relations, it became tempting to change them ourselves through revolutionary intervention, rather than letting history take its own course. Theoretical Marxism, as realized in Russian Bolshevism, has now gained the energy, the unity, and the exclusivity of a *Weltanschauung* – but at the same time it has also gained an uncanny similarity to what it is fighting against. Although it was itself originally a part of science, and although its implementation was built up on science and technology, it has established a ban on thought that is just as unyielding as religion was in its time. All critical investigation of Marxist theory is prohibited; doubts about its validity are punished in the same way that heresy was once punished by the Catholic Church. The works of Marx have taken the place of the Bible and the Koran as a source of revelation – although they are supposed to be no more free from contradictions and obscurities than those earlier sacred texts.

And, although practical Marxism has mercilessly swept away all idealistic systems and illusions, it has nevertheless developed its own illusions, which are no less questionable or unverifiable than the earlier ones. It hopes to change human nature over the course of a few generations in such a way that humans will live together almost without friction in the new social order, and that they will undertake to work without being compelled to do so. Meanwhile it

shifts the drive-restrictions that are indispensable to any society to other places; it diverts outwards the aggressive inclinations that threaten every human community; and it pounces on the hostility of the poor to the rich, the formerly powerless to the formerly powerful. But such a transformation of human nature is very improbable. The enthusiasm with which the mass currently follows the Bolshevistic lead, so long as the new order is incomplete and threatened from outside, offers no guarantee of a secure future in which it would be fully developed and in no danger. Just like religion, Bolshevism has to compensate its believers for the sufferings and deprivations of their present existence by promising a better 'beyond', in which there will be no ungratified need. This paradise is, it is true, to be in the here and now; it is to be established on earth and opened up to us within the foreseeable future. But let us remember that the Jews, whose religion knows nothing of an existence 'beyond', also expected the coming of the Messiah on Earth, and that the Christian Middle Ages constantly believed that God's kingdom was immediately imminent.

There is no doubt about what Bolshevism's answer to these objections will be. It will say this: So long as human nature hasn't yet been transformed, we have to use the methods that are effective on humans today. We can't do without the element of compulsion in their upbringing, without banning thought, without using violence to the point of bloodshed; and if we didn't awaken in them those illusions you mention, we wouldn't be able to bring them to submit to this compulsion. And the Bolshevist could then ask us most

politely to tell him how it could be done any differently. Now, this would beat us. I would have no idea about what advice to give him. I would admit that the conditions of this experiment would have stopped me and people of my sort from undertaking it – but we are not the only people concerned. There are also men of action, men with unshakeable convictions, men who are impervious to doubt and insensitive to the sufferings of others who prevent them from reaching their goal. We have such men to thank for the fact that the magnificent experiment of creating this type of new order is now actually being carried out in Russia. In an age when great nations proclaim that they are expecting to find their salvation merely from holding on to their Christian piety, the upheaval in Russia – despite its unpleasant individual features – seems none the less to herald a better future. Unfortunately, neither our own doubts nor the fanatical faith of others gives us any hint as to how the experiment will turn out. The future will tell us this; it will perhaps show us that the experiment was undertaken prematurely, that a comprehensive overhauling of the social order stands little chance of being successful until new discoveries have been made that increase our mastery over the forces of nature and thus make it easier for us to gratify our needs. Only then might it become possible for a new social order not only to banish the material need of the masses, but also to meet the cultural demands of the individual. Granted, we will even then have to battle for an unforeseeably long time with the difficulties that uncontrollable human nature creates.

Ladies and Gentlemen! Let me conclude by summarizing what I had to say about the relationship of psychoanalysis to the question of a *Weltanschauung*. Psychoanalysis is, I believe, incapable of creating its own special *Weltanschauung*. It doesn't need one. It is a part of science and can attach itself to the scientific *Weltanschauung*. This, however, hardly deserves the high-falutin name, for it doesn't have an all-encompassing perspective; it is too incomplete; it makes no claims to being a unity or forming a system. Scientific thought is still in its infancy; there are too many of the great problems that it has not been able to solve. A *Weltanschauung* based on science has, except from the emphasis it puts on the real external world, mainly negative traits such as the summons to 'truth' and the rejection of 'illusions'. Any of our fellow men who is dissatisfied with this state of things, who demands more if he is to be mollified for the moment, may obtain it for himself wherever he can find it. We shan't take it amiss: we can't help him – but nor can we think differently on his account.

Notes

1. [As a continuation of Freud's earlier *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series* officially start at number 29 and end at number 35. In order to avoid confusion, however, I am numbering them 1–7.]

2. [*Hamlet*, 1:5.]

3. [Goethe, *Faust*, Pt. I, Sc. 4.]

4. [Freud is referring to Dr David Forsyth (1877–1941), who was one of the first members of the London Society for Psychoanalysis (founded 1913) as well as Consulting Physician to Charing Cross Hospital.]

5. [Anton von Freund contributed much to psychoanalysis in terms of both moral and financial support.]

6. ['Freund' = 'friend'.]

7. [The German title of this essay, *'Die Zerlegung der psychischen Persön-lichkeit'*, presents a particular problem to the translator. *'Zerlegung'* has traditionally been translated as 'anatomy' and 'dissection'. However, these seem much too passive. I take *'Zerlegung'* to be an active process; to correspond, in fact, to the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of' analysis', namely 'the resolution or breaking up of anything complex into various simple elements, the opposite process to *synthesis*'. By using 'analysis' here, I do of course run the risk of causing confusion (of implying to the reader that this kind of' analysis' is the same as 'psychoanalysis'!).]

8. [Much of the material in this lecture can be found in a slightly different form in *The Ego and the Id*, sections I, II, III and V, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. John Reddick, Penguin Books, London, 2003.]

9. [The *Standard Edition* adds here: 'in these patients' – surely a gross distortion of Freud's views on religion and morality.]

10. [Emil Ludwig, *Wilhelm II* (1926).]

11. [Freud is referring to the series of lectures published in 1917.]

12. [See note 7.]

13. [I.e. the points during libido-development when fixations lay the ground for an individual to be predisposed to a particular form of neurosis later on.]

14. [Freud coins an extraordinary neologism here with the German word *Kotsäule* – literally a 'shit-column'!]

15. [Zweiter Zyklus, VII, 'Fragen'.]

16. [This term is borrowed by Freud from H. Silberer (1914), who probably used it to describe the phenomenon whereby people believe they have seen a single object when they have in fact seen *two* objects, one covering the other. For more details, see *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Lecture 20, 'The Sexual Life of Human Beings'.]

17. [Freud means the Danish intellectual Georg Brandes (1842–1927), whom he greatly admired throughout his whole life.]

18. [Freud uses the English expression.]

19. [Schiller, *Die Piccolomini*, II, 7.]

20. ['There are as many opinions as there are men.']

21. [An allusion to Rank.]

22. [Freud could be referring to Stekel.]

23. [Freud's sarcasm is enhanced by his use of the English word here!]

24. *[Weltanschauung* is, as Freud himself goes on to say, essentially untranslatable – thus it remains in German here. The German plural *(Weltanschauungen)* is also retained. The *Oxford Duden* dictionary offers 'world view' as an English equivalent – which merely highlights the fact that there *is* no adequate English equivalent. The German word appears in the *OED* supplement, defined as 'a particular philosophy or view of life; a concept of the world held by an individual or a group'; its first usage is given as 1868. Freud's own understanding of the term is laid out in the paragraphs below.]

25. [Heine, *Die Heimkehr*, LVIIL]

26. [Freud uses the English expression here, adding that he doesn't know of a suitable equivalent expression in German.]

27. [Kaiser Franz Josef was commonly known as 'the old man'.]

28. So I was told by a reliable source during the first year of the war.

An Outline of Psychoanalysis

Part One: The Nature of Things Psychical

The purpose of this brief essay is to offer as it were a dogmatic conspectus of psychoanalysis by bringing together all its doctrines in the most concentrated and clear-cut form. Obviously, it is not intended to convert or to convince you.

The postulates of psychoanalysis rest on an immeasurable wealth of observations and experiences, and only the person who has repeated these observations on himself and others has set about being able to pass his own judgement on them.

Chapter 1: the Psychical Apparatus

Psychoanalysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which remains the preserve of philosophical thought, and the justification for which lies in its results. We know two things about what we call the psyche (or psychical life). Firstly, we know about the brain (nerve system), the physical organ and scene of the psyche; secondly, we know that there are acts of consciousness that are presented to us in their immediate form and that no description can bring us any closer to. Everything in between is an unknown quantity to us; there is no direct relationship between these two end points of our knowledge. If there were such a relationship, it would at most give us an exact location of the processes of consciousness, and would not in the slightest help us to comprehend them.

Our two hypotheses take these ends or beginnings of our knowledge as their starting point. The first hypothesis concerns localization. We suppose that psychical life is the function of an apparatus which, we say, extends spatially and consists of several pieces – pieces which we, then, imagine to be similar to a telescope, a microscope or such like. The logical extension of such a notion is, disregarding certain attempts already made to approach it, a scientific novelty.

We have come to know about this psychical apparatus by studying the individual development of human beings. We call the oldest of these psychical provinces or forces the *Es*; it contains everything that is inherited, everything present at birth, everything constitutionally determined – above all, then, the drives originating from the bodily organization, which here [that is, in the *Es*] find a first psychical expression in forms unknown to us.[1]

Under the influence of the objective external world around us, part of the *Es* has developed in a particular way. In its original capacity as a cortical layer it was equipped both with organs to receive stimuli and with apparatus to protect against them; but, since then, a particular form of organization has developed that mediates between the *Es* and the external world. We have called this zone of our psyche the *Ich*.

The Main Characteristics of the *Ich*

Due to the relationship formed earlier between sensory perceptions and muscular action, the *Ich* has control over voluntary movement. It has the task of self-assertion, and fulfils it with respect to the *outside* world by getting to know the stimuli there, by storing information about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and finally by learning to change the external world in an expedient way to its own advantage (through activity). It also fulfils its task with respect to the *inner* world, that is, with respect to the *Es*, by gaining mastery over the demands of the drives, by deciding whether they should be allowed gratification, by postponing this gratification until the time and circumstances are favourable in the external world, or by suppressing their excitations altogether. Its actions are directed by observing the tensions that are either already present in it or have been introduced into it. If these tensions increase, this is generally perceived as *unpleasure*, and if they decrease, it is perceived as *pleasure*. However, it is probably not the absolute levels of this tension that are felt as pleasure or unpleasure but, rather, something about the rhythm in which they change. The *Ich* strives for pleasure, wants to avoid unpleasure. An expected, foreseen increase in unpleasure is answered by a *fear-signal*; its cause, whether it threatens from without or within, is called a *danger*. From time to time, the *Ich* dissolves its connection with the external world and retreats into the dormant state, in which it makes extensive changes to its

organization. We can conclude from this dormant state that this organization consists in a particular distribution of psychical energy.

The growing human has a particularly long period of childhood, during which he is dependent on his parents. As a residue of this period, a special authority develops in his *Ich*, in which this parental influence continues to exist. We have called this the *Über-Ich*. Insofar as the *Über-Ich* is distinguished from the *Ich* or is opposed to it, it is a third authority that the *Ich* has to take into account.

An action of the *Ich* is then fully apt if it simultaneously satisfies the demands of the *Es*, the *Über-Ich* and reality – in other words, if it can reconcile their demands with one another. The details of the relationship between the *Ich* and the *Über-Ich* become altogether comprehensible if we trace them back to the child's relationship with his parents. It is, of course, not only the personality of the individual parents that affects the influence they have over the child, but also the familial, racial and national traditions that they hand down, along with the demands of the particular social milieu they represent. During the course of the individual's development, the *Über-Ich* absorbs in the same way contributions from the later parental substitutes and other people who carry on having an influence, such as educators, public role models, and respected social ideals. We see that, for all their fundamental dissimilarity, the *Es* and the *Über-Ich* have one thing in common: they represent the influences of the past. The *Es* represents the influence of what is inherited, and the *Über-Ich* essentially represents the influence of

what is taken over from other people; whilst the *Ich* is mainly determined by what we experience ourselves – in other words, by accidental and current events.

This general pattern of a psychical apparatus could also be applied to the higher animals, those that are psychically similar to humans. We can suppose that an *Über-Ich* is always present when there has been a prolonged period of childhood dependency, as with humans. One can't avoid assuming that there is a distinction between the *Ich* and the *Es*.

Animal psychology has not yet started to tackle the interesting problem that raises itself here.

Chapter 2: the Theory of the Drives

The power of the *Es* expresses the actual purpose of the individual's life. This consists of gratifying his innate needs. We can't attribute to the *Es* an intention to remain alive and to use fear to protect itself from dangers. This is the task of the *Ich*, which also has to discover the most favourable and least dangerous kind of gratification whilst taking the external world into account. The *Über-Ich* may assert new needs, but its main function remains the restriction of gratifications.

Drives are what we call the forces that we suppose to lie behind the tensions caused by the needs of the *Es*. They represent the physical demands on the psyche. Although they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are conservative in nature; whatever state

a being has arrived at, an urge emerges to re-establish this state as soon as it has been abandoned. We can, then, distinguish between an indeterminate number of drives; indeed, one does so in common practice. Significant for us, however, is the possibility of being able to trace this multiplicity of drives back to a few basic ones. We have discovered that the drives can change their aim (by displacement), and also that they can replace one another, by the energy from one drive moving over to another. The latter process is still not well understood. After much wavering, we have decided to propose only two basic drives: *Eros* and the *destruction-drive*. (The opposition between the self-preservation and species-preservation drives, along with the other opposition between *Ich*-Iove and object-love, still falls within Eros.) The aim of the first drive is to establish and maintain ever greater unities, that is, 'binding'; the aim of the second is, by contrast, to dissolve connections, and thus to destroy things. In the case of the destruction-drive, we can also suppose that its ultimate aim is to convert the living into the inorganic state. Because of this, we also call it the *death-drive*. If we assume that the living appeared later than the lifeless and arose from this, then the death-drive fits into the formula I have mentioned, namely that drives strive to restore everything to an earlier state. We can't use this formula for Eros (or the love-drive). This would mean presupposing that living substance was once a unity which was then torn apart and now strives to be reunified.[2]

In the biological functions, the two basic drives work against one another or combine with one another. Thus the act of eating means

destroying the object with the ultimate aim of incorporating it; and the sexual act is an act of aggression with the intention of creating the most intimate union. This way in which the two basic drives work with and against each other gives rise to the whole spectrum of life-phenomena. The analogy of our two basic drives leads us beyond the realm of the living to the diametric opposition between the forces of attraction and repulsion that dominates the inorganic world.[3]

Changes to the proportions in which the drives are merged have the most tangible consequences. A strong increase in the proportion of sexual aggression turns the lover into the sex-murderer; a strong reduction in the aggressive factor makes him timid or impotent.

There can be no question of restricting either of the basic drives to one of the psychical provinces. They have to be found everywhere. We imagine an initial state in this manner: all the available energy of Eros, which we shall henceforth call 'libido', is present in the *Ich-Es*, which has not yet been differentiated, and serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies that are present at the same time. (We lack an analogous term to 'libido' for the energy of the destruction-drive.) It is relatively easy for us to trace the fate of the libido later on; it is more difficult to do so in the case of the destruction-drive.

So long as this drive operates within the individual as a death-drive, it remains silent; it only impinges on us when it is turned outwards as a destruction-drive. That this should happen seems to

be necessary for the preservation of the individual. The muscle system serves this diverting of energy. When the *Über-Ich* is established, considerable amounts of the aggression drive are fixated within the *Ich* and act self-destructively there. It is one of the dangers to health that humans take upon themselves en route to cultural development. It is wholly unhealthy to withhold aggression; the effect of this is that the person becomes ill. The shift from averted aggression into self-destruction via turning the aggression against one's own person is often demonstrated by someone in a fit of rage in which he tears out his hair or punches his own face, in the process obviously wishing that he were meting out this treatment to somebody else. A degree of self-destruction remains under any circumstances within the individual until it eventually succeeds in killing him, perhaps only once his libido is used up or fixated in a disadvantageous way. Thus one can generally suppose that the individual dies of his inner conflicts – but the species, on the other hand, dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world, if this has changed in such a way that the adaptations it has made are not sufficient.

It is difficult to say anything about the behaviour of the libido in the *Es* and in the *Über-Ich*. Everything that we know about it is related to the *Ich*, in which the entire available amount of libido is initially stored. We call this state absolute, primary *narcissism*. It lasts until the *Ich* begins to invest its notions of objects with libido, to transform narcissistic libido into *object-libido*. Throughout the whole of our lives, the *Ich* remains the great reservoir from which

libido-investments are sent out to objects and into which they are pulled back again, in the same way that a protoplasm behaves with its pseudopodia. It is only when the individual is totally in love that the main quota of libido is transferred on to the object, and the object to a certain extent takes the place of the *Ich.* One characteristic of the *Ich* that is important in life is the libido's *mobility*, the ease with which it passes from one object to other. In contrast to this is the fixation of the libido on certain objects that often persists throughout one's entire life.

It is an unmistakable fact that the libido has somatic sources; that it streams from various organs and parts of the body to the *Ich.* We can see this most clearly in that portion of the libido that is described according to its drive-aim as 'sexual arousal'. We call the most prominent of these parts of the body from which the libido comes the *erogenous zones* – although, in fact, the whole body is an erogenous zone of this kind. The best information we have about Eros, that is, about its exponent, the libido, has been gleaned by studying the sexual function, which, of course, coincides with Eros in the popular view, if not in our theory. We can form a picture of the way in which the sexual urge, which is destined to have a decisive influence on our life, gradually develops from the successive contributions from several partial drives, all of which represent particular zones.

Chapter 3: the Development of the Sexual Function

According to the popular view, human sexual life essentially consists of the urge to bring our own genitals into contact with those of someone of the opposite sex. Kissing, looking at, and touching this other body appear in the process as concomitant and introductory acts. This urge is supposed to appear at puberty, that is, at the age of sexual maturity, and is supposed to serve reproduction. Nevertheless, we have always known certain facts that don't fit into this narrow purview.

1) It is odd that there are people who are attracted only to individuals of their own sex and with their own genitals.

2) It is equally peculiar that there are people – we call them perverts – whose desires behave just like the sexual ones but which ignore the sexual organs or their normal use.

3) And, finally, it is striking that some children demonstrate a very early interest in their genitals and signs of arousal in them. They are said to be degenerate because of this.

It is understandable that psychoanalysis aroused a stir and provoked denials when, partly on the basis of these three disregarded facts, it contradicted all the popular opinions about sexuality. Its main results are as follows:

a) Sexual life doesn't bide its time until puberty, but starts to manifest itself very clearly soon after birth.

b) It isn't necessary to draw a sharp distinction between the terms 'sexual' and 'genital'. The former is the broader term and

encompasses many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals.

c) Sexual life encompasses the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body, a function which is later put into the service of reproduction. These two functions are often not necessarily mutually inclusive.

We are, of course, mainly interested in the first assertion, the most unexpected of them all. It has been demonstrated that there are signs of physical activity in early childhood to which only an old prejudice could deny the name sexual, and that are connected with the kinds of psychical phenomena that we later find in adult love-life such as, say, the fixation on particular objects, jealousy, or such like. Beyond this, however, it is evident that these phenomena are part of a natural and orderly development: they emerge in early childhood and invariably increase, reaching a climax somewhere around the end of the child's fifth year, before taking a break. During this break, everything stands still: much is un-learnt and recedes again. Once this so-called latency period has run its course, sexual life advances into puberty – we could say that it comes into bloom again. Here we come up against the fact that sexual life begins in two phases – something that is only known in humans, and something that is clearly very important for the process of becoming human.[4] It is not a matter of indifference that the events of this early period of sexuality, give or take a few residua, fall

victim to *infantile amnesia*. Our insights into the aetiology of the neuroses and our technique of analytical therapy are derived from these views. Tracing the developmental processes of this early period has also offered evidence for other hypotheses.

The first organ that appears from birth onwards as an erogenous zone and makes a libidinous claim on the psyche is the mouth. All psychical activity is initially directed at obtaining gratification of this zone's needs. Of course the mouth, with its function of providing nourishment, primarily serves self-preservation, but we ought not to confuse physiology with psychology. A need for gratification manifests itself early on, in the child's stubborn and persistent sucking; a need that – although it comes from and is stimulated by the taking in of nourishment – is nevertheless independent of nourishment and strives to gain pleasure. Because of this it can and should be called *sexual*.

During this oral phase, sadistic impulses already begin to occur sporadically with the cutting of teeth. This happens to a much greater extent in the second phase, which we called the sadistic-anal one, because here gratification is sought in aggression and in the excretory function. We base the right to mention the aggressive urges under the heading 'libido' on the view that sadism is a drive-blending of purely libidinal and purely destructive urges; a blending that will persist from now on for the rest of the person's life.[5]

The third phase is the so-called phallic phase; this is, as it were, a forerunner to the final form taken by sexual life, and is already very

similar to it. It is worth noting that it is the male member (phallus) alone that plays a role here, rather than the genitals of both sexes. The female genitals remain unrecognized for a long time to come; in its attempt to understand the sexual processes, the child clings devotedly to the venerable cloacal theory, which is, genetically speaking, entirely justified.[6]

With and during the phallic phase, early childhood sexuality reaches its climax – and approaches its decline. From now on, boys and girls have separate fates. Both have begun to place their intellectual activity in the service of sexual investigation; both take as their starting point the assumption that a penis is universally present. Now, though, the paths taken by the sexes diverge from one another. The boy enters the Oedipal phase: he begins to manipulate his penis whilst fantasizing about using it in some sexual way on his mother – until he sees that girls have no penis and this, combined with a castration threat, causes him to experience the greatest trauma of his life, which ushers in the latency period with all its consequences. After a vain attempt to do the same as the boy, the girl comes to recognize her lack of a penis or, rather, the inferiority of her clitoris. This has permanent consequences for her character-development; as a result of this first disappointment in rivalry she often initially rejects sexual life altogether.

It would be a mistake to believe that these three phases are smoothly replaced by each other. The one appears in addition to the other; they overlap; they exist alongside one another. In the early

phases, the individual partial drives embark upon their search for pleasure independently of one another; the phallic phase marks the beginnings of an organization that subordinates the other urges to the primacy of the genitals and signifies the beginning of the general striving for pleasure being categorized as belonging to the sexual function. The complete organization of a fourth, genital, phase is only achieved at puberty. Then, we find a state in which

1) some earlier libido-investments have remained intact;

2) others are taken up into the sexual function as preparatory, supporting actions, the gratification of which creates so-called fore-pleasure;

3) other urges are excluded from the organization either by being completely suppressed (repressed) or by being used in some other way in the *Ich*, to create character traits, to undergo sublimation with displaced aims.

This process is not always performed flawlessly. The inhibitions in its development express themselves as the manifold disruptions to sexual life. In these circumstances, fixations of the libido on states from earlier phases are then evident; their urges, which are independent of the normal sexual aim, are called *perversions*. One example of such inhibited development is homosexuality, if it is manifest. Analysis demonstrates that a homosexual object-attachment was present in all cases and, in most cases, has also been *latently* retained. The circumstances are complicated by the fact that

the processes necessary to bring about the normal outcome are usually neither, say, fully completed nor entirely lacking, but are *partially* completed so that the final outcome is dependent on these *quantitative* relations. The genital organization is then indeed achieved, but is weakened by the portions of the libido that have not made the transition and have remained fixated on pre-genital objects and aims. This weakening shows itself in the libido's inclination, in cases where it obtains no genital gratification or where it experiences objective difficulties, to return to its early, pre-genital investments (regression).

While studying the sexual functions we were able to come to an initial, provisional conviction – or more correctly speaking, a suspicion – that we had made two discoveries that would turn out to be important in this sphere as a whole. First, we saw that the normal and abnormal phenomena that we were observing (that is, their phenomenology) demand to be described from dynamic and economic points of view (in our case, this means from the point of view of the quantitative distribution of the libido); and second, we say that the aetiology of the sorts of disorder that we study is to be found in the history of the individual's development – that is to say, in his early years.

Chapter 4: Psychical Qualities

We have described the structure of the psychical apparatus, the energies or forces that are at work in it, and we have used a

prominent example to trace the ways in which these energies, mainly the libido, organize themselves into a physiological function that serves the preservation of the species. There was nothing in this that represented the quite unique character of what is psychical apart, of course, from the empirical fact that the functions that we call our psyche are based on this apparatus and these energies. We shall now turn to something that is characteristic of the psyche alone, indeed, something that, according to a most widespread belief, coincides with it to the exclusion of all else.

The starting point of this investigation is the unparalleled fact of consciousness, which defies all explanation and description. Undefinable and inexplicable it may be, but if we speak of consciousness then we none the less immediately know from our own most personal experience what is meant by it.[7] Many people, both within and outside science, are content to suppose consciousness alone to be the psychical thing, and in this case there remains nothing for psychology to do other than to distinguish between perceptions, feelings, thought processes and acts of will within the psychical phenomena. However, according to general consensus, these conscious processes don't in fact form a seamless, self-contained sequence – so the only thing that remains for us is to assume that physical or somatic processes accompany the psychical ones, processes which, we must grant, are more complete than those in the psychical sequences, since a few of them have parallel conscious processes, though others don't. Of course, it then seems

obvious to place psychological emphasis on these somatic processes, to recognize in them what is really psychical, and to look for another way to evaluate the conscious processes. Most philosophers, along with many others, now resist this, and declare the idea of something being simultaneously unconscious and psychical to be nonsense.

However, it is precisely this that psychoanalysis has to do, and this is its second fundamental assumption. It declares that the allegedly somatic 'accompanying processes' are the really psychical things and, by doing so, initially disregards the quality of consciousness. It is not alone in this. Some thinkers such as Theodore Lipps, for example, have said the same thing in more or less the same words, and the general dissatisfaction with the normal view of things psychical has led to ever more urgent demands for the concept of the unconscious to be adopted by psychological thought – although these demands have been made in such an indefinite and obscure manner that they could have no influence on science.

Now, it would seem that this difference between psychoanalysis and psychology concerned nothing more than a trifling question of definition; a question as to whether the name 'psychical' should be applied to the one or the other sequence. In fact, this step has become highly significant. Whereas in the psychology of consciousness people never got beyond those incomplete sequences that were clearly dependent on something else, the other view –

that the psychical is in itself unconscious – has allowed psychology to develop into a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those of other sciences – of, say, chemistry or physics – but it is possible to establish which laws they obey, to trace their mutual relationships and interdependencies seamlessly over long stretches; in other words, to reach what one calls an 'understanding' of the relevant area of natural phenomena. This can't happen without our making assumptions and creating new terms – but these should not be despised as testifying to any embarrassment on our part. On the contrary, they should be treasured as an enriching of science; they have as much claim to 'approximate value' status as the corresponding working premisses have in other sciences; they can expect to be amended, corrected and fine tuned after we have accumulated and sifted through further experiences. It is then also quite in keeping with our expectations that the fundamental terms and principles of the new science (drives, nervous energy et al.) remain for a long time as obscure as those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction).

All sciences are based on observation and experience that are mediated by our psychical apparatus. However, as our science takes this apparatus itself as an object, the analogy ends here. We make our observations by means of the same perception apparatus, precisely with the help of the gaps in what is psychical, by using the obvious conclusions to elaborate on what is omitted, and by translating these omissions into unconscious material. Thus we

construct as it were a sequence of conscious events in addition to the unconscious psychical processes. The relative certainty of our knowledge of the psyche is based on the binding force of these conclusions. Anyone who immerses himself in this work will find that our technique withstands every criticism.

In the course of this work, those distinctions that we call psychical qualities force themselves upon our notice. We don't need to characterize what we call 'conscious': it is the same as the consciousness of philosophy and popular opinion. Everything else that is psychical is, for us, the unconscious. We are soon led to postulate an important distinction within this unconscious. Some processes can become conscious easily; they may then cease to be conscious, but can become so again with no trouble; they can, as we say, be reproduced or remembered. This reminds us that consciousness is only ever a very fleeting state. Anything that is conscious is only conscious for a moment. If our perceptions don't confirm this, then that is only an apparent contradiction; it stems from the fact that the stimuli that lead to perception can last for a long time so that, meanwhile, the perceptions maybe repeated. The entire state of affairs becomes clear in the conscious perception of our thought processes: they may indeed persist, but they may just as easily disappear in the blink of an eye. Everything unconscious that behaves in this manner, that can so easily exchange the unconscious state for the conscious one, we thus prefer to call 'capable of becoming conscious', or *preconscious*. Experience has taught us that there is hardly any psychical process that is so complicated that it

could not occasionally remain preconscious, even if it usually presses, as we say, to become conscious.

Other psychical processes and material don't enter the consciousness so easily, but have to be deduced, guessed at, and translated into conscious expression in the manner described. For these, we reserve the name of the actual unconscious. We have, then, attributed three qualities to the psychical processes: they are either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious. The differentiation between the three categories of material that bear these qualities is neither absolute nor permanent. Something preconscious becomes, as we have seen, conscious without our being involved; and the unconscious can, through our efforts, be made conscious, whereby we may have the sense that we are often overcoming very strong resistances. If we try to do this with another individual, we mustn't forget that the conscious filling of the gaps in his perception, the interpretation that we present to him, doesn't yet mean that we have made the relevant unconscious material conscious in his case. This material is, rather, initially present in him in a two-fold fixation: firstly, in the conscious reconstruction he has heard and, in addition to this, in its original, unconscious state. Our continued efforts mostly succeed in making him conscious of this unconscious material himself, as a result of which both fixations coincide. The degree of effort, by which we estimate resistance against the material coming to consciousness, differs depending on the individual case. For example, something that is the result of our efforts in analytical treatment can also occur spontaneously;

material that is otherwise unconscious can transform itself into something preconscious and can then become conscious, as happens on a large scale in psychotic states. We infer from this that upholding certain inner resistances is a condition of normality. Such a reduction of resistances and the resultant clamouring of unconscious material frequently takes place while we are asleep and thus establishes the conditions under which dreams can be formed. The reverse can also happen: preconscious material can become inaccessible, cut off by resistances – as is the case when we temporarily forget something or when it just escapes our memory. Alternatively, a preconscious thought can even be temporarily transferred back into the unconscious state; this seems to be the pre-condition for jokes. We shall see that a similar transformation of preconscious content (or processes) back into the unconscious state plays a major role in the causation of neurotic disturbances.

Portrayed in this generalized and simplified form, the theory of the three qualities of things psychical seems to be a source of immense confusion rather than a step towards an explanation. But we mustn't forget that it is in fact not a theory at all but a first report on the facts that we have observed; that it sticks as closely as possible to these facts and makes no attempt to explain them. The complications that it reveals may make people understand the particular difficulties that our research has to struggle with. However, this theory will presumably also be made more accessible to us if we trace out the relationships that arise between the psychical qualities and the provinces or forces that we have

supposed to be part of the psychical apparatus. These relationships are, though, anything other than simple.

The process of becoming conscious is above all connected to the perceptions that our sense organs receive from the external world. From a topographical point of view, therefore, it is a phenomenon that occurs in the outermost cortex of the *Ich*. It is true that we also receive conscious information from within the body – the feelings, which have even more of a domineering influence on our psyche than external perceptions; and, moreover, under certain circumstances the sense organs also deliver feelings and sensations of pain outside their specific perceptions. Since, however, these sensations – as we call them, in order to distinguish them from conscious perceptions – at the same time emanate from the terminal organs, which we regard as extensions or offshoots of the cortical layer, we can still maintain the above assertion [that is, the one at the start of this paragraph]. The sole difference would be that the body itself would replace the external world so far as the terminal organs of sensation and feeling are concerned.

Processes on the periphery of the *Ich* as conscious, and all other processes in the *Ich* as unconscious: this would be the most simple idea that we could imagine. It may really be so in the case of animals – but, in the case of humans there is an added complication: the inner processes of the *Ich* can also acquire the quality of consciousness. This is the function of language, which firmly connects the material within the *Ich* with memory-traces of visual

or, more particularly, acoustic perceptions. From then onwards, the perceiving periphery of the cortical layer can also be excited from within to a far greater extent; inner processes such as those of imagination and thought can become conscious, and a special device is needed in order to distinguish between the two possibilities, namely *reality-testing*. It has become invalid to equate perception with reality (the external world). Errors, which can now easily occur, and frequently do so in dreams, are called *hallucinations*.

The interior of the *Ich*, which above all encompasses the thought processes, has the quality of preconsciousness. This is characteristic of the *Ich*; it is its sole prerogative. However, it would not be right to turn the connection with the memory-traces of language into a pre-condition of the preconscious state; rather, this state is independent of these memory-traces, even though the fact of language allows us to draw confident conclusions as to the preconscious nature of the process. Yet the preconscious state, distinguished on the one hand by its access to consciousness and on the other hand by its link with language traces, is still something special; its nature doesn't simply consist of these two characteristics. The proof for this is that large portions of the *Ich*, and above all of the *Über-Ich*, whose preconscious character can't be denied, still mostly remain unconscious in the phenomenological sense. We don't understand why this should be the case. The real nature of the preconscious is a problem that we shall try to tackle later.

The unconscious is the quality that reigns supreme in the *Es*. *Es* and unconscious belong just as intimately together as *Ich* and preconscious; indeed, the relationship between the former pair is even more exclusive. A review of the developmental history of an individual and his psychical apparatus allows us to establish that there is a significant distinction within the *Es*. Originally, *everything* was *Es*; the *Ich* grew up from the *Es* due to the constant influence of the external world. During the course of this long development, certain things within the *Es* were transformed into the preconscious state and were thus absorbed into the *Ich*. Other things remained unchanged within the *Es* as its barely accessible core. But as things took their course, the young and weak *Ich* dropped certain material that it had already adopted, transferred it back into the unconscious state, and behaved in the same way towards some new impressions that it could have adopted – so that these, finding themselves repulsed, could leave a trace only in the *Es*. Bearing its genesis in mind, we call this last part of the *Es* the *repressed*. It doesn't really matter that we can't always clearly distinguish between the two categories in the *Es*. They more or less coincide with the distinction between what it originally brought with it, and what it acquired while the *Ich* was developing.

If, however, we have decided to undertake a topographical analysis[8] of the psychical apparatus into *Ich* and *Es*, which runs parallel to the distinction between the qualities of preconscious and unconscious, and if we want to take this quality only as a *sign* of a difference rather than as the essence of it – then what is the actual

nature of the state that betrays itself in the *Es* through the quality of unconsciousness and in the *Ich* through that of preconsciousness? And wherein lies the difference between the two?

Now, we know nothing about this; and our paltry insights figure very pitifully in comparison with the deeply obscure ignorance that lies behind them. Here, we have approached the actual secret of things psychical, as yet unrevealed. We suppose, as we are accustomed to do in the other sciences, that a kind of energy is at work in the psyche, but we lack anything to go on that will enable us to approach an understanding of it by analogies with other forms of energy. We believe we can see that nervous or psychical energy is present in two forms; one freely flowing and the other, by comparison, bound; we speak of material being invested and hyper-invested with energy; and even venture the supposition that a 'hyper-investment' establishes a kind of synthesis of different processes, in which free energy is converted into bound energy. We have got no further than this. All the same, we remain firmly of the opinion that the difference between the unconscious and preconscious states lies in dynamic relationships such as these, from which it would be possible to derive an explanation for the way in which one can be converted into the other either spontaneously or with our being involved in some way.

Behind all this insecurity, however, there lies a new fact; one which was discovered thanks to psychoanalytical research. We have found that the processes in the unconscious or in the *Es* obey

different laws from those in the preconscious *Ich*. We call these laws as a whole the *primary process*, as opposed to the *secondary process* which governs the pattern of things in the preconscious, in the *Ich*. Thus the study of the psychical qualities has, it would seem, ultimately proved itself to be fruitful after all.

Chapter 5: Explanatory Notes Concerning the Interpretation of Dreams

Imagine an investigation of normal, stable states, in which the barriers of the *Ich* against the *Es* have remained secure and unruffled by resistances (opposing investments) and in which there is no difference between the *Ich* and *Über-Ich* because they are working in harmony with one another. Well, such an investigation would not be in the slightest bit enlightening. States of conflict and turbulence alone can further our knowledge, if the material of the unconscious *Es* has the prospect of penetrating the *Ich* and thrusting itself into consciousness – and if the *Ich* renews its stand against this attack. Only under these conditions can we make the observations that confirm or correct our assertions about the two partners. Our nightly sleep, however, is just such a state and because of this, the psychical activity during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is also our most promising object for study. Moreover, by studying dreams, we will also avoid the oft-repeated accusation that we base our picture of the normal psyche on our findings in pathology; for dreams frequently occur in the lives of normal people, however

much their characteristics may also differ from what we produce when we are awake. As is generally known, dreams can be confused, incomprehensible, practically nonsensical; what they say may contradict everything we know about reality; and we behave like insane people so long as we are dreaming, by attributing objective reality to the contents of a dream.

We set about understanding ('interpreting') the dream by supposing whatever we remember of a dream when we wake up not to be the real dream process but just a façade that hides this real process. This is what we mean when we differentiate between the *manifest* dream content and the *latent* dream thoughts. We call the process that allows the former to proceed from the latter the *dream-work*. The study of the dream-work uses an excellent example to teach us how unconscious material from the *Es* – both originally unconscious and repressed unconscious material – forces itself upon the *Ich*, becomes preconscious and, as a result of the *Ich's* opposition, undergoes that transformation which we know as *dream-distortion*. There are no features of a dream that could not be explained in this way.

It is best to start by saying that dreams are formed for two different reasons. Either a drive-impulse that is otherwise suppressed (that is, an unconscious wish) has found the strength while the individual is asleep to assert itself within the *Ich*; or an urge left over from waking life, a preconscious train of thought with its concomitant conflicting impulses, has been reinforced

during sleep by an unconscious element. In other words, dreams originate from the *Es* or the *Ich*. The mechanism for dream-formation is the same in both cases, as is the dynamic pre-condition. The *Ich* proves its later derivation from the *Es* by abandoning its functions from time to time and allowing things to revert to an earlier state. This happens, correctly speaking, by the *Ich* breaking off its relationships to the external world and withdrawing from the sense organs whatever it has invested in them. We are quite justified in saying that, at birth, a drive arises to return to the intra-uterine life we have given up – a drive to sleep. Sleep is a return to the womb of this kind. As the *Ich* governs motility when it is awake, this function is paralysed during sleep, and a good deal of the inhibitions that were imposed on the unconscious *Es* accordingly becomes superfluous. The withdrawal of these 'opposing investments' allows the *Es* a measure of freedom that is now harmless. There is rich and compelling evidence for the part played by the unconscious *Es* in dream-formation.

a) The dream memory is far more extensive than the memory in waking life. Dreams produce memories that the dreamer has forgotten, which would be inaccessible to him while he was awake.

b) Dreams make unlimited use of linguistic symbols, the meaning of which the dreamer mostly doesn't understand. However, we can draw on our experience to say what they mean. They probably come from earlier phases of language development.

c) The dream memory very often reproduces impressions from the dreamer's early childhood. We can say for certain that these not only had been forgotten but had been made unconscious because of repression. The help – mostly indispensable – that dreams afford us when we try to reconstruct the dreamer's childhood in the analytical treatment of neuroses is based on this.

d) In addition to this, dreams bring material to light which can come neither from the dreamer's mature life nor from his forgotten childhood. We are forced to regard this as part of an *archaic* inheritance that the child, influenced by the experiences of his forebears, brings into the world with him prior to having any experiences of his own. We then find the counterparts to this phylogenetic material in the earliest legends of mankind and in surviving customs. Thus dreams become a source of human prehistory that we should not dismiss out of hand.

However, what makes dreams so invaluable in giving us an insight into the psyche is the circumstance that, if the unconscious material penetrates the *Ich,* it brings its own ways of working along with it. I mean by this that the preconscious thoughts in which this unconscious material has found its expression are treated during the course of dream-work as if they were unconscious parts of the *Es*; and in other cases of dream-formation, the preconscious thoughts, which have garnered strength from the unconscious drive-impulse, are reduced to the unconscious state. Only in this way do we

discover what the rules governing the course of events in the unconscious are, and what distinguishes them from the rules we are familiar with in waking life. Dream-work is, then, essentially a case of the unconscious dealing with preconscious thought processes. To take an analogy from history: the invading conquerors don't treat a country according to the laws they find there, but according to their own laws. However, it is unmistakably the case that the result of dream-work represents a compromise. In the distortion imposed on the unconscious material and in the attempts – often inadequate – to give the whole thing a form that is still acceptable to the *Ich* (secondary processing), we can see the influence of the *Ich* – organization, which is not yet paralysed. That is, to use our analogy, an expression of the continued resistance of the vanquished.

The laws governing the course of events in the unconscious that come to light in such a way are peculiar enough, and give us an adequate explanation for most of what we find strange about dreams. Above all, there is a striking tendency to *compression*, an inclination to create new unities out of elements that we would certainly have kept separate in waking thought. As a consequence of this, a single element of the manifest dream often represents a whole host of latent dream thoughts, as if it were an allusion common to all of them, and the scope of the manifest dream is as a whole extraordinarily condensed compared to the rich material that it came from. Another peculiarity of dream-work, not entirely independent of the earlier one, is the ease with which psychical

intensities (investments) are displaced from one element to another, so that in the manifest dream one element that was unimportant in the dream thoughts often appears to be the clearest and, correspondingly, the most important; and, vice versa, essential elements of the dream thoughts are represented in the manifest dream merely by slight allusions. Moreover, having quite insignificant points in common is mostly sufficient for the dream-work to be able to replace one element with another in all further operations. It is easy to grasp the extent to which these mechanisms of compression and displacement can make it difficult for us to interpret a dream and to uncover the relationships between the manifest dream and the latent dream thoughts. From the proof that these two tendencies to compress and displace one another do exist, our theory draws the conclusion that energy exists in a state of free movement in the unconscious *Es* and that it matters more than anything else to the *Es* to find a release for quantities of excitation;[9] and it [our theory] uses both of these two peculiarities to characterize the primary processes attributed to the *Es*.

By studying dream-work, we have come to know yet many more characteristics of the processes in the unconscious; characteristics that are as remarkable as they are important. Only a few of these will be mentioned here. The decisive rules of logic don't apply in the unconscious; we could call it the Empire of the Illogical. Urges with opposing aims exist alongside one another in the unconscious, without the need ever arising for them to adjust to one another. They either have no influence whatsoever on one another or, if they

have, then what arises is not a decision in favour of one or the other, but a compromise that becomes nonsensical because it includes details that are mutually incompatible. Closely related to this is the fact that oppositions are not kept apart in the unconscious but are treated as if they were identical, so that every element in a manifest dream can also signify its opposite. A few linguistic researchers have recognized that it was just the same in the most ancient languages and that oppositions like 'strong–weak', 'light–dark', or 'high–deep' were originally expressed through the same root until two different modifications of the original word separated the two meanings from one another. Remnants of the original dual meaning are still supposed to be preserved even in a language so highly developed as Latin, in the use of words like *altus* ('high' and 'deep') and *sacer* ('sacred' and 'infamous') among others.

In view of the complications and the ambiguity of the relationships between the manifest dream and the latent content that lies behind it, it is of course justifiable to ask how we can arrive at the very idea of deriving the one from the other and whether we are not solely thrown back on making a lucky guess, supported perhaps by a translation of the symbols appearing in the manifest dream. We may respond by saying that this task can be satisfactorily solved in practically all cases, but only with the help of the associations that the dreamer himself brings to the elements of the manifest content. Every other way of proceeding is arbitrary and provides no surety. However, the dreamer's associations reveal the intermediate links; we can slot these into the gaps between the

two [that is, the manifest and the latent] and, with their help, we can reinstate the latent content of the dream, 'interpret' the dream. It is hardly surprising if every now and again this interpretative work, acting in opposition to the dream-work, fails to deliver a secure answer.

It still remains for us to offer a dynamic explanation for why the sleeping *Ich* takes on the task of dream-work at all. Luckily, this explanation is easy to find. With the help of the unconscious, every dream that is in the process of being formed makes a demand on the *Ich* to have a drive gratified (if it comes from the *Es*); or to resolve a conflict, remove a doubt, form an intention (if it comes from a residue of preconscious activity in waking life). However, the sleeping *Ich* is focused on the wish to carry on sleeping; it perceives this demand as a disturbance and thus seeks to get rid of it. The *Ich* succeeds in doing so through an act of apparent indulgence: it meets the demand with a *wish-fulfilment* which is harmless in these circumstances and thus removes it. This replacement of the demand by a wish-fulfilment remains the dream-work's most essential function. It is perhaps not superfluous to elaborate on this with three simple examples: a hunger dream, a comfort dream, and a dream provoked by sexual desire. While he is asleep the dreamer feels a need for food; he dreams of a magnificent meal and carries on sleeping. He had, of course, the choice either to wake up and eat, or to continue sleeping. He decided on the latter and satisfied his hunger through his dream. For a while, at any rate; if his hunger persisted, he would have to wake up after all. Here is the second

example: the sleeper, a doctor, is supposed to wake up in order to be at the hospital at a certain time. However, he carries on sleeping and dreams that he is already at the hospital – but as a patient who doesn't need to leave his bed. Or, to take a third example, the dreamer feels a yearning during the night to enjoy a forbidden sexual object, namely a friend's wife. He dreams of sexual intercourse with, it is true, an indifferent person – but one who nevertheless shares his friend's wife's name. Alternatively, his attempt to resist his desire expresses itself by his dream-lover remaining totally anonymous.

Of course, not all cases are so easy. Particularly with dreams that come from the day's undealt-with residua and that have simply undergone an unconscious reinforcement in the sleeping state it is often difficult to uncover the unconscious drive-force and to establish its wish-fulfilment, but we can assume that it is always present. The theory that dreams represent a wish-fulfilment will easily provoke disbelief if one remembers how many dreams have a directly unpleasant content or even cause us to wake up through fear, quite apart from the frequent dreams that have no particular emotional tone. But the objection about fear-dreams doesn't stand up to analysis. One mustn't forget that dreams are always the result of a conflict; they are a type of compromise-formation. Anything that is gratifying to the unconscious *Es* can be a cause for the *Ich* to feel fear – precisely because it *is* gratifying.

As the dream-work proceeds, the unconscious sometimes asserts itself better; at other times, the *Ich* defends itself more energetically. Fear-dreams are mostly the ones in which the content has been least distorted. If the demand of the unconscious becomes so great that the sleeping *Ich* is not in a position to fend it off by the means at its disposal, then it abandons its desire to sleep and returns to waking life. We will be taking all our experiences into account if we say that every dream is an *attempt* to eliminate disturbances to sleep by wish-fulfilment; thus dreams are the guardians of sleep. This attempt can be more or less completely successful; it can also fail – and then the sleeper awakes, apparently roused from his slumber by precisely this dream. Likewise, the good night-watchman who is supposed to guard the sleep of the little town sometimes has no alternative but to make a commotion and awaken the sleeping townspeople.

To conclude these discussions I shall add a remark that will justify the large amount of time we have spent on the problem of dream interpretation. It has turned out to be the case that the unconscious mechanisms that we have come to know through studying dream-work and that explain dream-formation to us also help us to understand the formation of the puzzling symptoms that make neurosis and psychosis so interesting to us. A correspondence of this kind must invariably awaken great hopes in us.

Part Two: The Practical Task

Chapter 6: the Psychoanalytical Technique

Dreams, then, are a psychosis, with all the inconsistencies, delusions, and tricks of the senses that the psychoses demonstrate. Admittedly, they are a short-lived psychosis; a harmless one; one even entrusted with a useful function, introduced with the individual's consent, ended by an act of his will. But, all the same, they are a psychosis; and we learn from them that even such a profound change in the psyche can be reversed and the normal function can take its place. Is it, then, too bold to hope that it must be possible to make the dreaded spontaneous psychical illnesses submit to our influence as well – and that they must be curable?

We already know a number of things that prepare us to undertake this task. According to our premiss, the *Ich* has the job of satisfying the claims of its three dependencies – reality, the *Es*, and the *Über-Ich* – while still retaining its organization and asserting its independence. The condition that brings about the state of illness that we are talking about can only be a relative or total weakening of the *Ich* that makes it impossible for it to fulfil its tasks. The most difficult demand on the *Ich* is probably that of suppressing the drive-claims from the *Es*; for this, it has to maintain large amounts of energy in opposing investments. However, the demands of the *Über-*

Ich can also become so powerful and relentless that the *Ich* faces its other tasks as if it were paralysed. We suspect that in the economic conflict that arises here, the *Es* and *Über-Ich* often make common cause against the besieged *Ich,* which wants to cling on to reality in order to retain its normality. If the first two become too powerful, they succeed in breaking up and changing the organization of the *Ich* so that its proper relationship to reality is disturbed or even cancelled out. We saw this in the case of dreams; if the *Ich* becomes detached from the reality of the external world then it sinks, under the influence of the internal world, into psychosis.

We base our plan for a cure on these insights. The *Ich* is weakened by the internal conflict; we have to come to its aid. It is like being in a civil war that is to be decided by the assistance of an ally from outside. The analyst and the patient's weakened *Ich* are, basing themselves on the objective external world, supposed to form a team against the enemies, namely the drive-demands of the *Es* and the conscience-demands of the *Über-Ich.* We make a deal with each other. The ailing *Ich* promises to be fully honest with us, that is, to put at our disposal all the material that its self-perception offers it; in return, we promise it the utmost discretion, and we put at its service our experience in interpreting material influenced by the unconscious. Our knowledge is supposed to compensate for its *lack* of knowledge; it is supposed to return to the *Ich* its dominance over lost zones of the psyche. This deal constitutes the analytical situation.

No sooner have we taken this step than the first disappointment awaits us, the first reminder that we should be more modest. If the patient's *Ich* is to be a valuable ally in our mutual labours, it must have preserved a certain measure of coherence, a modicum of understanding of the demands of reality – despite all the pressure put on it by hostile forces. But this can't be expected of the psychotic's *Ich*; this can't stick to a deal of this kind, indeed it can barely enter into such a deal at all. It will very soon have rejected us and the help that we are offering as belonging to the parts of the external world that no longer signify anything to it. We thus recognize that we have to abandon the idea of trying out our attempts at a cure on psychotics. Perhaps we will have to give up forever; perhaps only temporarily, until we have found another, more suitable, plan for them.

However, there is another class of people with psychical illnesses, who are clearly closely related to the psychotics: the vast number of people suffering from severe neurosis. The conditions that bring about their illness as well as its pathogenic mechanisms have to be the same – or at least very similar – in both cases. But the *Ich* of neurotics has proved itself to be more capable of resistance, has become less disorganized. Many neurotics have been able to hold their own in real life, despite all their complaints and the shortcomings that these cause. These neurotics may show themselves prepared to accept our help. We want to restrict our interest to them, and to attempt to see how far and by which methods we can 'cure' them.

With the neurotics, then, we make this deal: total honesty in return for complete discretion. That gives the impression that we were simply aiming to take the place of a secular father confessor, But there is a great difference. For we don't simply want to hear from the patient the things he knows and hides from others: he also has to tell us what he *doesn't* know. With this in mind, we give him a more precise definition of what we mean by honesty. We commit him to the *fundamental rule* of analysis, which is henceforth to govern his behaviour towards us. He is not simply to tell us what he intends to say, what he is happy to say, the things that would give him the kind of relief he would get after a confession: he has to tell us everything that his self-observation yields to him; everything that comes into his mind, even if it is unpleasant for him to say it, even if it seems to him to be unimportant or even ridiculous. If he succeeds in switching off his self-critical mechanism after being instructed thus, he will give us a wealth of material – thoughts, associations, memories – that are already under the influence of the unconscious, indeed are often directly derived from it, and that thus put us in a position to deduce his repressed unconscious material and to extend the knowledge his *Ich* has of his unconscious by sharing this with him.

However, this by no means suggests that the role of the *Ich* would be restricted to one of passive obedience, whereby it would deliver us the material we demand, and would trustingly accept our translation of this. A number of other things happen, a few of which we might have foreseen and others of which are bound to surprise

us. The most remarkable thing is that the patient doesn't continue to see the analyst in a realistic light, as a helper and advisor who, moreover, is paid for his efforts and who would himself be quite happy to play the role of, say, a mountain-guide on a difficult mountain climb. Rather, he sees in the analyst the return – the reincarnation – of an important person from his childhood, his past; and, because of this, transfers feelings and reactions onto him that undoubtedly applied to this role model. This fact of transference soon proves to be a factor of undreamt-of significance: on the one hand, it is an aid of irreplaceable value; on the other hand, it is a source of serious dangers. This transference is *ambivalent*: it encompasses positive and tender attitudes as well as negative, hostile ones towards the analyst, who is as a rule put in the place of one or other of the patient's parents, his father or his mother. So long as it is positive, it serves us admirably. It changes the whole analytical situation; it forces aside the patient's rational intention of becoming healthy and free from suffering. In its place appears the intention of pleasing the analyst, of gaining his approval and love. This becomes the actual motivating force of the patient's co-operation; the weak *Ich* becomes strong and, under its influence, the patient achieves things that he would normally find impossible; the symptoms cease and he appears to become healthy – but only for the sake of the analyst. The analyst may admit rather shamefacedly that he had embarked upon a difficult task without having the faintest idea as to the extraordinary powers that would put themselves at his disposal.

Moreover, the transference relationship brings two further advantages with it. If the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or his mother), then he also grants him the power that his *Über-Ich* exercises over his *Ich*, as these parents were, of course, the origins of the *Über-Ich*. The new *Über-Ich* now has the opportunity to re-educate so to speak the neurotic: it can correct mistakes for which his parents were responsible in his upbringing. Admittedly, we must at this point insert a warning against misusing our new influence. However much the analyst may be tempted to become teacher, role model and ideal for others, to create humans in his own image, he mustn't forget that this is not his task in the analytical relationship; indeed, that he would be betraying his task if he allowed himself to be swept away by his inclinations. He would then simply be repeating one of the mistakes of the parents, who crushed their child's independence by their influence. He would be merely replacing the earlier dependence by a newer one. In all his efforts to improve and educate the patient, though, the analyst should respect his individuality. The degree of influence that he can legitimately allow himself will be determined by the degree of developmental inhibition that the patient exhibits. Some neurotics have remained so infantile that in analysis, too, they can only be treated like children.

Yet another advantage of transference is that it allows the patient to present us with an important part of his life story in all its plastic clarity – a part about which he would probably otherwise have

given us insufficient information. He as it were acts it out for us instead of telling us about it.

Now let us turn to the other side of the relationship. As transference reproduces the patient's relationship to his parents, it also takes over the ambivalence of this relationship. It is almost impossible to avoid the positive attitude towards the analyst ultimately changing into the negative, hostile one. This, too, is usually a repetition of the past. The patient's tractability vis-à-vis his father (if the father was the person in question) and his courting of his father's favour were rooted in an erotic desire directed towards the latter individual. At some time or another, this demand presses its way forward in transference as well, and will insist on being gratified. In the analytical situation, it can only meet with a refusal. Actual sexual relations between patient and analyst are ruled out; even the more subtle means of gratification such as showing preference to someone or being intimate with them are granted only very sparingly by the analyst. A spurning of this kind is taken by the patient as a reason to change his attitude; the same probably happened during his childhood.

It is suspected that the successful cures that were brought about while the positive transference was dominant might be of a *suggestive* nature. If negative transference gains the upper hand they are blown away like chaff in the wind. We are horrified to see that all our efforts, all our work, have been in vain thus far. Indeed, even that which we might take to be a permanent intellectual gain

on the patient's part – his understanding of psychoanalysis and his faith in its effectiveness – suddenly disappears. He behaves like a child who has no faculty to judge for himself, who blindly believes whoever he loves – and no outsider. The danger of these transference states obviously consists in the patient misunderstanding their nature and taking them to be new, real experiences, rather than reflections of the past. If he (or she) feels the strong erotic desire hidden behind positive transference, then he believes that he has fallen passionately in love; if the transference then veers in the opposite direction, he considers himself to be insulted and neglected; he hates the analyst, his enemy, and is quite prepared to give up analysis. In both extreme cases, he has forgotten the deal he made at the start of the treatment and has become of no use for further work together. The analyst's task is always to tear the patient away from the threatening illusion; to show him again and again that what he takes to be a new, real life is actually a reflection of the past. And, in order that the patient doesn't get into a state that makes him inaccessible to all evidence, we have to take care that neither his love nor his hostility reaches an extreme level. We do this by being prepared early on for these possibilities, and by paying due regard to their early signs. Such care when managing transference tends to be very worthwhile. If we succeed, as we mostly do, in enlightening the patient about the true nature of the phenomena of transference, then we shall have deprived his resistance of a powerful weapon and shall have converted dangers into gains, for the patient will never forget what

he has experienced in the forms of transference; it has more power to convince him than anything he has acquired in any other way.

We find it most undesirable if the patient *acts out* his experiences outside transference rather than remembering them. For our purposes, the ideal conduct would be for him to behave as normally as possible outside treatment and to express his abnormal reactions only in transference.

Our method of strengthening the weakened *Ich* takes an increase in its self-knowledge as its starting point. We know that there is more to it than this – but it is a first step. The loss of such knowledge means that the *Ich* forfeits power and influence; it is the first tangible sign that it is being hemmed in and hampered by the demands of the *Es* and the *Über-Ich*. Thus the first part of the assistance we offer is an intellectual exertion on our part and a summons to the patient to collaborate in it. We know that this initial activity is supposed to prepare the way for us to undertake another, more difficult task. We shall not lose sight of the dynamic elements of this task even during its introductory phase. We acquire the material for our work from various sources: from whatever the patient's communications and free associations allude to; from what he demonstrates in his transferences; from whatever we draw from the interpretation of his dreams; from whatever is betrayed by his 'slips'. All this material helps us to make suppositions about what has happened to him and what he has forgotten, as well as about what is currently happening inside him without his understanding it.

However, we never forget in the process to keep a strict distinction between our knowledge and his knowledge. We avoid plunging in and telling him things that we have deduced often very early on in the piece, and we avoid telling him *everything* that we believe we have deduced. We consider very carefully at what point we should make him privy to one of our suppositions; we wait for a moment that seems the most suitable – something that is not always easy to decide. Normally we postpone sharing a supposition with him, enlightening him, until he has himself come so close to it that all that remains is for him to take one more step – albeit the step representing the decisive synthesis. If we proceeded differently, if we were to bombard him with our interpretations before he was prepared for them, then either what we said would have no effect or it would provoke a violent attack of *resistance* that would make it difficult to continue with our work, or could even jeopardize it altogether. If, however, we have prepared the ground correctly then we often achieve a situation in which the patient immediately confirms our interpretation and himself remembers the forgotten internal or external processes. The more precisely our interpretation coincides with the details of what the patient has forgotten, the easier it is for him to agree with it. Our knowledge on that particular matter has in this case become his knowledge, too.

Mentioning resistance brings us to the second, more important part of our task. We have already heard that the *Ich* protects itself against being invaded by undesired elements from the unconscious and repressed *Es* by means of opposing investments that must

remain intact if it is to function normally. The more oppressed the *Ich* now feels, the more desperately it persists – terrified, as it were – with these opposing investments, in order to protect what remains of it against further encroachment. This defensive tendency, however, doesn't in the slightest accord with the intentions of our treatment. On the contrary, what we want is for the *Ich*, emboldened by the security that our help affords it, to venture an attack in order to recapture what it has lost. In the process we come to sense the force of this opposing investment as *resistance* to our work. The *Ich* recoils from apparently dangerous undertakings of this kind that threaten unpleasure. It has constantly to be spurred on and pacified in order for it not to refuse to cooperate with us. This resistance, which persists throughout the entire course of treatment and which renews itself with every new piece of work, is what we somewhat incorrectly call *repression-resistance*. We shall hear that this resistance is not the only one we have to face. It is interesting to see that in this situation the party divisions are to a certain extent reversed: the *Ich* resists our suggestions, but the unconscious, normally our opponent, comes to our aid, for it has a natural 'impetus' and desires nothing more than to advance beyond the barriers the *Ich* sets up against it and into consciousness. The battle that develops if we achieve what we intend to achieve – namely to incite the *Ich* to overcome its resistances – is carried out under our direction and with our assistance. It doesn't matter what its outcome is, whether it leads to the *Ich* adopting a rejected drive-demand after submitting to fresh examination, or if it dismisses it

again, this time for good. In both cases, a constant danger has been eliminated, the scope of the *Ich* has been broadened, and a wasteful expenditure of energy has been made unnecessary.

Overcoming resistances is the part of our work that takes up the most time and is the greatest trouble. However, it is also worth it, for it brings about an advantageous transformation in the *Ich*; a transformation that will be maintained and will stand the test of life quite regardless of the outcome of transference. At the same time, we have also worked to remove the change within the *Ich* that had come about under the influence of the unconscious, for whenever we were able to demonstrate the existence of such progeny within the *Ich*, we pointed out their illegitimate origins and incited the *Ich* to reject them. We will recall that one of the conditions we attached to our assistance when we did our deal was that a change of this type within the *Ich* caused by an unconscious element storming it was not to exceed a certain measure.

The further our work progresses, and the more deeply we come to understand the psyche of neurotics, the more clearly are we pressed to recognize two new factors that demand the closest attention as sources of resistance. Both are completely unknown to the patient, and neither could be taken into account when we made our deal; moreover, they don't come from the patient's *Ich*. Whilst we can draw them together under the single phrase 'the need to be ill or to suffer', their origins differ, although there is an affinity between them as regards their nature. The first of these two factors

is the feeling of guilt, or consciousness of guilt, as it is called, disregarding the fact that the patient neither feels nor recognizes it. It is evidently the contribution to resistance made by an *Über-Ich* that has become particularly harsh and cruel. The individual shall not become healthy: he shall remain ill, for he deserves nothing better. This resistance doesn't actually disrupt our intellectual work but it does render it ineffectual; indeed, it often allows us to dispose of one form of neurotic suffering, but is immediately ready to replace it by another illness – a somatic one, if it comes to it. This consciousness of guilt also explains the phenomenon that we see every now and again whereby severe neurosis is cured or improved by real misfortunes; for the only thing that matters is that the individual is wretched, irrespective of how. The uncomplaining resignation with which such people often bear their hard fate is most remarkable, but is also revealing. In defending ourselves against this resistance, we have to restrict ourselves to making it conscious and to the attempt to slowly dismantle the hostile *Über-Ich*.

It is less easy to prove the existence of another form of resistance, a form that we find ourselves particularly ill-equipped to fight against. Among the neurotics, there are people in whom, to judge from all their reactions, the self-preservation drive has undergone a reversal. They seem to be set on nothing other than self-harm and self-destruction. The individuals who really do ultimately commit suicide perhaps belong to this group of people, too. We suppose that in their case, extensive drive de-mergences have taken place, which

have resulted in the liberation of excessive quantities of the destruction-drive that are turned inwards. Such patients can't endure being restored to health by our treatment, and resist it with every means at their disposal. But we do have to admit that this is a case that we have not entirely succeeded in explaining yet.

Let us now survey the situation that we have put ourselves into by trying to help the neurotic *Ich*. This *Ich* can no longer fulfil the tasks set for it by the external world, including human society. It doesn't have all its experiences at its disposal; a large portion of its memory bank has gone astray. Its activity is arrested by the strict prohibitions of the *Über-Ich*; its energy is eaten up by vain attempts to defend itself against the demands of the *Es*. Moreover, as a result of the continuing incursions of the *Es*, its organization is damaged; it is split; it can no longer create any kind of orderly synthesis; it is torn apart by mutually opposing urges, unresolved conflicts, and unrelieved doubts. The first thing we do is allow the patient's weakened *Ich* to take part in the purely intellectual work of interpretation, which strives provisionally to fill the gaps in his psyche; we have the authority of his *Über-Ich* transferred onto us – and then we incite it to take up the cudgels over every single demand made by the *Es* and to conquer the resistances that arise in the process. At the same time, we reinstate the order in his *Ich* by tracking down the material and urges that have penetrated it from the unconscious and by exposing them to criticism by tracing them back to their origins. We serve the patient in various functions: as authority and parent substitute; as teacher and educator; we will

have served him best if we manage in our capacity as analysts to raise the psychical processes in his *Ich* onto a normal level, transform material that has become unconscious, repressed, into *preconscious* material and thus give it back to the *Ich*. So far as the patient is concerned, we find a few of his rational factors work in our favour, such as his need (motivated by his suffering) to get better and the intellectual interest that we can awaken in him for what psychoanalysis can teach and reveal to us all. Of far greater force, however, is the positive transference with which he meets us. Fighting against us, on the other hand, are the negative transference, the repression-resistance of the *Ich* (its unpleasure at having to expose itself to the hard work imposed on it), the feelings of guilt provoked by its relationship with the *Über-Ich*, and the need to be ill, resulting from far-reaching changes to its drive-economy. Whether we can describe the patient's particular case as a mild or severe one depends on the degree to which the two latter factors are involved. Apart from these, we can recognize a few other factors that can be considered to have a favourable or unfavourable effect. A certain psychical lethargy or a sluggishness of the libido that doesn't want to abandon its fixations can't be welcome to us; the person's capacity to sublimate his drives plays a large role, as does his capacity to raise himself above the crude life of the drives and the relative power of his intellectual functions.

Rather than being disappointed by this, we find it entirely understandable if we come to the conclusion that the final outcome of the battle that we have entered into depends on quantitative

relations – on the amount of energy that we can mobilize in the patient to our advantage, as compared to the sum of energy of the forces operating against us. Here, again, God is with the stronger battalions. It is true that we don't always emerge victorious, but we can at least mostly see why the victory was not ours. Anyone who has followed our explanations only out of therapeutic interest will probably turn away contemptuously after this admission. But here we are concerned with the therapy only in so far as it works with psychological means; at the moment we have no others. The future may tell us how we can use particular chemicals to directly influence the amounts of energy and their distribution in the psychical apparatus. Perhaps other therapeutic possibilities, as yet unimagined, will also present themselves. But for the time being we have nothing better at our disposal than the psychoanalytical technique – and for that reason, despite its limitations, we ought not to despise it.

Chapter 7: a Sample of Psychoanalytical Work

We have obtained for ourselves a generalized knowledge of the psychical apparatus, of the parts, organs, and authorities that it consists of, of the forces that operate within it, and of the functions entrusted to its parts. Neurosis and psychosis are the states that express disturbances to the function of the apparatus. We have chosen the neuroses as an object for study, for they alone seem to be accessible to the psychological methods of our interference.

While we are making an effort to influence them, we gather the observations that will give us a picture of where and how they arise.

We want to mention one of our main findings in advance of our portrayal. Unlike infectious diseases, for example, the neuroses are not caused by some specific thing. It would be quite pointless to go looking for pathogens in their case. For one thing, they merge imperceptibly with the so-called norm; and, on the other hand, there is barely a single supposedly 'normal' state in which we could not point out indications of neurotic traits. Neurotics are equipped with pretty much the same innate constitution as everyone else; they experience the same things; they have no different tasks to perform. So why are their lives so much worse, so much more difficult? Why do they suffer more unpleasurable feelings, more fear and pain in the process?

We need not leave this question unanswered. What are responsible for the shortcomings and sufferings of neurotics are quantitative *disharmonies*. Indeed, the causation of *all* the forms of the human psyche is to be sought in the reciprocal action between innate dispositions and adventitious experiences. At one point, the disposition of a particular drive may be too strong or weak; a particular capacity may be stunted or may not have developed sufficiently during the individual's life. On the other hand, external impressions and experiences can make demands of varying strength on different individuals, and what one person's constitution can deal

with may present an impossible task for another's. These quantitative differences will determine the variety of possible outcomes.

However, we shall very soon realize that this is not a satisfactory explanation. It is too general; it explains too much. Our specified aetiology does apply to all cases of psychical suffering, misery and paralysis – but not all these states can be called neurotic. The neuroses have specific characteristics; they are a special type of misery. Thus we must expect that we will after all be able to find specific causes for them; or we can come up with the notion that, of all the tasks that the psyche has to deal with, there are some that defeat it particularly easily – which means that we could say, without having to retract our previous remarks, that the peculiarity of neurotic phenomena, often so remarkable, would be derived from this. If it remains the case that the neuroses are essentially no different from the norm, then the study of them promises to deliver us valuable contributions to our knowledge of this norm. In the process, we shall perhaps discover the 'weak spots' of a normal organization.

The above supposition is confirmed. Analytical experiences teach us that there really is one drive-demand that tends to be dealt with either unsuccessfully or with only partial success; and that there is a particular period of life that exclusively or predominantly merits consideration so far as the formation of neurosis is concerned. Both the nature of the drive and the period of life are factors that

demand to be considered separately, although they have much to do with one another.

We can comment with some degree of certainty on the role played by the period of life. It appears that neuroses are acquired only in early childhood (up until the age of six), although the symptoms may not appear until much later. Childhood neurosis may manifest itself for a short time, or may even be overlooked. In all cases, later neurotic illness links up with this prelude in childhood. So-called traumatic neurosis (caused by extreme terror or severe somatic shocks such as railway collisions, being buried alive, and such like) is perhaps an exception to this; its relationship to the determining factors of infancy has thus far eluded investigation. It is easy to account for the aetiological preference for the first period of childhood. The neuroses, as we know, are disorders of the *Ich*, and it is hardly surprising that the *Ich*, so long as it is weak, unformed, and incapable of resistance, fails to master tasks that it could deal with later on with its eyes shut, so to speak. (In these cases, the drive-demands from within, like the excitations from the external world, act as 'traumas' – especially if they encounter certain tendencies.) The helpless *Ich* defends itself against them by making attempts to flee (repressions), which later turn out to be inexpedient and mean permanent restrictions on its further development. The damage done to the *Ich* by its first experiences seems to us to be disproportionately large, but if we want an analogy, we need only think of the differences between the effect of a needle being stuck into a mass of cells that are in the process of cell-division (as in the

experiments of Roux) and that of it being stuck into the finished animal that the cells have later turned into. No human individual is spared traumatic experiences of this kind; none is absolved from the repressions that they give rise to. These dubious reactions of the *Ich* are perhaps indispensable for it to achieve another goal that it sets for itself for the same period of life. Within the space of only a few years, the little primitive is supposed to have turned into a civilized human child; is supposed to have completed an immensely long stretch of human civilized development in an almost uncannily abbreviated form. This is made possible by whatever pre-dispositions it inherits but it can, moreover, almost never do without the assistance of its upbringing, of the parents' influence that is a precursor of the *Über-Ich* in that it circumscribes the activity of the *Ich* through rules and punishments, and encourages or enforces repressions to be carried out. Nor ought we to forget, therefore, the influence of civilization when it comes to the factors conditioning neurosis. We recognize that it is easy for the barbarian to be healthy, whereas it is a difficult task for the civilized human. We may find the yearning for a strong, uninhibited *Ich* perfectly comprehensible; but, as our current age shows us, it is in the most profound sense inimical to civilization. And, since the demands of civilization are represented by the upbringing in the family, we must also bear in mind this biological characteristic of the human species, the extended period of childhood dependency, when we are considering the aetiology of neurosis.

So far as the other point, the specific drive-factor, is concerned, we discover an interesting dissonance between theory and practice. Theoretically speaking, there is no reason not to suppose that any old drive-demand could give rise to the same repressions with all their consequences; but our observations frequently show us, so far as we can judge, that the excitations that play this pathogenic role arise from the partial drives of sexual life. The symptoms of neurosis are always, so one might argue, either substitute gratifications for some sexual urge or another, or measures to prevent them being gratified; they are as a rule compromises between the two, of the kind that come about according to the laws of oppositions that apply to the unconscious. At this moment in time the gap in our theory can't be filled; the decision is made all the more difficult by the fact that most sexual urges are not purely erotic in nature, but are the product of erotic drives and elements of the destruction-drive being combined with one another. However, there can be no doubt that the drives that manifest themselves in a physiological sense as sexuality play a prominent, unexpectedly large role in the causation of neurosis – though it remains to be seen whether it is an exclusive one. We also have to bear in mind that no other function has been so energetically and comprehensively rejected over the course of cultural development as precisely the sexual one. Our theory will have to make do with a few hints that point to a more profound connection: the fact that the first period of childhood, when the *Ich* begins to differentiate itself from the *Es*, is also the period of early sexual blossoming, which the latency period

puts an end to; that it can hardly happen by chance that this momentous 'prehistory' is later subject to infantile amnesia; and, finally, that biological changes in the sexual life – such as precisely this two-phased onset of the function, the loss of the periodicity of sexual arousal and the transformation in the relationship between female menstruation and male excitation – must have been highly significant for man's evolution from animals. It remains for the science of the future to put these isolated pieces of data together to come to a new view. It is not psychology but biology that shows a gap here. It would perhaps not be unjustified to say that the weak spot in the organization of the *Ich* lay in the way it related to the sexual function, as if the biological opposition between self-preservation and species-preservation had here managed to create for itself a form of psychological expression. If analytical experience has convinced us that the assertion we hear so often – that the child is, psychologically speaking, the father of the man, and that the experiences of his early years are of unsurpassable significance for his entire later life – is totally correct, then it will be of particular interest to us if there is one special thing that we can take to be the central experience of this period of childhood. Our attention is firstly attracted by the effects of certain influences that don't apply to all children, although they appear often enough – such as the sexual abuse of children by adults; their being seduced by other, slightly older, children (brothers or sisters); and, unexpectedly enough, their being deeply affected by taking part (as visual or aural witnesses) in adults' (their parents') sexual deeds, mostly at a

time when we would not believe them either to be interested in or to understand such processes, nor to be able to remember them later on. It is easy to establish the extent to which the child's sexual receptiveness is awakened by such experiences and the extent to which his own sexual urges are forced down certain paths that he can never leave again. Since these impressions are subjected to repression either immediately or as soon as they try to return as memories, they set up the conditions for the neurotic obsessions that will later make it impossible for the *Ich* to master the sexual function and will probably make it turn away from it permanently. The latter reaction will result in a neurosis; if it fails to appear, then manifold perversions develop – or the function, so immeasurably important both for reproduction and for the entire shaping of life, will become totally insubordinate.

Instructive though such cases may be, the influence of another situation commands an even greater degree of interest. This is a situation that all children are destined to experience and that is necessarily derived from the factor of the extended period during which the child is looked after and during which it lives together with its parents. By this, I mean the *Oedipus complex*, so called because its essential content recurs in the Greek legend of King Oedipus, which has, luckily, been preserved for us by a great dramatist. The Greek hero kills his father and takes his mother as his wife. The fact that he does this unawares – by not recognizing them as his parents – is a divergence from the analytical facts of the

matter, which we can easily understand and which, indeed, we can even recognize as inevitable.

Here, we have to depict the development of boys and girls – males and females – separately, for it is now that the difference between the sexes expresses itself psychologically for the first time. The biological fact of the duality of the sexes presents itself to us as a great enigma; this represents one of the ultimate facts of our knowledge, defying all attempts to trace it back to anything else. Psychoanalysis has contributed nothing to explaining this problem; it clearly belongs entirely to biology. In the psyche we find only reflections of that great opposition, which are made difficult to interpret by a fact we have long suspected, namely that no individual being is restricted to one sex's ways of reacting but always allows a certain amount of room for those of the opposite sex too – in just the same way that the body bears the atrophied and often useless rudiments of the opposite sex's organs alongside the developed organs of its own. An empirical and conventional equation that is quite clearly inadequate serves to distinguish the male from the female in the psyche. We call everything that is strong and active 'male' and everything that is weak and passive 'female'. This fact that there is also *psychological* bisexuality weighs upon all our investigations, making it difficult for us to describe them.

The child's first erotic object is the maternal breast that feeds it; love arises on the pattern of the gratified need for nourishment. At

first, the child certainly doesn't distinguish between the breast and its own body; when the breast then has to be separated from the child's own body, transferred 'outwards' because he so often finds it absent, it takes part of the originally narcissistic libido-investment with it as an 'object'. Later on, the whole person of the mother comes to constitute this initial object; she not only nourishes the child but also cares for it and thus awakens a number of other physical sensations within it – both pleasurable and unpleasurable. In taking care of the child's bodily needs, she becomes its first seductress. The significance of the mother – unique, incomparable, unalterable throughout the whole of the individual's life – is rooted in these two relations; she is the first and strongest love-object, the paradigm for all later love-relationships – for both sexes. In all this, phylogeny has the upper hand over the individual's personal, accidental experiences to such an extent that it makes no difference whether the child really did suck at the breast or whether it was in fact bottle-fed and thus never enjoyed the tenderness of maternal care. In both cases, the individual's development takes the same course; indeed, in the latter case, the later yearning may become all the more intense. And, regardless of how long the child was nourished by its mother's breast, it will always remain convinced once it has been weaned that it was not long enough, and that she did not give it enough food.

This introduction is not superfluous; it can enhance our understanding of the intensity of the Oedipus complex. Once the boy has entered the phallic phase of his libido-development (from

two to three years old), has obtained pleasurable sensations from his sexual organ, and has learned how to create these for himself whenever he feels like it through manual stimulation, he becomes the mother's lover. He desires to possess her physically in the ways he has divined from his observations and notions of sexual life; he tries to seduce her by showing her his male member, his pride and joy. In short, his early awakened maleness tries to replace his father in her affections – the father who has already been his envied role-model up to this point due to the physical strength which he perceives in him and due to the authority in which he sees him clothed. Now the father is the rival who stands in his way, and whom he wishes to get rid of. If his father happened to be away and he was allowed to share his mother's bed, only to find himself banished from it again on his father's return, then it comes to make a profound impression on him that his father's disappearance means gratification, and his re-emergence means disappointment. This is the content of the Oedipus complex, which the Greek legend has translated from the child's fantasy world into supposed reality. In our particular cultural circumstances, a terrible end normally awaits it.

The mother understands perfectly well that the boy's sexual arousal relates to her own person. At some point, she reflects that it is wrong to allow it to continue, and she believes she is doing the right thing if she forbids him to manipulate his member. This ban, though, is of little use; at the most, it brings about a modification in the *method* of self-gratification. Eventually, the mother resorts to

the severest measure: she threatens to take the thing away from him which he is using to defy her. She usually attributes the responsibility for carrying out this threat to the father, in order to make it more terrifying and believable. She, so she says, will tell Father, and he will chop the organ off. Strangely enough, this threat is only effective if another condition is fulfilled both beforehand and afterwards.[10] In itself, it seems all too unimaginable to the boy that such a thing could happen. But if, when he is threatened, he can recall what female genitals look like, or if he encounters such genitals shortly afterwards – where this part of the body, prized above all else, really is absent – then he believes in the gravity of what he has heard and, becoming enmired in the *castration complex*, experiences the most severe trauma of his young life.[11]

The effects of the castration threat are manifold and quite enormous; they affect all the boy's dealings with his parents and, later, with men and women as a whole. Mostly, the child's maleness can't stand up to this initial shock. In order to rescue his sexual organ, he more or less entirely renounces all ownership of the mother; his sexual life frequently remains burdened by this ban for ever more. If a strong female component – as we put it – is present in him, then it gains strength from his maleness being intimidated. He gets into a passive attitude vis-à-vis his father such as he ascribes to his mother. As a result of the threat he has indeed given up masturbating – but he has not abandoned the flights of fantasy that accompany it. On the contrary, as they are now the sole form of sexual gratification remaining for him, they are nurtured more than

ever before – and in these fantasies he does indeed still identify with his father but at the same time, perhaps even predominantly, he identifies with the mother. Offshoots and modified products of these early onanistic fantasies tend to find their way into his later *Ich* and play a role in his character-formation. Fear and hatred of his father will become hugely increased, quite apart from such furtherance of his femaleness. The boy's maleness as it were withdraws and turns into a defiant attitude towards his father, one that will obsessively dictate his later conduct in the human community. As a left-over of his erotic fixation on his mother, an excessively large dependence on her sets in, which will persist in later life as servitude towards women. He no longer dares to love his mother – but nor can he risk not being loved by her, for this would put him in danger of her betraying him to his father and of being delivered up to castration. The whole experience, with all its pre-conditions and consequences, of which our account could give only a selection, falls victim to the most energetic repression; and, as is permitted by the laws of the unconscious *Es*, all the competing emotional impulses and reactions that were activated then remain preserved in the unconscious, ready to disrupt the later development of the *Ich* after puberty. If the somatic process of sexual maturity gives a new lease of life to libido fixations that have apparently been overcome, then sexual life will prove to be inhibited; it will lack unity, and will collapse into conflicting urges.

To be sure, the incursion of the castration threat in the boy's burgeoning sexual life doesn't always have these dreaded

consequences. Again, the amount of damage done and the amount of damage avoided will depend on quantitative relations. The entire occurrence, which we may very probably regard as the central experience of childhood, the greatest problem of early life and the most powerful source of later inadequacy, is so fundamentally forgotten that when we try to reconstruct it in the analysis of adults, it meets with the most decided disbelief. Indeed, they are so averse to it that they want to silence any mention of this taboo subject and, with peculiar intellectual blindness, fail to recognize the most obvious reminders of it. Thus, for instance, one hears it said that the Oedipus legend doesn't actually have anything to do with the interpretation put upon it by psychoanalysis; that this, so it is claimed, is a quite different case since, after all, Oedipus didn't realize that it was his father he had murdered and his mother that he had married. In putting forward this kind of argument, people fail to recognize that an approach such as the psychoanalytical one is essential to an attempt to give this material poetic form, and that it doesn't introduce anything alien, but simply skilfully brings out the theme's given factors. Oedipus' ignorance is the legitimate representation of the unconsciousness into which the entire experience is sunken for adults. And the compulsion of the oracle that makes – or is supposed to make – the hero innocent is a recognition of the inevitability of the fate that has condemned all sons to live through the Oedipus complex. When on an earlier occasion it was pointed out from psychoanalytical quarters how easily the riddle of another literary hero, Shakespeare's

procrastinator Hamlet, could be solved with reference to the Oedipus complex – since of course the prince fails in his task of punishing another person for something that matches up with his own Oedipal desires – then the general lack of understanding from the literary world demonstrated the huge extent to which the mass of humans were prepared to cling to their infantile repressions.[12]

And yet, more than a century before the emergence of psychoanalysis, the Frenchman Diderot testified to the significance of the Oedipus complex, expressing the difference between the primitive age and the civilized one in this sentence: *Si le petit sauvage était abandonné à lui-même, qu'il conservât toute son imbécillité, et qu'il réunît au peu de raison de l'enfant au berceau la violence des passions de l'homme de trente ans, il tordrait le col à son père et coucherait avec sa mère.*[13] Even if psychoanalysis could boast of no other achievement than uncovering the repressed Oedipus complex, I would venture to say that this alone would give it a claim to be classified among the most valuable new acquisitions of mankind.

In the little girl's case, the effects of the castration complex are more uniform and no less profound. The female child doesn't, of course, have to fear losing her penis; however, she does have to react to not having had one in the first place. Right from the start, she envies the boy his possession; indeed, one could say that her whole development takes place under the influence of penis envy. Initially, she makes vain attempts to do the same as boys; and later

on she makes more successful attempts to compensate for her defect – attempts that can ultimately lead to a normal female attitude. If during the phallic phase she tries like the boy to create pleasurable sensations in her genitals by manually stimulating them, then she often fails to obtain sufficient gratification, and the judgement she has made about the inferiority of her atrophied penis becomes extended to her whole person. As a rule, she soon abandons masturbation because she doesn't want to be reminded of the superiority of her brother or playmate, and she turns her back on sexuality altogether.

If the little woman persists in her first wish – to become a 'little boy' – she will end up being manifestly homosexual (in the most extreme cases) or will otherwise demonstrate pronounced male characteristics in later life: she will choose a 'male' career and such like. The alternative path runs via abandoning the beloved mother whom the daughter, influenced by penis envy, can't forgive for having sent her out into the world so ill-equipped. Full of resentment about this, she renounces the mother and substitutes another person for her as a love-object – namely the father. If someone has lost a love-object, then the obvious thing to do is to identify with it, to as it were replace it from within by identification. Here, this mechanism comes to the little girl's aid. The identification with the mother can now dissolve the initial attachment to her. The little daughter puts herself into her mother's place, as she has always done in her games; she wants to replace her in her father's affections, and, having previously loved her mother,

she now has double motivation to hate her: she is jealous, as well as hurt by being denied a penis. Her new relationship with her father may initially consist of her desire to have his penis at her disposal; however, it culminates in another desire, namely for him to give her the gift of a baby. Thus the desire for a baby has taken the place of the desire for a penis – or has, at least, separated itself from it.

It is interesting to see that the relationship between the Oedipus and castration complexes takes such a different – even opposing – form in women from the one it takes in men. In the case of the latter, so we have heard, the threat of castration puts an end to the Oedipus complex; whereas in the case of the woman, we discover the opposite: she is forced into the Oedipus complex due to the effect of lacking a penis. It does little damage to the woman if she remains in her female Oedipal attitude (the name 'Electra complex' has been suggested for this). Such a woman will go on to choose her husband for his fatherly characteristics and will be prepared to recognize his authority. Her yearning for a penis, which is in fact insatiable, can only be gratified if she succeeds in rounding out her love for the organ into a love for the person who bears it – just as had happened earlier when she progressed from loving the mother's breast to loving the mother's entire person.

If we ask an analyst about which of his patients' psychical formations have, in his experience, proved themselves least inaccessible to influence, then the answer will be thus: in the woman's case, it is the desire for a penis; in the man's case, it is his

female attitude towards his own sex – which, of course, has the loss of his penis as its premiss.

Part Three: What We Gain For Our Theory

Chapter 8: The Psychical Apparatus and the External World

Even all the very general insights and premisses that we listed in our first chapter were, of course, obtained through arduous and patient detailed work, of which type the previous chapter gave us an example. We may now find it tempting to assess the ways in which our knowledge has been enriched by such work, and what sorts of paths to further progress we have opened up. In this respect we may be struck by the fact that we were so often compelled to venture beyond the boundaries of psychological science. The phenomena we were dealing with don't only belong to psychology, but also have an organic-biological dimension and, accordingly, we have also made some significant biological discoveries in our attempts to build up psychoanalysis, and we have not been able to avoid coming up with new biological hypotheses too.

However, to stay with psychology for the moment: we have recognized that it is not scientifically feasible to distinguish between what is psychically normal and psychically *abnormal*, so this distinction – despite its practical importance – has only a conventional value attached to it. We have thus established the right to understand the normal life of the psyche from its disruptions – something that would not be permitted if these states

of illness, neuroses and psychoses, had specific causes that operated along the lines of foreign bodies.

The key to understanding the psychical ailments that are permanent and life-damaging was put into our hands by studying a psychical disturbance during sleep – one that is fleeting, harmless, indeed serves a useful function. And we can now venture to assert that the psychology of consciousness was no better capable of understanding the normal functions of the psyche than it was of understanding dreams. The data of conscious self-perception, which alone were at its disposal, have proved themselves to be in every respect inadequate to grasp the wealth and complications of the psychical processes, to uncover the connections between them and thus to recognize the conditions under which they are disrupted.

Our postulate of a psychical apparatus that is spatially extended, expediently constructed, and developed according to the needs of life, an apparatus that gives rise to the phenomena of consciousness only in one particular place and under certain conditions, has enabled us to develop the science of psychology on the same sort of basis as any other natural science, such as, for example, physics. Here, as there, the task consists of discovering something else behind the characteristics (qualities) of the object of research that are directly given to our perception – something that is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and that approximates more closely to what we suppose to be the real facts of the matter. We don’t hope to be able to approach these

themselves, for we see that everything new that we have inferred has after all to be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which we simply can't now escape. But this just is the nature and limitation of our science. It is as if we were saying in physics: 'if we could see that clearly, we would find that the apparently solid body consists of small parts of such and such a shape, size, and respective position'. In the meantime, we keep trying with artificial means to improve the effectiveness of our sense organs to the utmost, although we can't really expect all such efforts to make any difference to the eventual outcome: 'reality' will always remain 'unknowable'. The gain brought to light by scientific work on our primary sense-perceptions will consist of insights into connections and dependencies that are present in the external world, that can somehow or another be reliably reproduced or mirrored in the internal world of our thoughts, and the knowledge of which enables us to 'understand' something in the external world, to predict it and, possibly, to change it. We proceed in much the same way in psychoanalysis. We have found the technical means that enable us to fill the gaps in the phenomena of our consciousness and we avail ourselves of these means in the same way as a physicist would experiments. In this way, we deduce a certain number of processes that are in themselves 'unknowable', link them with those we are conscious of, and when we say, for example, that 'an unconscious memory has intervened here', then what that actually means is: 'something has happened here that's totally beyond us – but something that could only have been

described in such and such a way if it had ever come to consciousness'.

What right we have to draw such conclusions and make such interpolations, and the degree of certainty we can attach to them, remains, of course, open to criticism in each individual case, and we can't deny that it is often very difficult to decide – this difficulty being expressed in the lack of agreement among analysts. The novelty of the task is to blame for this – that is to say, the lack of training; but there is also a particular factor inherent in the subject, for psychology, unlike physics, doesn't always deal with things that can awaken only a cool, scientific interest. Thus we won't be too surprised if a female analyst, insufficiently convinced as to the intensity of her own desire for a penis, doesn't give this factor its due recognition in the case of her patients either. However, such sources of error from the personal element are ultimately of little significance. If we read old textbooks on the use of microscopes, then we are amazed to discover what extraordinary demands were made on the personality of those observers using the instrument in the days when the technology was still new – something that is not mentioned at all today.

We can't set ourselves the task of outlining a complete picture of the psychical apparatus and what it does; even if we were to do so, we would in any case find ourselves hampered by the fact that psychoanalysis has not yet had time to study all the functions

equally. Therefore I shall content myself with a detailed recapitulation of what I told you in the introductory chapter.

The dark *Es*, then, forms the core of our being; it has no direct contact with the external world and is accessible even to our knowledge only as mediated by another entity. The organic *drives* operate in this *Es*; they themselves consist of a fusion between two primal forces (Eros and destruction) that are combined together in varying proportions and are differentiated from one another by their relationship to the organs or organ-systems. The sole thing these drives strive for is gratification, and they expect to arrive at this by way of certain changes in the organs achieved with help from objects in the external world. However, the kind of immediate and heedless gratification of the drives that the *Es* demands would often enough lead to dangerous conflicts with the external world and to extinction. The *Es* is not in the slightest bit solicitous about ensuring the continuation of existence, and it knows no fear – or it would perhaps be more correct to say that it can indeed develop sensory elements of fear, but can't make use of them. The processes that are possible in and between the postulated psychical elements in the *Es* (the *primary process)* differ considerably from those which are known to us through conscious perception in our intellectual and emotional life; moreover, they are not subject to the critical restrictions of logic that rejects some parts of these processes as inadmissible and wants to annul them.

The *Es*, cut off from the external world, has its own world of perception. With extraordinary acuteness, it senses certain changes within itself, especially the fluctuations in the tension of the needs of its drives, which come to consciousness as sensations in the pleasure-unpleasure series. Granted, it is difficult to specify in which ways these perceptions come about and which sensory terminal organs help them to do so. But it is a fact that the self-perceptions – the vital sense, and sensations of pleasure or unpleasure – rule the processes in the *Es* with despotic violence. The *Es* obeys the unrelenting pleasure principle. This, however, doesn't apply to the *Es* alone. It seems that the activity of the other psychical forces is also capable only of modifying the pleasure principle, not of cancelling it out; and when and how the pleasure principle is overcome at all remains, theoretically speaking, a highly significant question, and one that has not been answered so far. The consideration that the pleasure principle demands a reduction – basically, perhaps, an extinction – of the tension of needs (*nirvana*) – leads to the relationships, as yet unassessed, of the pleasure principle to the two primal forces, Eros and the death drive.

The other psychical force which we think we understand best and in which we are most likely to recognize ourselves, the so-called *Ich*, has developed from the cortical layer of the *Es*, which is in direct contact with the external world (reality) by its being set up to receive and exclude stimuli. Starting from conscious perception, it has subjected ever greater areas and deeper layers of the *Es* to its influence, and shows in its persisting dependency on the external

world the ineradicable stamp of its origins (a bit like, for instance, being marked 'made in Germany'). Psychologically speaking, its job consists of raising the processes in the *Es* on to a higher dynamic level (by, say, transforming freely flowing energy into bound energy, as it corresponds with the preconscious state); what it does for the construction of the psyche is that, between a drive-demand and a gratificatory action, it switches on the faculty of thought, which seeks by means of trial actions to calculate the success of the intended undertakings according to its orientation in the present and its evaluation of earlier experiences. In this way, the *Ich* comes to a decision about whether the attempt at gratification should be carried out or postponed, or whether the demand of the drive might not have to be entirely suppressed as something dangerous (this is the *reality principle)*. Just as the *Es* sets out exclusively in search of gaining pleasure, so the *Ich* is ruled by a consideration for security. The *Ich* has set itself the task of self-preservation, which the *Es* seems to neglect, and avails itself of the sensations of fear as a signal that heralds dangers threatening its integrity. Since memory-traces can become conscious just as much as perceptions, especially through their associations with the remnants of language, the possibility exists here of confusion arising that would lead to a misreading of reality. The *Ich* protects itself against this through the device of *reality-testing*, which is allowed to lapse in dreams because of the conditions prevailing while the individual is asleep. Dangers threaten the *Ich*, which wants to assert itself against the excessively powerful mechanical forces that surround it, forces that primarily,

though not exclusively, come from external reality. Our own *Es* is a source of similar dangers for two different reasons. First, excessively strong drives can damage the *Ich* in a similar way to the excessively great 'stimuli' of the external world. They can't, it is true, destroy it; however, they *can* probably destroy its unique dynamic organization and can turn the *Ich* back into being part of the *Es*. Second, experience may have taught the *Ich* that gratifying a drive-demand that is in itself not intolerable would bring dangers in the external world with it, so that in this way the drive-demand itself becomes a danger. The *Ich,* then, does battle on two fronts: it has to defend its existence against an external world that threatens to destroy it, as well as against an all-too-demanding internal world. It uses the same methods of defence against both, but the defence against the inner enemy is particularly inadequate. As a result of its original identity with the inner dangers and of having lived with them on the most intimate terms since then, it is very difficult for it to escape them. They remain threats, even if they can be temporarily kept under control. We have heard that the weak and immature *Ich* of the first period of childhood is permanently damaged by the stresses imposed on it by its attempts to defend itself against the dangers that are part of this period of life. The child is protected against the dangers that threaten it from the external world by the solicitude of its parents; it pays for this security through a fear of *loss of love* that would deliver it up, helpless, to the dangers of the external world. This factor expresses its decisive influence on the outcome of the conflict when the little

boy gets into the Oedipal situation, in which the threat to his narcissism of castration, reinforced by primeval factors, gets the better of him. Driven by the combination of the two influences – the current, objective danger and the remembered, phylogenetically based, one – the child undertakes his attempts at defence – repressions – which, despite serving a purpose at that moment, none the less prove themselves to be psychologically inadequate if the later revival of the sexual life strengthens the drive-demands that were rebuffed in the past. Viewed in a biological light, the explanation for this would have to be that the *Ich* fails in its task of mastering the excitations of early sexual life – something that it is not qualified to do at this point because of its immaturity. We can see the essential pre-condition for neurosis in the way that the development of the *Ich* lags behind that of the libido, and we can't avoid coming to the conclusion that neurosis could be avoided if the childish *Ich* were spared this task – if, that is, infantile sexual life were granted its freedom, as happens in the case of many primitive peoples. The aetiology of neurotic illness is possibly more complicated than is described here; but if that is so, then we have at least chosen to describe an essential thread of the aetiological knot. Nor must we forget the phylogenetic influences that are represented somehow in the *Es* in forms as yet unfathomable to us, and that will certainly have a stronger effect on the *Ich* in that early phase than they will later. On the other hand, it begins to dawn on us that such an early attempt to dam in the sex drive, such a decisively partisan stance on the part of the young *Ich* in favour of the external world

as opposed to the internal one as comes about due to the ban on childhood sexuality, can't fail to have an effect on the individual's later cultural adaptability. The drive-demands forced away from direct gratification are compelled to take new routes that lead to substitute gratification and can, whilst taking these diversions, become desexualized and can loosen the connection with their original drive-aims. By saying this, we are anticipating the assertion that much of what our culture possesses and so highly prizes was gained at the expense of sexuality, through restrictions being imposed on sexual driving forces.

If we have had to emphasize repeatedly up to now that the *Ich* has its relationship to the objective external world to thank for its existence as well as for the most important characteristics it has acquired, we have at least prepared ourselves to assume that sickness – the state in which the *Ich* again most clearly approximates to the *Es* – is founded on this relationship to the external world being relaxed or dissolved. This ties in very well with clinical experience telling us that the trigger for an outbreak of psychosis is either reality becoming unbearably painful, or the drives becoming extraordinarily intensified – which, given the rival claims made by the *Es* and the external world on the *Ich*, necessarily has the same effect. The problem of psychosis would be simple and transparent if *Ich* and reality could be completely separated. But that seems to happen only rarely, perhaps never. Even in states that are so far removed from external reality as, for instance, hallucinatory confusion (amentia) we discover from what the sick people tell us

once they have recovered that, while they were ill, a normal person was hiding in a corner of their psyche (as they put it) – a person who, like a detached observer, let the whole illness business pass him by. I don't know if we can assume it always to be thus, but I can report similar things about other psychoses that take a less tempestuous course. I have in mind a case of chronic paranoia in which every attack of jealousy was followed by a dream which brought to the analyst's attention a correct, undeluded version of its trigger. Thus this interesting conflict presented itself: while the dreams of neurotics normally allow us to deduce jealousy that is alien to their waking life, in the case of psychotics we find that the dream corrects the delusions that prevail during the day. We may probably take it to be generally true that what we get in all such cases is a psychical *split*. Two psychical perspectives are formed instead of a single one, the one being the normal one that takes reality into account, and the other being the one that, under the influence of the drives, separates the *Ich* from reality. The two exist alongside one another, and the end result depends on their relative strength. If the latter is or becomes the stronger then this provides the pre-condition for psychosis. If this relationship is reversed, then we find that the delusional illness appears to be cured. In truth, though, it has merely retreated into the unconscious; indeed countless observations force us to infer that the delusion was fully formed and lying in wait for a long time before its manifest eruption.

The view that postulates a *splitting of the Ich* in all psychoses could not claim so much attention if it didn't turn out to be applicable to other states which are more similar to the neuroses – and ultimately to the neuroses themselves. I was firstly convinced of this in cases of *fetishism*. This abnormality, which maybe classed as belonging to the perversions, is, as is well known, based on the patient – almost always a male – not acknowledging the female's lack of a penis, this being highly undesirable to him as evidence that his own castration is a possibility. This leads him to deny what his own senses tell him, namely that female genitals lack a penis, and he clings to the opposite conviction. The denied perception does not, however, remain entirely without influence, for he still doesn't have the courage to assert that he did actually see a penis. Rather, he seizes upon something else – a part of the body or an object – and confers on it the role of the penis, which he doesn't want to be without. The thing he seizes on is mostly something which he did genuinely see when looking at the female genitals, or something that is a suitable symbolic substitute for the penis. Now, it would be wrong to call this process of fetish-formation a 'splitting of the *Ich*'; it is a compromise-formation aided by the displacement we have come to know about from dreams. But our observations show us yet more. The fetish was initially created in order to eradicate the evidence of possible castration, in order to avoid the fear of castration: if the female, like other living beings, possesses a penis, then there is no need for the male to be anxious about whether he will continue to possess one himself. However, we then encounter fetishists who

have developed the same fear of castration as non-fetishists, and who react to it in the same way. Thus their behaviour simultaneously expresses two contradictory premisses. On the one hand they deny the very fact that they perceived – that they saw no penis in the female genitals – and on the other hand they acknowledge the female's lack of a penis and draw the right conclusions from this. The two attitudes exist alongside one another for the whole of the individual's life, without influencing one another. *This* is what we can call a *splitting of the Ich*. These facts also allow us to understand why fetishism is so often only partially developed. It does not exclusively dominate the individual's object-choice but leaves space for a greater or lesser degree of normal sexual behaviour; indeed, it sometimes withdraws into a modest role or to a mere allusion. The fetishist has, then, never fully succeeded in detaching the *Ich* from the reality of the external world.

It should not be supposed that fetishism represents an exceptional case with regard to the splitting of the *Ich*: it is simply a particularly suitable object of study for this process. We are returning here to our argument that the childish *Ich*, dominated by the real world, deals with unpleasant drive-demands by means of so-called repression. We can now supplement this with the further remark that, during the same period of life, the *Ich* finds itself often enough in the position of defending itself against a demand of the external world that it experiences as painful; and it does so by *denying* the perceptions that tell it that reality is making this demand. Such

denials occur very often – not only in the case of fetishists – and wherever we get into a position to study them, they prove themselves to be half-measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from reality. A refusal to accept the perceptions is supplemented every time by an acknowledgement of them; two opposing outlooks, independent of one another, always set themselves up – and this results in the splitting of the *Ich*. The outcome depends once again on which of the two can seize for itself the greater intensity.

The facts of the *Ich* being split, which we have described here, are not as new and strange as they might first appear. After all, it is a general characteristic of the neuroses that, with respect to some particular behaviour, two different stances, opposed to one another and independent of one another, exist within the person's psyche; the only difference being that the one belongs to the *Ich*, while the opposing one, being repressed, belongs to the *Es*. The difference between the two cases is essentially a topographical or structural one, and it is not always easy to decide which of the two possibilities we are dealing with in any individual case. However, the important thing they both have in common is the following: whatever the *Ich* undertakes in striving to defend itself – whether it wants to deny a part of the real external world, or to reject a drive-demand of the internal world – the outcome is never a total, complete one. On the contrary, it always gives rise to two opposing stances of which the defeated, weaker one also leads to psychical

complications. To conclude, we need only point out how little our conscious perception tells us about all these processes.

Chapter 9: the Internal World

The only way that we can give an account of complex clusters is to describe their various elements one by one. And consequently, all our explanations are initially guilty of being one-sided simplifications, and wait to be filled out, added to and thereby corrected.

The concept of an *Ich* that mediates between the *Es* and the external world, taking over the drive-demands of the one in order to procure their gratification and making perceptions with respect to the other that it uses as memories; the concept of an *Ich* that, in its concern for self-preservation, wards off excessively strong demands from both sides, all its decisions being dictated in the process by the directive of a modified pleasure principle – this concept actually applies only to the *Ich* as it is until the end of the first period of childhood (around the age of five). At about this time, an important change has taken place. A part of the external world has – partially, at least – been abandoned and has instead been adopted by the *Ich* (through the process of identification); has, that is to say, become part of the internal world. This new psychical authority continues to carry out the functions that those particular abandoned people had performed in the external world: it observes the *Ich*, gives it orders, judges it, and threatens it with punishments

– just like the parents whose place it has occupied. We call this authority the *Über-Ich*, and experience it in its judging capacity as our *conscience*. What is striking is that the *Über-Ich* often develops a severity for which the actual parents have provided no pattern; and also that it calls the *Ich* to account not only for what it does, but also because of thoughts and unfulfilled intentions that the *Über-Ich* somehow seems to be familiar with. This reminds us that the hero of the Oedipus legend, too, feels guilty on account of his deeds and submits to a self-inflicted punishment, even though the compulsion that the oracle put him under ought to acquit him of all blame both in our judgement and in his own. The *Über-Ich* is indeed the legacy of the Oedipus complex and is only set into action once this complex has been dealt with. Thus its excessive severity doesn't follow an actual model, but corresponds to the strength of the defence used against the temptations of the Oedipus complex. The claims of philosophers and believers that man's moral sense isn't instilled into him by his parents or acquired by him as a member of the community but is infused into him from a higher authority are probably based on an inkling of the Oedipal fact.

So long as the *Ich* works in total harmony with the *Über-Ich* it is not easy to distinguish the manifestations of one from those of the other, although tensions and estrangements between them make themselves very clearly apparent. The agony we feel when our conscience reproaches us precisely corresponds to the child's fear of loss of love which was replaced by its moral authority. If, on the other hand, the *Ich* has successfully resisted a temptation to do

something that the *Über-Ich* would find objectionable, then its sense of itself is elevated and its pride is strengthened, as if it had made a valuable acquisition. In such a way, the *Über-Ich* continues to play the role of an external world for the *Ich* – although it has become part of the *internal* world. For the whole of later life, it represents the influence of the individual's childhood – the care and upbringing given to him by his parents, his dependency on them – the childhood that has become so very prolonged in humans because of their living together in families. And it is not only the personal characteristics of the parents that come into play in this process but everything else that has had a determining effect on *them*, too: the proclivities and expectations of the social milieu in which they live; the dispositions and traditions of the race they come from. Someone who preferred to make general assertions and sharp distinctions might say that the external world, in which the individual finds himself exposed when he has detached himself from his parents, represented the power of the present; the *Es*, with its inherited tendencies, represented the organic past; and the *Über-Ich*, the later addition, represented above all the past of the whole civilization that the child is meant to relive, as it were, in the short span of its early period of life. Such generalizations can't easily be generally correct. Some part of our cultural inheritance has certainly left its traces behind in the *Es*; much of what the *Über-Ich* contributes will awaken an echo in the *Es*; the effect of all kinds of things that the child experiences freshly will be intensified because these things are repetitions of some ancient phylogenetic experience. ('You have to

earn what you have inherited from your fathers, to make it your own.'[14]) Thus the *Über-Ich* occupies a kind of middle ground between the *Es* and the external world; in it, the influences of past and present are unified. With the inception of the *Über-Ich,* one has as it were a lived experience of the way in which the present is converted into the past.

Notes

1. This oldest part of the psychical apparatus remains the most important throughout one's entire life. Psychoanalytical research also took this as its starting point.

2. Poets have fantasized about similar things, though nothing that corresponds to this is known from the history of living substance.

3. The philosopher Empedocles of Acragas was already familiar with the portrayal of the basic forces or drives, which many analysts still resist.

4. Cf. the supposition that humans are descended from a mammal that became sexually mature at the age of five. According to this view, the straight course of sexual development was disturbed at around that age by some great external influence. Other changes in the sexual life of humans in comparison to animals could be connected with this, such as, say, the disappearance of the libido's periodicity and the role played by menstruation in the relationships between the sexes.

5. The question arises as to whether the gratification of purely destructive drive-impulses can be felt as pleasure; whether pure destruction can occur without the addition of the libido. Gratification of the death-drive that has remained in the *Ich* seems not to provoke sensations of pleasure, although masochism represents a blending quite analogous to sadism.

6. Early vaginal excitations are often reported; however, this is very probably a case of *clitoral* excitation – that is, excitation in an organ analogous to the penis. This does not stop us being justified in calling the phase 'phallic'.

7. One extreme branch of thought, exemplified by American behaviourism, believes it can found a psychology that ignores this basic fact!

8. [See note 7 to *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: New Series*, p. 171 above.]

9. The analogy would be a non-commissioned officer who has just silently accepted a reprimand from his superior taking out his anger about this on the first unsuspecting private he comes across.

10. [The contradiction here (that this condition be fulfilled *both* beforehand *and* afterwards, followed by the remark that the child *either* recalls having seen the female genitals *or* sees them later on) is Freud's own.]

11. Castration is not missing from the Oedipus legend, either – for the blindness with which Oedipus punishes himself for his crime is,

according to the evidence of dreams, a symbolic substitute for castration. We can't exclude the possibility of a phylogenetic memory-trace being partly responsible for the extraordinarily terrifying effect of the threat – a memory-trace from the prehistory of the primal family, when the jealous father really did rob the son of his genitals if the latter became burdensome for the woman's affections. The ancient custom of circumcision, an alternative symbol for castration, can only be understood as an expression of the son's submission to the father. (Cf. the primitives' puberty rites.) The form taken by the course of events described above in peoples and cultures where childhood masturbation is not suppressed has not yet been investigated.

12. The name 'William Shakespeare' is very probably a pseudonym hiding a great unknown. A man who is thought by some to be the author of Shakespeare's plays, Edward de Veré, Earl of Oxford, lost his beloved and admired father when he was still a boy and completely broke off all relations with his mother, who remarried very soon after her husband's death.

13. ['If the little savage were left to his own devices, such that he retained all his imbecility, and such that he joined to his childish paucity of reason the violent passions of a man of thirty, then he would strangle his father and sleep with his mother', Denis Diderot, *Le neveu de Rameau* (1774). I am grateful to John Reddick and Gerry McCarthy for their great 'Teamwork' (to coin a good German expression) on this French translation!]

14. [Goethe, *Faust*, Pt. I, Sc. 1.]

* *The Ego and the Id* in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* trans. John Reddick (London: Penguin Books, 2003).